. A captured French dispatch revealed the isolation of Soult's scattered troops. Moore decided to attack them. Moore's advance into Spain. "Threatening Napoleon’s communications was as dangerous as trying to snatch the prey from a lion." - Cyril Falls, Oxford University "Moore took up his post on 6 Oct, and orders shortly arrived for him to advance into Leon.... However, the transport and logistical problems that bedevilled all armies in the Peninsula soon plunged the British commander's calculations into confusion. Moore and his staff were remarkably ignorant of the geography of the country they were to cross, and little useful information could be extracted from the Portuguese." (Gates - "The Spanish Ulcer" p 106) Meanwhile Baird was having difficulties getting his force to move as fast as he wished. He made a landing at Corunna on Oct 26th and by Nov 22nd his corps had penetrated no further than Astorga. Moore arrived at Salamanca and after hearing of the defeat of Blake's Spaniards at Espinosa, the annihilation of Army of Estremadura and the destruction of Castaños at Tudela, he was having second thoughts about his own campaign. He rejected the entreaties of the Supreme Junta and ordered a withdrawal to Portugal. On Dec 5th however Moore received news that the population of Madrid offered resistance to the French army. A letter arrived from General La Romana, in which the Spaniard assured Moore that he had rallied Blake's divisions and was ready to take the field with 23,000 men. Pedro Caro y Sureda, 3rd Marqués de la Romana began his military career in the navy. Jose M. Rodriguez of napoleon-series.org writes: "... Pedro was promoted to ensign and aide to General Moreno. When, in 1779, Spain and Great Britain went to war ... the [Spanish] king ordered an attack to retake the island of Minorca (in British hands since 1763). A fleet ... with 8,000 soldiers on board, was dispatched to the island. The land forces were under the command of General Moreno, and so the young Pedro was attached to him. On Feb 5th, 1781, the last British post, the castle of San Felipe, surrendered ... and Minorca returned to Spanish hands." A captured dispatch revealed the isolation of Marshal Soult's scattered corps. Moore decided to strike a blow at the French communication lines at Burgos and guarding them Soult's troops and thus oblige Napoleon to relinquish his grip on Madrid. However, much of the information Moore received was incorrect. Madrid had surrendered to Napoleon on Dec 4th and on Dec 11th Moore received gloomy information about it. On Dec 13th British cavalry picked up a copy of Napoleon's order to Soult. Thus advised as to the location of the various French units, Moore decided that he had time for a hit-and-run attack on Soult. One of Soult's infantry divisions being in Santander and his cavalry brigade in the Tagus valley, there seemed every chance that he could be overwhelmed before he could receive any help. Moore crossed the Douro at Zamora. On Dec 20th he swinged to the left, linked up with Baird at Mayorga and established contact with La Romana. Moore was warned by Romana that Napoleon had been advancing northward. Meanwhile Moore's cavalry surprised Soult's cavalry picket at Sahagun, but the fugitives fled to the main body and warned of the danger. Soult sent a messenger to Napoleon informing him of the British and asking him for reinforcements. Napoleon already had been aware of Moore's army at Salamanca and was hurrying northwards. On Dec 19th three British deserters from the 60th Foot (actually they were Frenchmen captured at Trafalgar and enlisted in the British army) reached the French outposts with news that Moore's army had been in Salamanca as late as Dec 13th. However, the chances of catching the British were slim. "Setting the weather aside, Moore was so far to the north that it was unlikely that a force from Madrid would ever have been able to cut him off. The emperor's only chance, indeed, was that his opponent would be caught unawares, but Moore was well aware of the danger and fled westwards as soon as he got news that Napoleon was on the march, whilst he had also long since requested that his transports should be sent round from Lisbon to La Corunna. Vigorous action on the part of Soult, it is true, might just have slowed Moore down enough to allow Napoleon's forces to get behind him, but the marshal elected to wait for the first reinforcements that were being sent up to him from Burgos and then was slowed down by pouring rain ..." (Esdaile - "The Peninsular War")

