"The [Russian] infantry was generally composed of athletic men
... but generally of short stature, ... inured to extremes of weather and hardship;
to the worst and scantiest food;
to marches for days and nights."
- Sir Robert Wilson
"... the Russians are very brave." - Karl von Clausewitz
1. Introduction: Russian Infantry. 2. Equipment. 3. Uniforms. 4. Organization. 5. Training and Tactics. 6. Best Regiments.
"The Russians had to be beaten down
"When desperately wounded, the
In the battle of Valutina Gora, |
Picture: General Raievski 'The Hero of Borodino' and the Russian infantry in 1812.
General Blucher directed Russian 2nd Grenadier Division toward
In 1799 in Italy, Suvorov sent Russian officers to the Austrians
In Borodino in 1812, the attacking Westphalian infantry met
In the battle of Morungen, the Russian Yekaterinoslav Grenadiers
"Lads, shoot at everything French,and keep up the scare with bayonets!" |
Introduction: Russian Infantry.
Picture: Russian infantry in 1812.
Picture by Oleg Parkhaiev, Russia.
Sir Robert Wilson writes:
"The [Russian] infantry was generally composed of athletic men between the ages of 18 and 40, endowed
with great bodily strength, but generally of short stature, with martial countenance and
complexion; inured to extremes of weather and hardship; to the worst and scantiest food;
to marches for days and nights."
Charles Emmanuel de Warnery writes in his 'Remarques sur le militaire...'
that the Russian privates surpassed all European counterparts since "they are always in
good humor, even when in the greatest misery." (Napoleon's pampered Old Guard was nicknamed
'The Grumblers'.
The Bavarians and the British troops
According to French author Loraine Petre the powers of marching of Russian foot soldiers
were marvellous. For days at a time they would march regularly every night and yet fight
all day with the very minimum of rest and food. Despite the abuse, mistreatment and poor food
it was the private and not the Russian officer or general, who won the admiration of
western observers and military men.
The vast majority of Russian infantrymen were uneducated countryfolks.
The illiteracy ratio was higher than in other European countries.
In 1790s only 1 private in 24 was literate, 1 in 6 among corporals and 4 in 14 among
the sergeants. The worst situation was in the infantry.
Those of the soldiers who came from the Baltic Provinces, Poland or Ukraine
had better chances of education than those from Russia itself.
De Tolly was one of the few generals who strongly believed that education of soldiers was
one of the most important things. He and his officers taught many of soldiers
how to read and write.
The Russians had a bad reputation for drinking. The troopers received 3/8 litre of
‘liquor’ but prefered kvas, a native beer. Anything stronger than beer was often
diluted with water. Each private, combatant and noncombatant carried a wooden “bottle” protected
by leather.
In June 1812, an officer of 26th Jäger Regiment recalled:
"Here the column was allowed a short halt. The soldiers were issued a portion of spirits at
an unusual time -after the midday meal- and then yet another glass for each man. Afterward
it was ordered to take spirits, of which we had no shortage, along on the road ...
The ample spirits rejuvenated our soldiers. They forgot the heaviness of their loads, the
exhausting marches, and by their talk scorned the imminent dangers. In our ranks singing broke
out. The more fanciful started dancing, entertaining themselves and cheering up the others.
Our drunken march continued the whole night without rest, so that even the sober became tired."
(Kharkevich (compiled by) - "1812 in Diaries, Notes, and Memoirs of
Contemporaries; Material of the Military Archive of the Main Staff. Series III. Wittgenstein's
Corps.")
According to Bulgarin, in the
battle of Heilsberg (1807), Grand Duke Constantine brought 2 wagons of “grain wine”
and suhary for his uhlan regiment before they go into action.
Borodino was rather an exception in this aspect where there was no drinking and still
the Russians fought like lions.
Polish revolutionary leader Tedd Kosciuszko fought the Russian on several occassions, and
wrote: "When they are on the offensive they are fortified by copious distributions of alcohol,
and they attack with a courage which verges on a frenzy, and would rather get killed than fall back. The only way to make them desist
is to kill a great number of their officers ... The Russian infantry withstand fire fearlessly, but their own
fire is badly directed ... they are machines which are actuated only by the orders of their officers."
Picture: Russians (left) versus Austrians (right), France's allies in 1812.
Picture by Oleg Parkhaiev, Russia.
