Introduction: The War in Spain and Portugal.
The Spanish War of Independence (called Peninsular War in English speaking world) pitted Spain, Great Britain,
and Portugal against Napoleonic France. The war began when French troops occupied Portugal in 1807 and Spain in 1808.
It was the first large-scale guerilla war, from which the English language borrowed the word.
It was a war of contrasts; a war fought in the icy passes of the high Pyrenees and on the burning wastes of the Sierra Morena.
It was a war of infinite cruelty.
According to David Gates, books which cover the Peninsular War have been
disappointing. Many are accompanied by an irritangly jingoistic - or blatantly unimpartial -
style, a common failing is to concentrate almost exclusively on the campaigns of Wellington
and his immediate opponents. The conflict waged against the French by other British
generals and the Spanish army, although crucially important, is dismissed in a few brief
comments. This betrays a failure to grasp the very core of the military
and political problems confronting the French.
How the French authors present the war in Spain. UNDER CONSTRUCTION ....
The Peninsular affair began in 1807, through a secret convention signed by Prince
Kurakin and Talleyrand. It contained, among other things, the following stipulations:
The Emperor believed there, in Peninsula, to be sound strategic and economic reasons for
intervening. Portugal was not involved in the embargo of British goods and Spain was
only a half-hearted participant.
The conflict between France and Portugal was precipitated when Portugal refused to comply
with Napoleon's Continental System. By a secret convention reached at Fontainebleau (1807)
Spain agreed to support France against Portugal.
In summer 1807, France and Spain
pressurised Portugal to align with France against Britain. Portugal, an old friend of
Britain, was reluctant, and was also mindful that any conflict with the old friend could lead
to Britain seizing her South American colonies. (The Portuguese empire was the earliest and
longest lived of the colonial Western European empires. In the 18th century, Portuguese colonial ambitions centred in Brazil
and a few bases in Africa and Asia)
Jean-Baptiste Lemonnier-Delafosse, an officer of light infantry in the division of General Heudelet
described his entry to Portugal: "The French army entered Portugal with 6 days' worth of supplies in each soldier's haversack, and on top of that w few wagons. It was, therefore, without any proper magazines, and soon it found itself without food of any sort.
Nevertheless, it was necessary to live. Once the initial resources had run out ... a regular system of marauding was organized ...
Woe be to the peasant who was caught by such an expedition ! ... When the troops were operating in places they did not know, guides were needed. If no-one came forward at their call,
someone would be seized at random."
Fortunately for Junot's troops, however, the Portuguese offered no resistance and on Nov 30, with only 1,500 men about him,
Junot entered Lisbon - having covered 300 miles in only 14 days !
Lisbon contained 250,000 inhabitants and was a large city despite the fact that in 1755
earthquake and tsunami killed more than a third of capital's population.
When the French troops marched on Lisbon, the royal family of Bragança fled to Brasil without resisting. They were escorted by British squadron.
Godoy and Napoleon advocated immediate partition of Portugal. The civil authorities in Lisbon collaborated with
the French, but the Portuguese people took matters into their own hands. Already in December a
serious riot erupted in Lisbon. Gates writes: "Ordering the dissolution of the tiny Portuguese army,
he [Junot] then begun a programme of exactions which the infuriated population, lacking weapons and leaders, were
powerless to resist. A sinister calm fell over Portugal and Napoleon began preparing
his next move." (Gates - "The Spanish ulcer" pp 8-9)
French troops were gathering along the French-Spanish border.
Officer Chlapowski of Napoleon's Guard Lighthorse writes: "I spent 3 days in Bayonne,
just at the time when the old Spanish king, Charles IV, his queen, and the Prince of Peace
[Godoy] were leaving for Valencay, where the Emperor was to imprison them. ...
The Emperor also invited Ferdinand to Bayonne, but refused to recognize him as king and
packed him off to Valencay as well. ... The Emperor and Empress lived in the palace of Marac a quarter of a mile from the city
on the road to Pamplona. ... A battalion of Old Guard Grenadiers were camped in tents by
the chateau, so close that only a carriage could pass between them and the wall.
The French began a series of maneuvers to secure Spain for France.
On the pretext that they were reinforcements for Junot, large numbers of French troops entered
Spain and seized Pamplona and Barcelona. It allowed fresh troops to pour across the Pyrenees with
complete impunity. Godoy responded by recalling the Spanish troops aiding Junot and advising the Royal family to leave Madrid for the
Americas. The Spanish people, however, blamed him for the situation and the announcement of the Royal family's departure provoked a major riot.
Order was restored when Prince Ferdinand proclaimed that the unpopular minister had been dismissed
and taken into protective custody. This, however, was interpreted as further defence of Godoy by the king and fresh riots errupted.
Charles agreed to abdicate in favour of Ferdinand.
On 23rd March 1808 the French entered Madrid and refused to recognize Ferdinand as the
rightful monarch. French officer de Marbot wrote: "On the 23rd Murat entered Madrid at the head of
Marshal Moncey's corps. The new king had called upon the people to give a good reception to
his friend Napoleon's troops. He was punctually obeyed; we saw nothing but friendly faces
among the vast and curious crowd."
1. Introduction.
- - - Secret convention between Russia and France. >
- - - The invasion of Portugal "was an armed parade, not a war." >
- - - "Spain ... must be French." >
2. The French army.
- - - Quality of French soldiers in Spain. >
- - - Napoleon seemed to ignore the food question. >
3. The Spanish army.
- - - Positive opinions about the Spanish army. >
- - - Negative opinions about the Spanish army. >
4. Madrid: blood on the streets.
5. French occupation: rape, pillage, and drunkenness.
6. Spanish vs French: battles, sieges and combats.
7. Baylen, 1808: Spanish victory.
8. "The lion in the fable tormented to death by a gnat". The Guerilla War.
9. The British in Peninsula. Viva os Ingleses valerosos !"
- - - Royal Navy. >
- - - Moore's failed campaign. >
- - - Wellington's long and succesful campaign. >
10.The Spanish Ulcer.
but that one, yet multiplied sentiment which filled the whole people.
It was the inmost soul of each and every one that resisted the blow -
which neither ball nor bayonet could reach."
- de Rocca, officer of the French hussars
Books which cover the Peninsular War have been disappointing.
Many are accompanied by an irritangly jingoistic - or blatantly unimpartial - style,
a common failing is to concentrate almost exclusively on the campaigns of Wellington
and his immediate opponents. The conflict waged against the French by other British
generals and the Spanish army, although crucially important,
is dismissed in a few brief comments.
It can - and often does - even call into question the title of the book: a work which only
tells selected parts of the story cannot accurately be described as a history of the war,
particularly when ommissions frequently include the bulk of the 5 years of major campaigns
that occurred in the Peninsula's southern and eastern reaches.
Just because relatively few British troops were involved in them,
they are not to be dismissed as insignificant.