. Moore "fled westwards as soon as he got news that Napoleon was on the march" - Charles Esdaile “The English are running away as fast as they can.” - Napoleon Realising what Moore had in mind, the Emperor saw a golden opportunity to swing into his rear, while Soult contained him frontally. The British army would be encircled and destroyed. Napoleon took his army towards the Guadarrama Pass and in appalling weather led through the mountains. He believed that Moore's communications stretched back from Valladolid and along the Douro. But Moore's army was actually further north. Napoleon ordered Lahoussaye's cavalry to scout westward toward Salamanca. The VIII Corps and Lorge's dragoon division were assigned to Soult, who was instructed to maneuver to fix the English while Napoleon cut them off from Salamanca. Napoleon had decided that the appearance of British infantry in Valladolid would be a good indication that Moore was in earnest, and he therefore would remain in Madrid until this was reported. When the report reached him that afternoon, he ordered Lapisse, Dessoles and part of his Guard to march at once. It seemed obvious that Moore had changed bases and that Soult might be in considerable danger. However by hard marching, he hoped to overtake and destroy Moore. Napoleon's crossing of the Sierra Guadarrama. Napoleon walked 8 miles up the steepest part of the pass, arm in arm with his soldiers. Lapisse's infantrymen "exasperated by fatigue, shouted insults as he passed." In the Sierra Guadarrama the French were struck by a terrible blizzard, the cavalry was forced to dismount, and when the snow turned to rain the infantrymen were struggling through deep mud. Coignet remembers fording a freezing river and emerging with his legs "as red as lobsters". Napoleon walked 8 miles up the steepest part of the pass, arm in arm with his soldiers. Lapisse's infantrymen "exasperated by fatigue, shouted insults as he passed." Ney's corps cavalry lacked the strength for long-range reconnaissance through this broken country. Though it found Salamanca evacuated, thus confirming Napoleon's deduction that Moore had given up Lisbon for another base, farther north, it also reported the English no farther ahead than Valladolid. Napoleon felt so hopeful that - while ordering Ney to seize the Tordesillas Bridge - he wrote to Joseph to have Madrid papers publish the news that "20,000 English are cornered and doomed." The actual situation was considerably different. Moore was reported nearing Valladolid, and La Romana advancing from Leon. On 21st British cavalry surprised and defeated Debelle at Sahagun. Learning that Ney had reached Tordesillas, Soult ordered an advance through Sahagun to fix the enemy, while Ney came in on their flank and rear. Napoleon feared that the English might flee before he brought them to battle. It was extremely fortunate for Moore that the Emperor found it as difficult as he did to get accurate information of British movements. The British had far better knowledge of the French positions "due to the [Spanish] guerillas' capture of large numbers of French couriers." Esdaile - "The Peninsular War" Had Moore been at Valladolid, his army would have been destroyed. It was extremely fortunate for Moore that the Emperor found it as difficult as he did to get accurate information of enemy movements and that he was 50 miles further than his enemy supposed. The British had far better knowledge of the French positions. "If Moore's operations were being conducted with a sure grasp of the positions and intentions of the enemy, it was in large part due to the guerillas' capture of large numbers of French couriers. Not until 15 December was Soult informed that Moore was on the move, whilst Napoleon did not hear of the matter for another 4 days." (Esdaile - "The Peninsular War" p 148) Napoleon learned about Moore's presence at Sahagun area, but his own troops were so exhausted that he had allowed them to rest most of the 26th. On the next day Napoleon sent his army forward at daybreak, Marshal Ney leading. Unfortunately, worried that Soult might be too weak to resist a major offensive, he directed Ney toward Medina-de-Rio-Seco, instead of Benavente. By the 28th, with English infantry reported in Benavente, it was evident that Moore was retreating. Napoleon feared that the English might flee before he brought them to battle. Still hopeful of striking Moore's flank, he drove his troops forward along roads knee-deep in mud, galloping ahead of them with a small escort in his anxiety to determine whether Moore were retiring through Astorga or Zamora. During the 28th and 29th, he checked his infantry along the flooded Esla River, awaiting the outcome of his cavalry reconnaissances - which proved disappointing. Ney's cavalry could not find a ford. La Romana's troops were defeated at Mansilla and were compelled to relinquish Laon. La Romana's corps joined the British in Astorga. Small Combat at Benavente. Despite the moral-boosting success in this combat, Moore's retreat towards the sea continued. At Benavente a small French cavalry force was ambushed and defeated by the British and German cavalry. French General Lefebvre-Desnouettes crossed the river with 600 cavalrymen and impetuously attacked the British and German cavalry. The enemy at first gave way. General Stewart soon brought in more cavalry. The French continued advancing, until Lord Paget, accompanied by a hussar regiment forced them to re-cross the river. The British-German cavalry captured 70-100 prisoners, incl.Lefebvre-Desnouettes. Despite the moral-boosting success in this small