Despite the French and British army's fame from bayonet use, it was probably the Russian army
who used the bayonet the most times in Napoleonic wars. The suvorovian motto was
'"The Bullet's an Idiot, the Bayonet's a Fine Chap' (pulia duraka, no shtyk molodets).
A witness of the battle of Smolensk recalled that "I found the commander of the regiment,
Major-general Tsibulsky, in full uniform, mounted on horseback among his marksmen.
He replied that he was unable to restrain his men, who after exchanging a few shots
with the French repeatedly tried to dislodge them by bayonet assaults, without awaiting
orders. Even as he spoke, there was a shout of "Hurrah" from the line of men.
There were also cowards, as in any other army. According to Kutuzov in 1805 at Austerlitz two
battalions of Novgorod Musketier Regiment "ran away without offering the
slightest resistance".
The Podolsk Musketier Regiment lost all six Colors at Austerlitz.
In Bautzen in 1813, behind the Russian infantry was posted a screen
of Cossacks, whose function was to act as military police and stop any frightened individual.
(Nafziger - "Lutzen and Bautzen" p 225)
In Austerlitz in 1805, General Losakov abandoned his musketier regiment and fled to the city of Lvov.
After war he was degraded from general to the rank of private.
in the Great Redoubt by a gruff NCO Zolotov of 18th Jager Regiment.
He pushed and prodded the Frenchman with a bayonet and then
marched him as a kind of living trophy straight to headquarters,
paying no heed to the trail of blood the general was leaving
behind from his numerous bayonet wounds.
"Bullet's an idiot, bayonet's a fine chap"
can be also be considered as well fed and supplied.)
The Russian bayonet attack was fierce and well-known throughout Europe.
In Russian military manual issued in June 1812 was clearly stated "The bayonet is the true
Russian weapon and the push of the bayonet is far more decisive than musketry"
He [Tsibulsky] began to shout, even drove the marksmen back with his sword. At his presence,
his command was obeyed, but only a few paces from him the cry of "Hurrah!" resounded again
and again, and the men flung themselves on the enemy.... Light wounds were ignored until
the wounded fell from exhaustion and loss of blood."
(Tarle - "Napoleon's Invasion of Russia")
Equipment of Russian Infantry. In the beginning of Napoleonic Wars the inferior quality of powder and muskets plagued Russian infantry. Another problem was the outdated metallurgical and gunpowder industries. Between 1805 and 1809, the manufacturers limited production to 2 calibers, and in 1809 to one caliber. But the old weapons were still in use. In the beginning of 1812 the armament of the infantry included Russian and foreign weapons of 28 different calibers. Factories at Tula and Sestrovetsk produced between up to 170,000 weapons a year. The Russian musket of 1805-pattern weighed 5.16 kg while the 1808-pattern only 4.46-4.47 kg. The 1808-pattern musket was 145.8 cm long (with bayonet 183 or 188 cm) and it had caliber 17.78 mm. Although many regiments were armed with the new musket of 1808-pattern, in some units were still used old Russian muskets of various calibers. Many muskets were so worn out with firing that they were non-functional. Many muskets were purchased in other countries, including 60,000 from Great Britain. The Moscow Grenadier Regiment received large number of British "Brown Bess." See below: Picture: British infantry muskets. Source: Brent Nosworthy - "With Musket, Cannon, and Sword." There were thousands of captured weapons. The French Charleville musket was considered by many Russians as the lightest and best made, the British were larger and more durable, the Prussian, Swedish and old Russian muskets were considered as unwieldy. The ammunition was kept in a cartridge pouch worn on a deerskin crossbelt 6.7 cm wide, over the left shoulder. The black leather pouch held 60 cartridges. In November 1808 was ordered that the bayonet should always be carried fixed, as for the grenadiers and musketiers, as for the jägers. Between 1803 and 1812 the factories in Toula (Tula) issued 20,000 rifles. In June 1808 the rifle was withdrawn and used only by NCOs and 12 marksmen in each jager company. The rifle had barrel with 8 grooves, it was 66-cm long and of 16.51 mm caliber. It weight (without bayonet) was 4.09 kg and its total length with the sword-bayonet was 153.7 cm. Besides weapons the infantrymen carried tools. The second rank of every company carried 20 ax (each 73.2-cm long), 10 shovels and 5 pick (kirok) and hoes (motika). The iron parts of axes and shovels were kept in special covers made of used cloth. In 1811 halberds were withdrawn from all grenadier regiments, and the sergeants and NCOs who had them were given muskets with bayonets and, consequently, cartridge pouches with crossbelts. |
Uniforms of Russian Infantry.