The treaty of Tilsit in 1807 ended war between Russia and France and began an alliance between the two empires
which rendered the rest of Europe almost powerless.
Art. I. Russia is to take possession of European Turkey, and to extend her
possessions in Asia.
Art. II. The Bourbon dynasty in Spain and
the house of Braganza in Portugal will cease to reign. Princes of the Bonaparte family will succeed to both of these crowns.
"The French force destined to invade Portugal, was already assembled in Bayonne ...
It was commanded by General Junot, a young man of a bold, ambitious disposition, but of greater reputation for military talent
than he was able to support; and his soldiers, principally conscripts, were ill-fitted to endure the hardships which awaited them."
(Napier - “History of the War in Peninsula 1807-1814” p 25)
Junot thrusted down the Tagus Valley to Lisbon. The French troops found the terrain barren
and inhospitable. According to wikipedia.org Portugal is split in two by its main river,
the Tagus (Tejo). Northern landscape is mountainous in the interior areas with plateaus. The South area between the
Tagus and the Algarve features mostly rolling plains with a climate somewhat warmer and drier than the cooler and rainier north.
Portugal is one of the warmest European countries. In mainland Portugal, yearly
temperature averages are about 15º C (55° F) in the north and 18ºC (64°F) in the south.
One observer noted that "The invasion was an armed parade, not a war."
On picture: captain of Portuguese Cacadores in 1811, by Carlos Ribeiro.
The Portuguese infantry were brave, steady and respected by English and French alike.
Polish officer Chlapowski of Napoleon's Guard cavalry described the Portuguese soldiers as
"small, gaunt, but very tough breed." They were the most efficient
in mountain warfare. One French officer remarked that the Portuguese bragged less than English and
Frenchmen and so got less credit for their service.
The Portuguese cavalry however was not as good as the infantry. Napier writes that the abuses and desertions in the Portuguese cavalry
"had been so great that one division was suppressed."
The ease with which Junot's troops had seized Portugal lulled the Emperor into a
false sense of conquest. He was excessively optimistic in calculating some of the benefits
he hoped to gain from Spain.
Doubtlessly fascinated by Spain's history of splendour, Napoleon was convinced that the
country was excessively wealthy when, in fact, she was virtually bankrupt.
According to Summerville “In 1807 Spain was one of the most backward nations of Europe …”
Right beside them were 200 Basques from the Pyrenees, who had
formed a guard of honor for the Emperor. Their costume was a short blue jacket, short black
breeches ... They were fine looking, lively people, and reputedly good shots. Five hundred
paces further on along the Pamplona road was a squadron of our Polish Guard Lighthorse
under Cpt. Dziewanowski. ...
There can be no frontier in Europe which so starkly divides two such markedly different
countries. ... On one side of the Bidassoa the people are short, cheerful and lively,
and on the other side [Spanish] tall, serious and dreary. On the French side, little houses
... are scattered here and there, over more or less flat countryside, while on the far side
stands the town of Irun, hewn from the local stone, with high mountains behind it into which
the road climbs immediately on leaving the town, twisting and turning upwards from peak to
peak until it reaches Vittoria ... There wass a post rider, a Spaniard in his great cape,
galloping along in front of me. His horse's bridle was covered with bells, so at night,
although I could not see him, I could always hear him. Spanish post horses are marvellous
mounts ... " (Chlapowski/Simmons - "Memoirs of a Polish Lancer" pp 33, 35)
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The French Army in the Peninsula.
Central Europe was the primary theater of war (with few short breaks for Italy and Spain) and this is not surprising
that the largest armies, and the best troops led by the best commanders fought there most of the
time. Napoleon spent few years in Italy and only few months in Spain.
The first French 'Army of Spain' had 160,000-170,000 men, organized in five army corps, each
with own staff, artillery, cavalry and engineers. In the following years the army was steadily growing in numbers. In July 1811 there were 355,000 French soldiers [290,000 effectives] in Peninsula.
Students of Napoleon's central European campaigns will be struck by the relatively small numbers of cannon employed in Spain. This is largely explained by the terrain and a chronic shortage of horses. The atrocious roads and mountainous topography of Spain and Portugal, were unsuited for larger number of guns. The terrain greatly deterred the French from employing heavy cavalry. Consequently, apart from a tiny handful of provisional cuirassiers, the heaviest mounted troops consistently used were dragoons.
"A young French conscript, Phillipe Gille, provides
a detailed account of the inadequate manner in which French soldiers were rushed to the
front. Mobilized in France in 1808, Gille apparently did not even receive his musket until
arriving at the Spanish border. There he joined a provisional unit composed of fellow conscripts, crossed the border, and soon
engaged in combats with guerilla. Eventually his unit merged with similar ad-hoc formations to make up Dupont's ill-fated army.
Near the Spanish town of Jaen they faced their first formed opposition from Spanish regulars. In spite of their inexperience,
the conscripts formed line, advanced with trailed arms, received a close range volley, charged at the bayonet, and routed the
Spanish. While such intrepid shock action worked against poorly trained Spanish infantry, it was ill-suited for more
professional opponents such as the British. ...
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The Spanish Army.
The Spanish army comprised of the following troops:
These troops were organized into seven armies and one reserve.
The quality of Spanish troops varied, from very poor to good. The militia was generally of poor quality, but some regulars were fine troops. For example on 29 October "The First Regiment of Catalonia ... received the attack with the greatest coolness and kept up a very regular fire by platoons, maintaining their position against an enemy nearly 5 times their number ... The most veteran troops could not possibly have displayed more soldeirlike firmness or more sangfroid in action ..." (- W.Parker Carroll to Castlereagh, November 1808)
For some Polish officers the Spanish soldiers were brave but poorly led by their officers.
"Some regiment which looked like black hussars, which I had never seen before, drew particular
attention to themselves. Their attack failed, and was doomed from the start as they had begun
to gallop at 1,000 paces and so were exhausted by the time they had covered half this
distance.
Negative opinions about the Spanish army.
The Spanish forces and their leaders are usually described
(by the French and British) as useless, cowardish, poorly trained and disciplined,
stupid etc. etc. They supposedly amounted to nothing and lost every battle they have fought.
For example William Napier in "History of the War in Peninsula"
writes that the Spaniards "being divided in corps, under different generals of equal
authority, they could execute no combined movement with rapidity or precision,
nor under any circumstances could they unite more than 40,000 men at any given point...
The generals had lost nothing of their presumption, learnt nothing of war ... " and
"Her [Spain] efforts were amongst the very smallest causes of his [Napoleon] failure.
Portugal has far greater claims to that glory."
Napier writes: "I come now to another topic, which is one of serious consideration. ... That is the frequent, I ought to say
constant and shameful misbehaviour of the Spanish troops before the enemy ...