combat, Moore's retreat towards the sea continued. Soult, meanwhile, maintained the pressure on the fleeing British corps. "… the enemy close at our heels, thirsting for our blood !" - W. Green of 95th Rifles. The French advance guard encountered evidence of the British's mounting demoralization. Many British units' morale cracked once the headlong retreat began. Everywhere, Soult's advance guard encountered evidence of the British's mounting demoralization; the roads were littered with wagons, supplies, equipment, weapons and scores of stragglers who were captured at every turn. Sullen, the British treated Galicia like a hostile country. Moore writes: “The people run away, the villages are deserted, and I have been obliged to destroy great part of the ammunition and military stores. For the same reason I am obliged to leave the sick. In short, my sole object is to save the Army.” Almost every village which the British infantry passed, a cavalry officer of the rearguard reported, ‘exhibited melancholy proofs of the shameful devastation committed by the infantry which had preceded us; we observed in flames whilst we were at a considerable distance, and it was still burning when we passed through it. The inhabitants shouted ‘Viva los Francesces! and we overtook some stragglers who had been stripped and maltreated by the Spaniards. The Spaniards rang their church bells to evince their gratitude to God for having got rid of such a bunch of heretics and vandals. According to General Stewart the Spaniards "… abandoned their houses as the British army approached, locking their doors and concealing the little stock of provisions of which they were possessed … These things increased the irritation under which the troops already laboured. They [soldiers] began to look upon the Spaniards as enemies and treat them as people unworthy of consideration. This was severely retaliated by an enraged peasantry ..." The officers were quite unable to control their men. Except of the rearguard and a few of the more ordely regiments such as the Guards, the discipline no longer existed. One officer wrote: “In the end Vilafranca was literally plundered, and the drunkenness that prevailed among the troops led to the most shameful incidents. Down by the river the artillery destroyed all their stores, and lighting big fires burnt all their ammunition wagons, which they broke up for the purpose. They also threw all their ammunition into the river.” "They [British stragglers] were soon overtaken by the French chasseurs who treated them most unmercifully ..." -Captain Gordon According to Commissary Schaumann the combination of raw salt fish and rum ‘in empty stomachs’ resulted in the death of many men. “One of them took up a defiant attitude, a la Fabius, in the middle of the road, and with fixed bayonet shouted that he was General Moore.” The commander in chief ordered his troops out of town and back onto the Corunna road, but 'Great numbers would not leave the town, but concealed themselves in the wine cellars, which they had broken open, and were left there." (Summerville - "March of Death" p 120) Bembibre exhibited all the appearance of a place lately stormed and pillaged. Every door and window was broken. Wagon after wagon was abandoned and even the headquarters' supply of ready cash had to be thrown into a ravine. At Bembibre, the French dragoons rounded up hundreds of drunken British soldiers, and at Villafranca, British deserters were found to have looted their own army's depots ! Cpt. Gordon writes: "They [British stragglers] were soon overtaken by the French chasseurs who treated them most unmercifully, cutting to their right and left, and sparing none who came within reach of their swords." A few maimed and lacerated survivors made the safety of the British column, their injuries arousing howls of horror, pity, and outrage. Moore made public exhibits of them, in the hope that their shocking wounds might deter others from quitting the colours. The retreat remains a dark chapter in the history of the British army. Napoleon received news of political intrigues in Paris and that Austria was mobilising her large army. On December 30th, the main French army began crossing the Esla River, and Marshal Soult entered Leon. Napoleon pushed forward. Unfortunately the cares of his vast empire were plucking at his coattails. He received news of political intrigues at Paris and that Austria was again mobilising her large army. On January 1st, the Emperor left Benavente, still hopeful that Moore would stand at Astorga. Some distance from Astorga, a messenger from Paris overtook him: Austria seemed on the verge of declaring war; Fouche and Talleyrand were deep in intrigues against him; The Emperor was needed in France. On January 17th he began a breakneck ride for Paris, arriving there on the 24th. Before leaving, Napoleon announced his decisions: - the Guard and Lapisse's infantry would return to Benavente - Ney would concentrate at Astorga - only Soult (3 infantry divisions, light cavalry, 2 dragoon divisions) would continue the direct pursuit.