Many Russian generals in that time were excessively concerned with details of dress,
which in the case of some officers became an obsession. Their soldiers were busy for
hours polishing the leather pouch and carbine belt, boots, buttons, and headgears.
Tsar Alexandr had more relaxed attitude on uniforms than his father, although still
not being as practical as was Suvorov or Kutuzov who were rather exceptions in this aspect.
Once a year each infantryman received 2 pairs of boots, 3 pairs of stockings, 1 headwear, 1 knapsack, 1 coat, 1 pair of trousers. Once every two years he received 1 greatcoat. The Russian cloth factories were obliged to sell part of their production in a fixed price for the army. In general the production was insufficient and additional uniforms were purchased from Britain, the major supplier of clothes and arms to Russia.
The style and design of Russian uniform changed several times, being influenced by the
Prussians and the French. The Prussians covered themselves with glory during the Seven Years War and Tsar Paul
(1754-1801) took them as example on which he dressed his troops disregarding the Russian
national tradition and different climate. For example coats were tighter and soldiers
had to wear the very unpopular in Russia gaiters. They also wore Prussian caps,
adopted the Prussian motto of “Gott Mit Uns” (God With Us) and had to powder and plait
their hair.
The average and minimal temperatures in Russian regions differ. In the European regions of Russia the average winter temperature sometimes falls below -15 °C; however,
sometimes it is much colder: even down to -30 °C for a month or two. One of the factors for these temperatures is Russia's geography: it is as northerly as Canada. (Brr).
Winter is a common excuse for military failures of invaders in Russia (General Winter and
General Snow. Failure in spring or fall is excused by General Mud :-)
Left: Russian grenadier in 1802-1805 wearing the old-fashioned mitre cap and greatcoat. Picture by Viskovatov, Russia. Right: Russian infantrymen and grenadiers in 1804-1807, wearing shakos and greatcoats. Picture by Patrice Courcelle, France. The greatcoat was a very popular wear although restricted faster movements on battlefield. Officer Shimanski wrote: "Running in a greatcoat, I was fatigued..." (Russian greatcoats were longer than those worn by the French and German troops). The greatcoat was either brown-grey, grey, brown, dark green or black. In 1811 the greatcoat cuffs became colored, which do not appear to have been universal. In the beginning of 1814 campaign was ordered to wear on the greatcoat a white cloth strip to be tied around the left arm as a "field sign" to distinguish Allied troops.
For parade the greatcoat and haversack were removed. In a very cold weather they additionally wrapped a cloth made of linen or wool around their feet, inside of the boots. This cloth was called onuchi (pronounced as onoochee) and had to be washed quite often as the feet easily sweated.
In 1809 was ordered: with a strap and buckle 3.4 inches from the end.
Picture: NCO of Orel Infantry Regiment in 1812-13, by Oleg Parkhaiev, Russia.
In 1802 was ordered that the green coat (not the grey greatcoat) would be "double-breasted, of dark-green cloth, with
a standing collar of a special color for each Inspectorate; with cuffs the same color as the collar; with dark-green flaps
on the cuffs; with red kersey lining, with brass buttons and two shoulder straps, of a special color for each regiment in
an Inspectorate... In November 1807 was issued an order for all grenadier regiments:
"collars and cuffs of coats, as well as collars of greatcoats, are directed to be of
red cloth".
In April 1812 the musketier regiments were assigned shoulder straps according to seniority within divisions. In 1810 all grenadiers were ordered to wear red shoulder straps. In 1814 the grenadier and the newly formed grenadier-jäger regiments were ordered to adopt yellow shoulder straps with initials in red, instead of the red shoulder straps with yellow initials. Regiments who wore yellow shoulder straps were ordered to change into blue ones and those with light blue change to green piped red. All these changes were not actually adopted before the end of Napoleonic wars.
Picture: headwears of infantry in 1802-05, by Oleg Parkhaiev
In the beginning of Napoleonic wars the tall and strong grenadiers wore mitre caps.
In 1802 they were almost the same form and size as under Tzar Paul. In February 1805 in grenadier regiments the mitre caps were replaced with new ones.