In the battle of Talavera, in which the Spanish army with very trifling exceptions was not
engaged, whole corps threw away their arms and ran off in my presence when they were
neither attacked nor threatened with an attack, but frightened I believe by their own fire ...
I mean the infantry - it is lamentable too see how bad that of the Spaniards is. ...
It is said that sometimes they behave well; though I acknowledge I have never seen them behave
otherwise than ill. ... Nothing can be worse than the officers of the Spanish army...
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Madrid: blood on the streets.
On May 3rd - a day Francisco Goya would commemorate in one of his most famous paintings - French soldiers fired into the Madrid crowds who had attacked them. Some Spaniards were captured and executed by the French.
When this massacre became known, an insurrection broke out in other parts of Spain, namely
Asturias, and soon afterward embraced the whole country. It is to be remarked that this
first spontaneous rising originated with the people, while the 'better' classes had quietly
submitted to the foreign yoke.
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French occupation: rape, pillage, and drunkenness.
But still many French officers and generals looked for loot and women, with both seduction and rape being frequent occurrences. Some generals brought their wives which angered Napoleon. In July 1813 Napoleon wrote to General Clarke: "Give orders that all the wives ... (and) all the loose women, including those who go dressed as men, ... be removed beyond the Garonne immediately."
Despite more or less genuine efforts to maintain discipline, the soldiers supplemented their rations by living off the country, fed their campfires with furniture, window frames, doors and fencing, and made off with a wide variety of valuables and trinkets.
The supplies of food and uniforms were unsufficient.
The soldiers began wearing captured Spanish uniforms. The Baden infantry replaced their
leather helmets with the ones of British 23rd Regiment of Light Dragoons, which had lost
half their men in a foolish charge at Talavera. The French 13rd Cuirassier Regiment had
no armor and wore brown Spanish jackets.
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Spanish vs French: battles, sieges and combats. The Spanish troops fought very well in several battles. After his defeat in 1813 at Ordal Cross, Lord Bentinck stated: "The only good notice I can give is the bravery of the English and Spanish soldiers and the valiant steadiness of the last." According to Miquel Miró in May of 1815, the Spanish soldiers headed by Col. Torres were "all honored with the distinction Cross of the Battle of Ordal with the legend "Rey, Patria o la Muerte" (King, Our Country or Dead). Colonel Antony Bray was distinguished with the highest Spanish military honor: the Cruz Laureada de San Fernando."
To my surprise there was a high number of battles, sieges, combats and actions fought
between the Spaniards and the French. Actually more than between the French and the British.
 - In October 1808 Spaniards under Blake defeated
Marshal Lefebvre. (ext.link)(François Joseph Lefebvre was a honest man and brave commander. He was a commander of the Paris troops and supported Bonaparte in his coup d'etat in 1799. In 1806 at Jena, Lefebvre was in command of the infantry of the Guard.) - In July 1808 Castanos defeated French corps under Dupont (ext.link)(In 1805, as the leader of one of Ney's divisions, Dupont earned distinction at Albeck-Haslach, in which he prevented the escape of the Austrian army from Ulm. At Friedland he won further fame. With a record such as but few of divisional commanders possessed, Dupont entered Spain in 1808 at the head of a corps. - In May 1809 the Spanish army defeated
Suchet (ext.link) at Alcaniz.(Suchet was one of the most brilliant of Napoleon's generals. In 1805 and 1806 he increased his reputation at Austerlitz, Jena, Pultusk and Ostroleka. In Spain as commander of the army of Aragon and governor of the province, which, by wise and (unlike that of most of the French generals) disinterested administration no less than by his brilliant valour, he in 2 years brought into complete submission.) - In 1809 the Spanish troops defeated Marshal Michel Ney at Ponte Sampaio.(Ney was called Brave des Braves ("the bravest of the brave") and is one of the five most popular Napoleonic marshals. He won his greatest fame during the heroic retreat from Russia. In English speaking world Ney is most known for Waterloo.) - In October and November 1811 Lacy sent Eroles into France to raid the valley of the
Cerdagne. The Spaniards defeated the French National Guard and stole away with cattle and
huge contributions of money from the civilians. Napoleon was furious.
- On 31 August 1813 at San-Marcial the Spanish infantry led by Freire and Longa defeated
French infantry. The Spaniards used British style tactics, delivered a volley and charged
with bayonets. After a short resistance the French fled.
On October 1st 1809, King Joseph Bonaparte's army consisted of:
On 15th August 1810 the French army in Spain had:
On 15th April 1811 the French army in Spain had:
Strength of the French armies in Spain in July 1813: (In mid November: 102 battalions and 74 squadrons.)
The siege of Saragossa was very bloody and became known in whole Europe. The number of deaths in the interior of the city [Saragossa] during the siege, including those who were killed by the enemy, has been estimated at upwards of 40,000 human beings. The French mines reduced many buildings to ruins. The Spaniards saturated the timbers of many houses with rosin and pitch, and set fire to those which could no longer be maintained, interposed a burning barrier, which often delayed the French and Poles and prevented them from pushing their successes during the confusion that necessarily followed the bursting of the mines. The constant bombardment, the explosion of mines, the crash of falling buildings, clamorous shouts, and the continued echo of musketry deafened the ear, while volumes of smoke and dust clouded the air. .
"Although ultimately defeated, the defenders of Saragossa had once more covered themselves with glory and had given the invader a demonstartion of fanatical, national resistance. It was a demonstration the French army was never to forget and, at Gerona and elsewhere, it was to inspire Spaniards to maintain replica struggles that have few parallels in the history of war." (Gates - "The Spanish Ulcer" p 128)
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Kiss the foul track where tyrant's tread, Still Freedom lifts her dauntless head In sacred Saragossa.
The practis'd tools of grasping power
But native valour, noble pride,
Each house a fortress to defend,
Not so with thee, thou pride of Spain!
In house by house, in street by street,
Again returns Napoleon's horde
Arragonese! so brave, so true,
Again to vast exertion call'd,
Though wasting flames around thee curl'd,
O'erwhelm'd by numbers and o'ercome, |
Battle of Baylen 1808: Spanish victory.