. "La Romana tried to persuade him [Moore] to hold the mountain passes ..." - Summerville Marshal Soult takes over command from Napoleon. Soult pressed Moore hard, but ran no unnecessary risks. Soult was left with only 16,000 infantry and 3,500 cavalry. He pressed Moore hard, but ran no unnecessary risks. "Moore had previously let it be known that he hoped to make a stand at Astorga and, upon his arrival, Romana tried to persuade him to hold the mountain passes … in the rear of the town… The idea was not totally without merit… and 25.000 British troops were more than enough to defend the two narrow defiles, yet Sir Moore dismissed the possibility out of hand." (Summerville - p 85) The British general sent his light troops through Orense to Vigo, where they embarked on the 17th. General La Romana moved southward. At midnight, after the destruction of the remaining stores and 500 horses, Moore ordered his army back on the Corunna road. "The country the English left behind them in their retreat was totally wasted, and every night Soult's troops had to seek provisions at very great distances from the beaten road, which considerably retarded their march and augmented their fatigues." (de Rocca - p 65) There were several small combats between the French advance guard and British rear guard. "… at about 1 PM, with Colbert closing in on Cacabellos, Paget hustled his troops down the snow-clad hill and across the Cua to the safety of the western bank. Here, screened by the vineyard walls, his infantry fanned out into extended order, while the 6 guns of Carthew's artillery battery were wheeled into position astride the road commanding the bridge. Moments later, Colbert's troopers poured over the brow of the recently-vacated hill, pursuing the riflemen and hussars of Paget's pickets into Cacabellos itself. It was in this point that, according to Cpt. Gordon, the 15th Hussars made a stand … 'For some minutes were were so jammed together in a narrow street that it was impossible for either party to advance or retire. … Nevertheless, the flood of the French horsemen proved too much for Gordon and his comrades and they eventually broke, stampeding through the ranks of retreating riflemen (as well as panic-stricken staff officers out on reconnaissance) and making a mad dash for the bridge… Blakeney described the scene … 'The situation of the Light Company [of the 28th Foot] was now very embarrassing, in danger of being trampled down by our own cavalry [hussars], who rode over everything which came in their way… for in their confusion the were firing in every direction … and we were so mixed up with them and our own cavalry that we could offer no formation to receive the enemy…' As for Colbert's men, though they had hacked down several British hussars and taken 48 riflemen prisoner … had been recalled by their commander in order to rally, prior to launching of another sortie." (Summerville - p 125) The French light cavalry under Franceschi bagged some 500 British prisoners on the road. There were also deserters and sick. Five guns and thousands of muskets intended for Romana's army were dumped in the river at Betanzos. "Moore lost around 1,000 men on the road from Lugo…" (Summerville - p 165) In military terms, Moore's decision to retreat was probably sensible enough, but in other aspects it was a disaster. Especially from the Spanish point of view. Having first failed to appear in time to meet Napoleon's counter-offensive and then allowed Madrid to fall without firing a shot, the British seemed to be abandoning Spain altogether. British and Spanish troops separated. While the British had to reach Corunna where the Royal Navy was to evacuate them, the Spaniards had no such haven to run to. At all events La Romana was absolutely furious, for many of the supplies stored at Astorga had been intended for his army, whilst Moore had initially promised him that he would defend the town. And there was worse to come. As Moore retreated so desertion, drunkeness and large number of British stragglers appeared. While the British army had to reach Corunna where the Royal Navy was to evacuate them, La Romana's Spanish troops had no such haven to run to. Soon the British and Spanish troops separated. Soult sent Francesci's cavalry after La Romana who fell on the Spanish rear guard at the Foncebabon Pass and captured 1,500 prisoners. Romana had planned to withdraw northward into Asturias. Now, finding the passes there blocked with snow, he turned toward Astorga, crowding in on Moore's withdrawal. In Astorga "many British soldiers took to prowling the streets in search of alcohol. .. Fights were started with Romana's troops over possession of the best billets; shops and houses were looted … The excesses committed by the British moved Romana to lodge an official complaint with Moore…" (Summerville - p 82) "The English have seized ... the mules and oxen that drew our army's artillery, munitions and baggage train. ... They have killed 3 magistrates and various other inhabitants. ... They have not paid for the carts and animals that they have used to move their women and their immense baggage trains. ... In a word the French themselves could not have found agents better calculated to whip up hate of the British than the army commanded by General Sir Moore." (- General La Romana) “The retreat was more properly a flight.” - C. Robinson General Stewart writes: "In Astorga, the blowing up of ammunition wagons, the destruction of entrenching tools and the committal of field equipments to the flames for a whole division, gave signal for all the bad passions of those who witnessed them, to let loose; and, mortifying as it is to confess it, the fact cannot be denied, that from that hour we no