Below is a picture of uniforms worn by the Russian infantry in Austerlitz Campaign in 1805.
Picture: Russian infantry in Austerlitz Campaign in 1805. Picture by Andre Jouineau, France. Upper row: NCO, musketier, grenadier, grenadier with rolled greatcoat, drummer Lower row: infantryman in greatcoat, officer in parade uniform, officer in campaign uniform.
In 1809 there were several changes introduced in the grenadier regiments.
In 1810 in the jager regiments, the carabiniers and strelki were given short swords
patterned after the swords in the rest of the infantry.
In 1811 these carabiniers and strelki were ordered to have tall black plumes on
their shakos of the same pattern as those confirmed at this time for grenadier regiments:
black for privates; black with a white top with an orange stripe down its middle for NCOs; and red for drummers and fifers.
(Within few day however the plumes were abolished for the strelki.)
In 1811 all grenadiers, carabiniers, strelki, fusiliers, and officers had their former thick black plumes replaced with new and narrow ones.
New shako called kiver was introduced in 1812. See picture --> During long marches and in the camp the soldiers wore more comfortable forage round cap.
In summer the soldier no longer wore black, tall boots. During campaign, and in many battles, the infantrymen wore trousers. These were made of canvas or linen and could be grey, brown, green. The trousers were comfortable and liked by the men, they were worn despite the repeated orders from regimental officers.
A yellow brass badge was fixed to the cartridge box. It differed in shape between
various branches: Officers' uniforms resembled those of the rank-and-file, though their coats had longer tails. The junior officers were distinguished with epaulettes. The senior officers' (majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels) epaulettes had a fringe hanging from the edge. Officer wore a gorget at his neck bearing a black and gold double eagle. The gorgets were silver for 2nd lieutenants, silver with gilt edge for lieutenants, silver with gilt edge and eagle for 2nd captains, gilt with silver eagle for captains. The officers also wore the sash wrapped twice around the waist and knotted on the left side. The sash was of silver fabric, with 3 interwoven horizontal lines of black and orange. During campaign the officers wore green frock coats, grey breeches or grey trousers with red stripes, and bicorn hat or shako. They also carried the black knapsack but the gorget and sash were omitted. NCO's pompon was quartered in red and white and his collar's upper edge was pipped white. The drummers and fifers wore infantry coats with the addition of 6 white shevrons on each sleeve, 6 white lace loops on the breast, and 3 on each cuff flap. The grenadiers' drummers wore red instead of black plume. Drums were copper with white cords, and hoops painted in white and dark green triangles. The drum apron was usually of light brown hide.
Uniforms of Russian infantry in 1812 Campaign, picture by Andre Jouineau, France.
Uniforms of the
Russian Army, 1801-1815
The opolchenie (militia) was raised in autumn of 1806. It was raised again in 1812.
Serfs formed the bulk of the opolchenie, they were chosen by ballot from every 4-5 men
per 100 aged 17 to 45 and required the permission of their landlord.
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Training and Tactics. In the very beginning of 19th century the Russia infantry was trained according to linear tactics explained in "Voinskim Ustave o polevoi piehotnoi sluzhbe 1796 goda." It suffered horrible defeats in 1805 at Austerlitz and in 1807 at Friedland. The army required changes in organization, training and tactics. In 1807 A. I. Hatov published "General Essay on Tactics" (Obshchii opyt taktiki). In 1808 was published book "Notes on the Latest Changes in the Drill". In 1808 gathered a committee to create regulations (ustavy) for infantry, cavalry and artillery. Unfortunately it produced very little. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War in 1812 only ustavy for the infantry were ready. It was called Voinskii ustav o piehotnoi sluzhbe. It consisted two parts. The first one was called "School of recruit or soldier" (Shkala rekrut ili soldat) and emphasized accuracy of fire. The second was called "School of company training" (O rotnom uchenii)
Unfortunately Russia was the land of useless formalities.
The taste for parades was carried beyond all bounds. Parade ground precision was what
was instilled into recruits and musketry training was neglected.
Barclay de Tolly stressed the importance of target-practice in 1810, and in 1811. His works were titled "Instructions for Target Practice" and "Code of Infantry Service."
Generally the Russians formed their infantry division in two lines.
In the first line was first infantry brigade of 4 battalions formed either in lines
or columns. Approx. 140-210 m (200-300 paces) behind was the second line.