"General Dupont was entrusted with the pacification of Andalusia in southern Spain by Napoleon, but after sacking Cordoba the French commander found himself faced by a massive popular rising and the 30,000-strong army of General Reding. Instead of retreating over the Sierra Morena immediately, Dupont unwisely lingered in the plain of Andujar, and when at last he did decide to retire, his column, burdened by wounded and loot, found the road toward distant Madrid threatened by the Spaniards." (Chandler- "Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars" p 39) "Along the line of march, and in the town of Andujar, where he arrived the evening of the 18th, Dupont found terrible proofs of Spanish ferocity: his stragglers had been assasinated, and his hospital taken; the sick, the medical attendants, the couriers, the staff officers, in fine, all who had the misfortune to be weaker than the insurgents, were butchered, with circumstances of extraordinary barbarity, and upwards of 400 men had perished in this miserable manner since the fight of Alcolea." (Napier - “History of the War in Peninsula 1807-1814” p 88)
General Dupont sent Chabert's brigade (3.000 infantry) west of Baylen against Spanish positions. But Coupigny's division threw back the attackers. Dupont feared that Spanish troops led by Castaños will attack him from the rear and ordered a fresh attack. French brigade of heavy cavalry drove through 2 Spanish battalions but was forced to withdraw. Chabert's brigade was again repulsed and Schramm's brigade (2,000 Swiss) were thrown back by Reding's Spanish division. At 8am the French attacked again but without success. Pannetier's brigade (3,500 infantry) was forced to fall back by Reding's troops. At about 12.30 pm Dupont led a last and desperate attack against the centre of the Spanish line. In front marched the Marines of Imperial Guard. But this attack also failed, Dupont was wounded, some battalions disintegrated while the Swiss deserted to the enemy. Henri Lachoque writes: "Towards evening Dupont placed himself at the head of the Guard Marines who were ployed in column along the road. Sword in hand and followed by his staff, he ordered the drummers to beat the charge and advanced. What remained of his division moved forward under a withering fire. Dupont was wounded, the marines' attack repulsed, and some of the Swiss, refusing to fight against their compatriots, deserted to the enemy." (Lachoque - "The Anatomy of Glory" p 128)
The Spanish division led by La Peña closed in on the French rear Dupont sued for a ceasefire.
After prolonged negotiations, the French surrendered on condition that his troops
would be shipped back to France. Approx. 12.000-18.000 French soldiers laid down their arms;
and 2.000 were dead and wounded on the battlefield. The Spanish casualties were less than 1.000 killed and wounded. The postbattle terms of surrender included the repatriation of the French army back to France. Arguing that a repatriated French army would simply be marched back into Spain to fight again, the British convinced Spain to renege on its promise. The Spaniards dumped the POWs on the deserted island of Cabrera, which had insufficient food, water, shelter and medical facilities. Thousands of POWs died from malnutrition and disease. The French held on the hulks in Britain also suffered greatly.
Nowhere was the news of Spanish successes more welcome than in London. Past enmities were forgotten, as British society went mad with fabulous notions of Hispanic heroism and zeal. The press launched a popular campaign in support of the Spaanish rebels. British enthusiasm turned to delirium, however, when deputies from Supreme Junta arrived in London seeking aid. The Spanish deputies ask for cash and they got it - 1.5 million in silver as well as 120,000 muskets and 100,000 uniforms. It was after Baylen that the revolution came to a head, and that part of the high nobility who had accepted the Bonaparte dynasty or wisely kept back, came forward to join the popular cause. Napier writes: "It is truly astonishing that Dupont, who from his rank must have been well acquainted with Napoleon's Italian campaigns, should have caught so little of the spirit of his master. And then the capitulation of General Vedel, after his retreat was actually victory by himself, without any great imprudence ! Joseph called Dupont's capitulation a 'defection". (- Napier p 97)
Front cover of book: "Bailén 1808" |
The Guerilla War in Spain (1808 - 1814)
"The War of Independence did not produce on the Spanish side
great generals ... The true giants ... were the leaders
of those intrepid bands that almost from the very beginning
made the war in Spain a nightmare for the Napoleonic armies."
(G. Lovett- "Napoleon and the Birth of Modern Spain")
Spain is Europe's second most mountainous country and only Switzerland has a higher terrain. The central 2/5 of the country is primarily high plains crossed by mountain ranges and rivers. It is a perfect place for a guerilla warfare. It is impossible to argue that the guerillas were models of discipline, it is also difficult to show that they were of very much value in military terms. In places where the French could not deploy their cavalry (dragoons) the guerillas were able to gain the occassional success, whilst they were also able to put up a good show behind the walls of such towns as Gerona and Roses. Gerona even came to rival Saragossa as the embodiment of Spanish patriotism. Antonio Moliner Prada writes: "As sentinels and pickets, too, they were fine, but every time they had to confront the French in open battle they were swept away with heavy losses." In the mountainous Spain, the French transport wagons could only be dragged with difficulty and toil, by hill and hollow, over roots, rocks and stumps. Nature had formed the country for a war of ambuscades and surpirses, and no pains were spared to guard against them. William Stothert of the 3rd Foot Guards wrote about the guerillas: "... they are incited to attack the enemy's convoys and straggling parties as much by the hope of plunder as from patriotism." There were also quite few Englishmen (stragglers, deserters etc.) captured by the guerillas and either killed, sold or exchanged for weapons, money or gold.
The population of whole provinces took up arms and made a partisan warfare, as in Galicia and Asturias. Antonio Moliner Prada writes: " Citizens of Igualada, Manresa and other neighbouring towns raised such a force in the Bruc mountains with the aim of halting General Schwartz's march on Zaragoza. The skirmish, which took place on June 6, had the desired effect and suceeded in putting the imperial troops to flight. Made famous by the incident of the so-called 'drummer of Bruc', this was an important psychological victory - it was, indeed, the first defeat that Napoleon's army suffered in Spain - and was to become symbol repeatedly exploited by the civil and military authorities in their anti-French propaganda campaign." Soldier Mignolet of 1st Regiment of Tirailleurs of Young Guard wrote home: "We are surrounded by 40.000 Spanish brigands whom we must fight every day - and the situation gets no better, but worse. Their bands grow bigger every year, for we burn their towns and villages ... " (The few regiments of Young Guard left for Spain in October 1809)
Not only local peasants formed the guerilla bands. There was also an assortment of
freebooters, deserters, smugglers and bandits who were organized into ad hoc regional
private armies. The guerrillas carried on the war as their own cause, independently of all
foreign influence and to their own interest. They made no formidable appearance as a body,
but were nevertheless extremely dangerous to the French. As an opportunity offered itself the
most daring among the civilians came out and joined the guerrillas.
It was not uncommon to see them standing out a whole day in sight of a vigilant enemy,
in order to intercept a carrier or to capture supplies. It was in this way that the younger
Mina captured the Viceroy of Navarra, appointed by Joseph Bonaparte, and that Julian
made a prisoner of the commander of fortress at Ciudad Rodrigo.
The French had great difficulties with communicating with each other, it resulted slower concentration of troops. Napier writes: "..the French could never communicate with each other nor combine their movements, except by the slow method of sending officers with strong escorts; whereas, their adversaries could correspond by post, and even by telegraph an advantage equal to a reinforcement of 30,000 men." (- Napier p 129)
Wellington writes: "The French armies have no communications and one army has no knowledge of the position
or of the circumstances in which the others are placed, whereas I have knowledge of all that passes on all sides."
Scores of vital messages failed to get through and, for example, hardly any of the correspondance between King Joseph and Marmont reached
destination, with the result that, the marshal was unaware that Joseph' Army of the Centre was en route to join him, and, consequently,
went ahead and fought the Battle of Salamanca with 15,000 men less than he might have had.
Sometimes the priests led the peasants against the French troops. Jomini writes: "When Ney's corps replaced Soult's at Corunna, I had camped the companies of the artillery-train between Betanzos and Corunna, in the midst of four brigades distant from the camp from two to three leagues, and no Spanish forces had been seen within fifty miles; Soult still occupied Santiago de Compostela, the division Maurice-Mathieu was at Ferrol and Lugo, March and's at Corunna and Betanzos: nevertheless one fine night the companies of the train-men and horses- disappeared, and we were never able to discover what became of them: a solitary wounded corporal escaped to report that the peasants, led by their monks and priests, had thus made away with them." ( Jomini - "The Art of War.") Facing in Spain by seemingly endless struggles that entailed a great deal of danger but precious little glory, the once loyal soldiers of the emperor grew cynical and resentful, with the result that their willingness to sacrifice their lives fell off dramatically. Still worse, perhaps, frightened, harassed and frustrated, the troops became increasingly undisciplined and engaged in acts of revenge or casual brutality. Esdaile writes: "Also problematic in this respect was an increase in desertion that provided the Allies with an important source of manpower whilst simultanously augmenting the need for new conscripts; by 1813, for example, the Duke of Wellington had no fewer than three regiments of cavalry and seven battalions of infantry that were recruited in whole or in part from foreign deserters, whilst substantial numbers of deserters also appear to have been serving with the famous guerilla commander, Francisco Espoz y Mina" (Esdaile - “Popular Resistance in the French Wars” p 202)
The guerilla war in Portugal is poorly researched. According to Charles Esdaile "there is no discreet study of her insurection and guerilla movement at all, the only information that we have coming from British accounts of the Peninsular War. Yet these are in reality all but useless: written by historians interested only in the doings of Wellington's army, their treatment of the subject is at best superficial. To take Oman, for example, all he does in this respect is to copy out various passages from the memoirs of French soldiers who fought in the successive invasion armies of Junot, Soult and Massena ... Setting aside the fact that we do not in any sense 'get inside' the resistance, relying on French memoirs as a source for the Portuguese insurection is a risky step. ... Similar remarks, meanwhile, can be made with respect to Spain. Here, too, the memoirs of French veterans are not to be relied upon, or, at least, taken at face value. Thus, in the first place, emphasising the guerilla war was a convenient way of explaining away French defeat in Iberia: the victors of Austerlitz, Jena and Friedland had only been worsted because they were confronted by an enemy who did not fight fair." (Esdaile - "Popular Resistance in the French wars" pp 207-208)
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The British in Peninsula.
It is a curious fact that by the mere force of circumstances the Spanish Catholics were driven to an alliance with protestant England, a power which the Spaniards were accustomed to look upon as the incarnation of the most damnable heresy, and little better than the Grand Turk himself became ally. Napier writes: "As early as April, General Castanos, then commanding the camp of San Roque, had entered into communication with Sir Hew Dalrymple, the Governor of Gibraltar. He was resolved to seize any opportunity that offered to resist the French, and he appears to have been the first Spaniard who united patriotism with prudent calculation - readily acknowldging the authority of the Junta of Seville, and stiffling the workings of self-interest, with a virtue by no means common to his countrymen at that period." (Napier - “History of the War in Peninsula 1807-1814” p 36) Britain profited from the campaign of 1809 after Napoleon had been compelled to leave Spain hurriedly to take command in Germany. Had he been able to remain on the Peninsula, it is probable the campaign in Spain would have turned out very differently. The Emperor might well have broken Spanish resistance and driven Wellington into the sea. (Rothenberg - "The Emperor's Last Victory" p 27) Wellington's corps in Spain was viewed by Russia, Prussia and Austria as of little importance, and the Allies generals saw no British troops in the main theater of war facing the Emperor himself. The Allies asked Great Britain to send troops into central Europe, to fight the French, but the Government refused. According to some British authors, it was Wellington's army, and not the Spaniards, was the primary cause of victory in Spain. Without the British, the guerillas would do more harm to the Spanish people than to the enemy. Napier writes: "That the guerilla system could never seriously affect the progress of the French, is proved by the fact, that the constant aim of the principal chiefs was to introduce the customs of regular troops; and their success against the enemy was proportionate to their progress in discipline and organization. There were not less than 50,000 of these irregular soldiers, at one time, in Spain; and so severely did they press upon the country tha it may be assumed as a truth, that if the English army had abandoned the contest, one of the surest means by which the French could have gained the good will of the nation would have been extirpating of the partidas." (- Napier Vol II, p 128)
During 1811 the British-Portuguese army did not share
the fate of that of Massena, was almost entirely the responsibility of the Royal Navy.
In sharp contrast to the Allied army, the French supply network was constantly disrupted by
guerilla bands and the rebellious population.
The French naval vessels, backed by a powerful force of privateers and American ships, instigated a relentless campaign againt British vessels, and by summer 1814, about 800 merchantmen had been sunk, damaged or captured, many of them in home waters. Gates writes: "With ships like USS 'Argus' rampaging up and down the English Channel (ext.link), Wellington's formerly smooth supply system was appreciably disrupted."
Moore's failed campaign.
This campaign began as follow: General Moore left a garrison in Lisbon of 10,000 men and entered Spain with 20,000 to aid the Spanish. His command was to be augmented with 16,000 more under General Baird being sent through Corunna. Moore hoped that his action will disrupt Napoleon's offensive and draw his attention away from Portugal. In the beginning of September arrived reinforcements. The British government designated another army (under Baird) to go to Peninsula and decided to assist the Spanish armies in the field. Moore arrived at Salamanca and after hearing of the defeat of Blake's Spaniards at Espinosa, the annihilation of Army of Estremadura and the destruction of Castaños at Tudela, he was having second thoughts about his own campaign. He rejected the entreaties of the Supreme Junta and ordered a withdrawal to Portugal. On Dec 5th however Moore received news that the population of Madrid offered resistance to the French army. A letter arrived from General La Romana, in which the Spaniard assured Moore that he had rallied Blake's divisions and was ready to take the field with 23,000 men. A captured dispatch revealed the isolation of Marshal Soult's scattered corps. Moore decided to strike a blow at the French communication lines at Burgos and guarding them Soult's troops and thus oblige Napoleon to relinquish his grip on Madrid. However, much of the information Moore received was incorrect. Madrid had surrendered to Napoleon on Dec 4th and on Dec 11th Moore received gloomy information about it.
Realising what Moore had in mind, the Emperor saw a golden opportunity to swing into his rear, while Soult contained him frontally. The British army would be encircled and destroyed. Napoleon took his army towards the Guadarrama Pass and in appalling weather led through the mountains. On December 30th, the main French army began crossing the Esla River, and Marshal Soult entered Leon. Napoleon pushed forward. Unfortunately the cares of his vast empire were plucking at his coattails. He received news of political intrigues at Paris and that Austria was again mobilising her large army. The Emperor was needed in France. On January 17th he began a breakneck ride for Paris, arriving there on the 24th.