Here stood the second infantry brigade of 4 battalions formed in columns.
The Russian infantry defended villages in this way: Jagers in skirmish order occupied
the outer buildings and gardens. Inside the village in the streets stood individual
companies, they if necessary supported the most threatened parts of the skirmish line.
Behind the village stood reserve; one or several battalions formed in column(s).
In the summer of 1811 were conducted divisional maneuvers. In such maneuvers participated infantry, cavalry and artillery. Special attention was paid to the cooperation of the three arms and to skirmishing but multi-divisional maneuvers were rare. During the army maneuvers in May 1812 the 3rd Infantry Division under General Konovnitzin (see picture) was held up as a model for the army. In the battle of Borodino, the 3rd Infantry Division defended Bagration Fleches against Davout's French infantry and then together with the elite 1st Grenadier Division faced Prince Poniatowski's Polish infantry.
The Russian infantry advanced in four cadences: During long marches infantry movements were sometimes sped up by the use of horses and wagons. In 1812 in Vyazma one battalion of the 5th Jäger Regiment was transported on horseback to the battlefield. In June 1813, General Worontzov transported 6 grenadier and 1 jäger battalion on wagons to keep up with light cavalry and Cossacks. Only higher orders prevented the brilliant capture of Leipzig. Generally the Russian infantryman was not the best shooter in Europe to say the least. The men were trained in firing quick volleys by entire platoons and battalions. Only few commanders trained their troopers in aiming their muskets and emphasized the accuracy of fire.
Kutuzov (see picture) insisted that troops must be inspected and tested in aimed fire.
Barclay de Tolly writes: "The purpose of the training is not in that the men would pull
the triggers evenly and all at the same time, but that they would aim well..."
He also issued several orders on the training in aimed fire.
Besides the shortages of lead bullets, the Russian powder was of lower quality. Many muskets were so worn out with firing that they were non-functional. Prussian Colonel Muffling mentions that in 1814 three newly raised Russian battalions were attacked by French cuirassiers. The Russians delivered volley at 60 paces killing not a single man or horse ! Not discouraged by their failure they held their ground. The cuirassiers retired. General Langeron described a firefight at Austerlitz: "Soon, the French lines initiated a very sharp and very murderous fire of musket and canister upon the brigade of Kamensky which in a moment had many men rendered hors de combat. (Kamensky's brigade) answered with a less sharp and badly directed fire, the majority of our soldiers fired in the air... in justice I ought to say that despite the superior number of the enemy, despite their little experience of war and the effect on them of an unforseen attack on their rear, despite the noise of gunfire, which many of them were hearing for the first time, they maintained themselves admirably for nearly 2 hours and in these two hours more than half of the two regiments were left dead." (Langeron - "Journal inedit de la Campagne de 105; Austerlitz" p 75)
The line formation had been standard during the XVIII Century but lost popularity after the French triumphs with columns during the Revolutionary Wars.
Column was the favorite formation for the Russians. Any movement in line was inconvenient, while columns moved faster and easier maneuvered.
Infantry Tactics during the Napoleonic Wars. The deeper the column was the heavier casualties it suffered from artillery fire. Not only a direct hit could kill many soldiers, a cannonball rolling and ricocheting was breaking men's legs. The column on battlefield could be either company or half-company wide. If it was one company wide then the four companies stood one behind the other with full or half intervals. It means the distance between companies was prescribed as equal to full or half frontage of a company. This type of column was the best formation for movement and maneuver. There was also closed column with only 3 paces intervals between companies. Bayonet charges were caried out either in "attack columns" (half-intervals) or in closed columns. Closed columns and hollow squares were used against cavalry. Wide intervals between battalion columns allowed numerous Russian artillery and cavalry to move freely between them. Unfortunately the Russian columns were often so placed that it was possible to pound them well with artillery before they were charged. In the battle of Borodino, Kutuzov ordered the 3rd 'Grenadier' Corps be placed so the French would not be able to see it. Later that day General Leontii Bennigsen (see picture) visited this corps and ordered to move it forward without informing the commander in chief. Only some Russian commanders used terrain as a cover. For example in the battle of Borodino some infantry columns used depressions and ravines as shelter from French artillery fire. Russian artillery officer, N.E.Mitarevski, wrote that his gunners "couldn't see friendly infantry, but when it was necessary, they appeared as if from out of the ground." (Zhmodikov - "Tactics of the Russian Army ..." Vol. II)