With the Spanish armies defeatd and the British driven from the country, the winter 1808 seemed full of promise for the French troops. The projected invasion of Portugal - delayed by Moore's interference - could now go ahead. However, the interminable guerilla warfare continued to occupy vast numbers of French troops and the ever resilient Spaniards were soon raising new troops to fling into the fray.
Meanwhile fresh British troops were landing in Peninsula. Edward Costello of 95th Rifles writes:
"... after a tolerably pleasant voyage we anchored off Lisbon [28 June 1809]. From thence, in a few days, we proceeded in open boats up the River Tagus, and
landed about 4 miles from Santarem, where we encamped for the night. On the following day we marched into the city
of Santarem amid the cheers of its inhabitants, who welcomed us with loud cries
Viva os Ingleses valerosos !"
(Costello - "The Peninsular and Waterloo Campaigns" p 17)
As strategist Wellington was one of the best in Europe. Striking north, he surpised Soult and drove him into the interior. With Portugal in revolt all around him, Soult seemed doomed, but escaped by a daring march through the mountains to Orense. Wellesley then turned on Victor and advanced up the Tagus River together with Cuesta. Victor retired to Talavera, where Joseph joined him with the French reserves. Wellesley repulsed Victor in a 2-day battle, but had to retreat hurriedly when Soult, Ney, and Mortier emerged from the mountains to his left rear.
De Rocca writes: "The French sought, in vain, to provoke Lord Wellington to come out and give them battle. That modern Fabius [Fabius The Cunctator] remained immovable in his lines, and coolly contemplated his enemies below him, from the top of his high rocks." (de Rocca, - p 177) In 1811 Massena grimly held his starving army before Lisbon for a month, then fell back to Santarem, where Wellington did not choose to attack him. In March, with supplies exhausted, Massena managed a skillful retreat on Salamanca, with Ney again displaying a savage talent for rear-guard fighting. Soult, meanwhile captured Badajoz. Victor was defeated at Barrosa by Graham, but the cowardice of La Pena made it a fruitless success, and Victor soon renewed the blockade.
In April, Wellington besieged Almeida. Massena advanced to its relief, attacking Wellington
at Fuentes de Onoro (ext.link). The French claimed victory, because they won the passage at Poco
Velho, cleared the wood, turned the British right flank, obliged the cavalry to retire,
and forced Wellington to relinquish 3 miles of ground. The British also claimed victory because the village of Fuentes was in their hands and their
object (covering the blockade of Almeida) was attained. The French, without being in any
manner molested, retired.
Part of Wellington's army had besieged Badajoz, until Soult forced it to retire on Albuera. There, Soult outmaneuvered Beresford, but could not quite win the battle, and so retired to Seville. Wellington joined Beresford and unskillfully renewed the siege of Badajoz. Marmont (who had replaced Massena) joined Soult, and Wellington retired - but soon appeared before Ciudad Rodrigo. In September, Marmont crowded him back and reprovisioned that fortress.
During 1810-1811, the majority of the French annual conscript calls of 180.000-200.000
conscripts went to Spain and dramatically lowered the quality of the French troops.
The lack of seasoned officers caused replacement battalions and squadrons returning to
Spain to be led by inexperienced officers of reserve formations and second rate troops.
Additionally Napoleon considered the war in Spain so insignificant that he rarely bothered
to bring to it his military genius, relying instead on his marshals and simultaneously
launching his disastrous Russian campaign of 1812.
Between September 19 and October 21 Wellington besieged Burgos but failed to
capture it and retreated to Portugal being pursued by the enemy and losing several thousands men
Despite the heavy losses suffered during retreat, the year of 1812 was a good year for
Wellington, his troops captured Cuidad Rodrigo and Badajoz and defeated Marmont at Salamanca.
In August Wellington entered Madrid. By the way, one of several acts that soured relations between the British and the Spanish during the Peninsula War was the destruction of the famous ceramic factory in Madrid, wool factory, and Roman Bridge at Alcantara by Wellington's troops. In 1813 Wellington's army advanced against Joseph and Jourdan. In June Wellington (75,000-90,000) he routed the French (50,000-60,000) at Vittoria. After Vittoria Wellington failed to pursue effectively and the French recovered. He now shortened his communications by shifting his base of operations to the northern Spain coast, and began operations against san Sebastian and Pampeluna, at first unsuccessfully. Soult was given command of all French troops in Spain and advanced through western Pyrenees, but was finally repulsed. Wellington captured San Sebastian, later invading southern France as far as Bayonne. Soult fought and almost won at Toulouse, the last battle of the war. Suchet evacuated Valencia, but defeated two British expeditions from Sicily.
However, despite the advantages and victories in pitched battles, Wellington's campaign in Peninsula was "the most protracted campaign of the period". Claims were made that "the Peninsular War had been pursued with insufficient vigour."
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The Spanish Ulcer.
Could the Spaniards win the war without British money and Wellington's British-Portuguese army ? For France the war in Spain was if not a sideshow, it was of a secondary importance, with the exception of couple of years. Losing in Spain in 1812 or 1813 would have meant little if there was a decisive victory in Germany or Russia. Henri Lachoque writes: "No matter how grave affairs became in Spain Napoleon considered them of secondary importance. The principal danger lay in the east." (Lachoque - "The Anatomy of Glory" p 195) The war however had the greatest importance for the Spanish and Portuguese people. Without their determination to fight the French there would be no British expeditionary corps. There would be no resistance. After Napoleon's definite defeat, King Ferdinand VII, was restored to the Spanish throne and reigned with rigid absolutism.
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Sources and Links.
On picture: "the French arrived [at Tordesillas], sixty ... headed by Captain Guingret, a daring man,
formed a small raft to hold their arms and clothes, and plunged into the watre, holding their swords with their teeth,
swimming and pushing their raft before them. Under protection of a cannonande they crossed this
great river, though it was in full and strong water, and the weather very cold, and having reached the other side,
naked as they were, stormed the tower: the Brunswick regiment then abandoned the wood, and the gallant Frenchmen
remained masters of the bridge." (Napier - "History of the War in the Peninsula 1807-1814"
Vol IV, p 138)
According to David Gates there was a tremendous variety in the quality of soldiers
that Napoleon committed to the Peninsula at various stages of the war.
The first French army to march into Spain in 1808, for example, was predominantly composed of
inexperienced conscripts.
In Peninsula the French met serious problems while the Emperor seemed to ignore the food
question. In 1812 Marshal Marmont complained to Napoleon: "... the English army is always concentrated and can always be moved,
because it has an adequate supply of money and transport. 7,000 to 8,000 pack mules bring
up its daily food ... His Majesty may judge from this fact the comparison between their
means and our's -we have not 4 day's food in any of our magazines, we have no transport,
we cannot draw requisitions from the most wretched village without sending
thither a foraging party of 200 strong; to live from day to day, we have to scatter
detachments to vast distances, and always to be on the move ...
Lord Wellington is quite aware that I have no magazines, and is acquinted with the
immensely difficult character of the country, and its complete lack of food resources ... He knows that my army is not in a position to cross the Coa, even if nobody opposes me, and that if we did so we should have to turn back at the
end of 4 days, unable to carry on the campaign ..."
Spanish soldiers, picture by Funcken:
"It has been the practice of many historians to pour scorn on just about everything the
Spanish forces did and a good deal of this criticism is justified. However, the fact remains that without the
Spanish Army it is doubtful that the Allies would have won the war. Whilst it is true that
their soldiers and generals performed badly on a large number of occasisons,
it is also the case that Spanish units behaved outstandngly well on others: Baylen, Tamames
and Alcaniz are all examples of clear-cut Peninsular victories by indigenous armies and,
at San Marcial, in 1813, a major Imperial offensive was brought ot a complete standstill by the determined Spanish troops that lay in its path.
Indeed, by the later months of the war, the Spanish were providing some units of extremely
good quality ... 
Murat, a simple and unsophisticated soldier, squabbled with the Regency Junta by
Ferdinand to govern in the absence of the king.
On 2nd May disorders began in all of Madrid, and only in the evening the French were
again masters of the city. The French were attacked by the people of Madrid because
it protected the hated Godoy (one of the ministers of the Spanish sovereign Charles
IV who had taken shelter in France). Godoy's house was broken into and sacked, his
Guard hussars dispersed by the King's body-guard.
Chlapowski of Napoleon's Guard Lighthorse writes: "There were no more than 4,000 infantry in Madrid, the Fusiliers of the Guard,
12 artillery pieces and 200 Mamelukes at the Royal Palace. The cavalry of the Guard was stationed in villages 1 to 1.5 miles from the city ...
The inhibitants collected in the key areas around the city, armed with long swords and knives. Many had firearms.
Most of them gathered in the city center at the square called the Puerto del Sol, but they were also milling around in the side streets.
They shot at officers riding past with orders. Murat's ADC, Gobert, was stabbed several times in the legs as he fought his way through the Puerto del Sol, but despite this
he made it right across town to the Fusiliers, who straight away marched to the arsenal. They took it without a shot and dispersed the crowd which had taken a few old artillery pieces, but did not know how to fire them.
About 2,000 peasants and citizens were captured."
(Chlapowski - "Memoirs of a Polish Lancer" p. 36, translated by Tim Simmons)
Baron de Marbot described what he saw: "While defending the dismounted dragoon,
I had received a blow from a dagger in my jacket sleeve, and two of my troopers
had been slightly wounded. My orders were to bring the divisions to the Puerta del Sol,
and they started at a gallop. The squadrons of the guard, commanded by the celebrated
Daumesmil, marched first, with the Mamelukes leading.
The civilian population were treated by the French in a manner that ranged from the merely
boisterous to downright brutal. Rape, pillage, murder, thievery, drunkenness and anything
else were common. "... the number of towns whose inhabitants were accused of firing on the
French - most notably, Medina de Rio Seco and Chinchon - experienced appaling massacres.
To decribe this policy as genocide - a term that can certainly be applied in other contexts,
most notably the Vendee - would be to go too far.
Wherever the French soldiers went the Church's property was expropriated and the religious
orders dissolved. The French did not or could not distinguish between guerrilla and civilian.
Hence innocent civilians killed in reprisal or revenge.
The Spaniards rarely surrendered a city without a siege, and usually fought
fiercely even after the city walls were breached.
"It would be impossible correctly to describe the spectacle which was then presented by the
unfortunate city of Saragossa. The hospitals could no longer admit any more sick or wounded.
The burying grounds were too small for the number of dead carried thither;
the corpses sewed up in cloth bags were lying by hundreds at the doors of the several
churches." (Suchet - "War in Spain")
In May 1808, the whole Spain was up in arms against the French.
Juntas led the revolts from Aragon to Galicia, and from Catalonia to Asturia.
Despite this situation Murat continued to send relatively optimistic reports to Napoleon
and so, the Emperor was badly misinformed about the true nature of the war.
To deal with the supposedly weak and isolated trouble spots, Napoleon
drew up a plan which Murat put into operation. Large army was to be kept at and around
Madrid, while Dupont's corps was to move on Cordova and Seville.
On 19th July 1808 the Spanish troops defeated Dupont at Baylen (Bailén, Bailen).
The battle went wrong for the French already in the beginning. "The Spanish General had 25.000
regular infantry, 2,000 cavalry and a very heavy train of artillery. Large bodies of armed peasantry,
commanded by officers of the line, attended this army, and the numbers varied from day to day, but the whole multitude that advanced towards the Guadalquivir could not have been less
than 50,000 men." (Napier - p 90)
The news about French defeat at Baylen sent shock waves throughout Europe. The Spanish regiments proclaimed themselves the "conquerors of the conquerors of Austerlitz."
Napoleon was furious: "The capitulation of Baylen ruined everything.
In order to save his wagons of booty, Dupont commited his soldiers to the disgrace
of a surrender that is without parallel."
Picture: guerillas attack on French convoy. Picture by: ???
Napoleon, failing to grasp the nature of the revolt in Spain, issued orders to the marshals which
incl. the usual talk of 'flying columns', making examples', 'utilising the Spanish authorities' and so on.
He assumed that the French troops would be capable of holding the territory and be free to release units for service
in other theaters.
The guerrillas ambushed French convoys, attacked French encampments, and pounced upon, dodged,
and fought French columns. Local guides could not be trusted unless their families were held hostage for their good
behaviour. It was best to move quickly and by night. Lists of casualties included many
"ambushed" and "disappeared". Couriers and convoys could get through only under strong escort
from one fortified post to another.
Likewise, on a number of occassions, Wellington owed his salvation to the intelligence role
of the guerillas. Gates writes: "Immediately after Talavera ... [Wellington] confidently marched off to attack what he believed to be only 10,000 French troops with a force of 18,000-strong.
In fact, the Imperial 'detachment' consisted of three entire army corps and numbered well over
50,000 men. Had Wellington not received a timely warning of his miscalculation
from the guerillas, it is extremely probable that in the ensuing battle both he and the British army would
have ceased to be active factors in the scenarios of the Peninsular war. As it was, he was able to
retreat in time." (- Gates, p 35)
The Spaniards were fired up by priests who were terrified by the fate that had fallen upon
their brethren in France.
The Spanish clergy was hostile not only to the French atheists and occupants but also
to English "heretics". Local peasants sometimes had hidden all their kids having
been told the English would eat them.