Far more often however the Russian infantrymen were not allowed to use terrain as cover or
lie down on the ground to lessen the casualties. As an example is a situation
in Leipzig in 1813, described by Digby-Smith:
There were not many admirers of skirmish formation in Russia, one of the few were Suvorov and Kutusov. Kutusov wrote several sets of notes on light infantry already in the 1780s. The skirmish line was formed by the Russian infantry this way: the soldiers of 1st rank formed the front chain, the soldiers of 2nd rank formed the second chain, while the 3rd rank formed a reserve behind the center. The skirmishers acted in pairs with 2 or 5 paces intervals between pairs, maneuvered according to drum signals and moved at a run (150-200 paces per minute). They were trained to use terrain features, to fire from standing, kneeling or lying position. Jägers (light infantry) were usually the ones sent to skirmish. If there was insufficient number of jägers the line infantry or grenadier regiments sent their own skirmishers. The troops were sent to skirmish by platoons or companies, which relieved each other in turn, or by entire battalions and even regiments. For example a day before the Battle of Eylau, the Arkhangel Musketier Regiment (line infantry) was deployed as skirmishers to cover the withdrawal of the 4th Division. In Krasne in August 1812, the 49th Jäger Regiment (light infantry) was placed in front of the village in skirmish order. There were disagreements about the use of large number of skirmishers. Published in 1811 "On Jäger Training" recommended the use of entire jäger battalion (4 companies of 2 platoons each) in skirmish order. The grenadier and strelki platoon were kept in reserve behind both flanks of the skirmish line formed by the remaining six jäger platoons.
Barclay de Tolly was against using large number of skirmishers. He wrote in 1812:
"in the beginning of a battle one is to push out as few skirmishers as possible,
but to keep small reserves, to refresh the men in the chain and [to keep] the rest
behind formed in column. Heavy losses cannot be attributed to skillful actions of the
enemy, but to excessive numbers of skirmishers confronted to the enemy fire."
Russian General Prince Eugene Wirtemberg wrote that in Russian army was a tendency to push out a lot of skirmishers and only in 1813 the right proportion was found (only part of battalion and not the entire unit was sent out as skirmishers). It was said that until 1806 the Russian skirmishers were below European average. During the numerous wars however they improved. The Prussians, who fought the Russians in 1812, considered the jägers to be competent skirmishers. According to Prussian officer von Clausewitz, the Russian jägers at Borodino fought in the skirmish line with great dexterity. (Clausewitz - "The Campaign of 1812 in Russia" 1992, pp 162-157)
Chichagov however claimed that Russian infantry had not enough wit and adroitness
to fight in skirmish order. Barclay de Tolly considered the French skirmishers
superior to the Russians in agility and marksmanship and more effective in the woods.
Only after 1812 the abilities of French skirmishers declined.
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The Best Regiments of Russian Infantry. Generally the best were the Guard regiments, followed by grenadier, jager and musketier regiments. We have selected eight regiments (3 grenadiers, 3 infantry, 2 jagers) which - in our opinion - are the best. They have distinguished themselves on battlefield, captured enemy's color and guns, or put up a gallant fight to beat off the enemy.
NOTE:
In April 1813 the 1st, 5th, 14th, and 20th Jägers were awarded badges for their shakos with the inscription “For excellence”
(Za otlichie).
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Sources and Links.
Recommended Reading.
For bibliography see our article "The Russian Army".
Pictures by Viskovatov, Chagadayev, Parkhayev and others.
Karl Fedorovich Baggovout.
Petr Ivanovich Bagration.
Mihail Bogdanovich Baraclay de Tolli.
Leontii Bennigsen.
Mihail Mihailovich Borozdin-I.
Mihail Semenovich Vorontzov.
Nikolai Vasilievich Vuich.
Dmitrii Sergeievich Dohturov.
Russian Infantry - - - - - Russian Cavalry and Cossacks - - - - - Russian Artillery
Battle of Heilsberg 1807
Bennigsen vs Napoleon
Battle of Borodino 1812
The bloodiest battle of the Napoleonic wars
Battle of Dresden, 1813
Russians, Austrians and Prussians
crushed by Napoleon
Battle of Leipzig, 1813
The Battle of the Nations,
the largest conflict until World War One.
Battle of La Rothiere 1814
Russians under Blucher defeated Napoleon.