The war was fought with 
"In so far as the world of the Anglo-Saxon historiography was concerned, Oman's magisterial conclusions set a seal of approval on the guerillas, the eighty years that have passed since the publication of the last volume
of his work having been accompanied by a veritable chorus of praise. On all sides the many populists who chose to write about the Peninsular War leapt to acknowledge
the exploits of the guerillas. To quote Longford, for example: 'Spain was to be saved ... not by grape-shot, greybeards and grandees, but by a hardy guerillas and the sudden flash of the knife ... Even the basic force of 200,000
veterans which Napoleon was compelled to keep, year after year, in Spain would never be safe
from the noon-day ambush and things that went bump in the night.' Charles Esdaile continues "It was not just the writers of popular history
who echoed the general refrain, however. Amongst historians of greater pretention Oman's theories
have also been accepted without question and even pushed to fresh lengths. 'It was above all,' wrote David Chandler,
'the interaction of Wellngton's operations with those of the guerilla bands that ... made the French problem wholly intractible ... Even with 320,000 men the marshals
could not both contain the diffuse ... 'war of the flea' and at the same time ... meet
Wellington's latest foray deep into their territory.'
On picture: in 1812 the second in command of the British army,
Lord Paget, was captured by French dragoons. In 1809 the first in command, Wellington, was
almost captured at Combat of Casa de Salinas.
According to David Gates without the Royal Navy, Great Britain's campaign in Spain and Portugal could never have been waged
and certainly not with the success that was eventually achieved.
He writes: "As well as ferrying troops to and from
the war zone, the fleet transported virtually all the gold, equipment, food and munitions used by the Allied armies
and guerillas. ... Moreover, whereas the lack of any naval support of their own confined the French
to moving via the appalling Peninsular roads, the Allied forces could frequently transport men and material by sea;
a method that was invariably safer, cheaper and quicker.
The total naval dominance lasted until 1812, when the USA interfered, albeit indirectly,
on the side of the French.
In 1812 the war with USA broke out and 
General Sir Moore's corps arrived at Maceira Bay on the 24 August with the following troops:
Fraser's Division (4 British btns.), Murray's Division (4 German btns.), Paget's Division
(2 German and 1 British btn. and German cavalry regiment), and artillery (2 German and 2
British batteries).
Napoleon already had been aware of Moore's army at Salamanca and was hurrying northwards. On Dec 19th three British deserters from the 60th Foot (actually they were Frenchmen captured at Trafalgar and enlisted in the British army) reached the French outposts with news that Moore's army had been in Salamanca as late as Dec 13th.
However, the chances of catching the British were slim. "Setting the weather aside, Moore was so far to the north that it was unlikely that a force from Madrid would ever have been able to cut him off.
The emperor's only chance, indeed, was that his opponent would be caught unawares, but Moore was well aware of the danger and fled westwards as soon as he got news that Napoleon was on the march, whilst he had also long since requested that his transports should be sent round from Lisbon to La Corunna. Vigorous action on the part of Soult, it is true, might just have slowed Moore down enough to allow Napoleon's forces to get behind him, but the marshal elected to wait for the first reinforcements that were being sent up to him from Burgos and then was slowed down by pouring rain ..." (Esdaile - "The Peninsular War")
Soult was left with only 16,000 infantry and 3,500 cavalry. He pressed Moore hard, but ran no unnecessary risks.
The British general sent his light troops through Orense to Vigo, where they embarked on the 17th. General La Romana moved southward. At midnight, after the destruction of the remaining stores and 500 horses, Moore ordered his army back on the Corunna road.
Other than for the rearguard and the Guards the discipline of many of the British regiments
disintegrated. Moore finally halted in Corunna.
Marshal Soult began to collect his scattered troops for battle. However, the appearance of British warships and transport fleet and the detonation of 4,000 barrels of gunpowder - convinced the Frenchman that the British's escape was imminent. Realising that he could delay no longer, re resolved to attack immediately.
In the battle Moore was mortally wounded.
General Hope pressed the embarkation. Benjamin Miller writes: "As we drifted down the harbour we saw hundreds of our
soldiers, which had been doing duty in the garrison, sitting on the rocks by the water's side … waving their hats and calling for
the boats to take them off …" The British had almost finished the embarkation by morning, when French artillery came into
action from cliffs overlooking the bay. Cpt. Gordon writes: "The French … opened a cannonade upon the shipping in the harbour, which caused great confusion amongst the transports. Many were obliged to cut their cables, some suffered damage by running foul of each other, and 5 or 6 were abandoned by their crews and drifted on shore."
The expedition reached England between 21 and 23 June, having lost some 8,800 men. "The people of Portsmouth looked
on in horror at the spectacle that was emerging from the harbour. The British expeditionary force had returned home, but
there was no grand parade through the streets, no pomp or colour, no tale of victory. What appeared seemed rather to be
the mere wreckage of an army." (Esdaile - "The Peninsular War" p 140)
By May 1809, the French armies were victorious almost everywhere in Spain.
Victor advanced on Badajoz, defeating Cuesta at Medellin. Soult occupied northern Portugal,
but halted at Oporto to refit his army before advancing on Lisbon. In April Wellesley took
command of the British army in Portugal, plus a new, British-trained Portuguese army.
Wellington was a skilfull tactician, and later he earned reputation for being a cautious general
who only fought defensive actions from positions of overwhelming strength (named by some Fabius The Cunctator).
In 1810 Soult rapidly cleared all of southern Spain except Cadiz, which he left Victor to
blockade. Massena took Ciudad Rodrigo, and forced Wellington back through Almeida to Busaco,
where Wellington offered battle. Goaded by his headstrong corps commanders, Massena made an
unsuccessful frontal attack. The next day, he turned Wellington's flank, and the latter
thereupon retired - devastating the countryside as he went - into a previously fortified
position called the "Lines of Torres Verdes."
Picture: British infantry storming Badajoz, by Mark Churms.
Enjoying many advantages over the French, Wellington achieved a record of victory perhaps
unmatched in the history of the British army. The British infantry performed gallantly especially
when placed on a strong defensive position. Wellington's Portuguese and German troops
were steady and respected by British and French alike. In the English speaking world, Wellington's campaign in Peninsula became the most popular napoleonic campaign among
wargamers.
Battles alone don't win this type of wars. British military historian Hart writes:
"... the presence of the British Expeditionary Corps was an essential foundation... Wellington's battles were materially the least effective part of the operations.
By them he [Wellington] inflicted a total loss of some 45,000 men only - counting killed,
wounded and prisoners - on the French during the 5 years' campaign... whereas Marbot reckoned
that the number of French deaths alone during this period averaged 100 a day.
Hence it is a clear deduction that the overwhelming majority of the losses which drained
the French strength, and their morale still more, was due to the operations of the
guerillas..." (Hart - "Strategy" 1991, pp 110-111)