longer resembled a British army." According to Crabb Robinson “The retreat was more properly a flight. It was conducted very blunderingly and with precipitation.” Inexperienced English officers, unaware of the hardships to come, had permitted a large number of women to accompany the army at the outset of the campaign. Their plight was one of the most tragic aspects of the whole retreat. Cpt. Patterson of 50th Foot writes: “Whenever we gained summit of a hill, all eyes were on the watch to catch a glimpse looked out for ships.” Harris writes that "Many talked of home and recollected previous Christmas Eves in Old England, shredding tears as they spoke of the relatives never to be seen again…" With Napoleon and his army gone, the general outlook improved much. According to Sir Oman, Moore "shocked at the state of indiscipline into which his regiments were falling, throught only of getting to the sea as quickly as possible." "Moore had made the safety of the mountains and his eventual salvation - courtesy of the Royal Navy - seemed all but guaranteed." (Summerville - p 91) But with Napoleon and his army gone, the general outlook improved so much that Moore even offerred battle in an extremely strong position outside Lugo. He eventually decided to take the road again when Soult declined to attack immediately. The weather was atrocious and Soult's troops were stretched across the mountains. "Lieutenant General Cradock had tried to reinforce Moore's army in early December by sending forward Brigadier General Cameron with the 1/45th Regiment, 1/82nd Regiment, and the 97th Regiment. Only the 1/82nd Regiment got through and the others turned back. Sometime betwen 26-29 December, Brigadier Generals R. Stewart and Drieberg with the 29th Regiment, 2/31st Regiment, 5th Battalion and 7th Line Battalion King's German Legion, and half-brigades of light 6 pounders under Lawson and Rettberg were sent to reinforce Moore's army; however, they only reached Castello Branco and on 8 January they turned back to Abrantes. On 5 January, Brigadier General Cameron, with 1/45th Regiment 97th Regiment and the convalescents of Moore's army, advanced again into Spain, but on 9 January news of Moore's retreat caused him to return. Lieutenant General Cradock, on 14 January, ordered a Brigade [probably commanded by Major General Mackenzie] of 14th Light Dragoons, 2/9th Regiment, and 3/27th Regiment to embark for Vigo and try to reach Moore's army from there. While still in the Tagus, news of Moore's retreat caused them to disembark." (- Ron McGuigan, napoleon-series.org)

. "The people of Corunna, however, were inspired with nothing but pity at the sight of Moore's army." - Summerville - p 169 In Corunna. The brave Spanish mayor of the city of Corunna, galloped round the streets, shouting words of encouragement and giving advice. Shopkeepers and barbers were given muskets. The British troops who finally reached Corunna were in very poor state. "The people of Corunna, however, were inspired with nothing but pity at the sight of Moore's army. In fact, so shocked and appalled were they at this procession of spectres-men hollowed out by hardships … that they made sign of cross as the soldiers passed." (Summerville - p 169) Cpt. Gordon of 15th Hussars writes: “A comparison drawn at this period between the British army and Romana’s mob would not have been much in favour of the former.” The brave Spanish mayor of the city of Corunna, on a fine Andalusian stallion, galloped round the streets, shouting words of encouragement and giving advice. Shopkeepers and barbers were given muskets from the British stores and looked as if they meant to use them. Even the women [of Corunna] pitched in, willingly supplying the batteries with baskets of ammunition, which they carried on their heads. " ...La Corunna and its environs were crammed with stores and munitions of all sorts, most of which had to be burned or blown up ..." (Esdaile - "The Peninsular War" 2002, p 155) Most of the British artillery wagons that had escaped the holocaust at Villafranca were thrown over the cliffs into the sea. By January 14th, most of what could not be used by the British army and its Spanish allies had been destroyed. On the evening of that day over 100 transports and 12 warships sailed into the bay from Vigo, and at last the embarkation could begin. Hastily, before the wind should change, the remainder of the sick, all the guns except nine, and all the cavalry regiments, which would be of little use on the rocky broken slopes outside the town, were sent aboard. Less than 1,000 horses went with them. The rest had to be killed. The slaughter of the horses was performed with appalling clumsiness. The horses were brought to the edge of the cliffs overhanging the beach and were shot and then pushed over on the sands below where soldiers with hammers ‘despatched those who had landed there alive because of a badly aimed shot. So uncertainly, in fact, were the pistols aimed that the men were advised to cut the horses’ throats with swords instead of trying to shoot them. Many terrified horses neighed and screamed as the sight of their fellows struggling on the blood-splashed beach. Moore could not hope that the infantry would be able to follow the cavalry with as little interference from the enemy. Reports had reached him that Soult’s engineers had come up to repair the bridge at Burgo a few hours after Paget had been withdrawn, and the infantry divisions of Merle and Merment were now streaming across it towards the Heights of Palavea. Moore ordered preparations for departure and the destruction of 4,000 barrels of gunpowder. The blast had broken virtually every window in Corunna.

. According to Haythornthwaite the British troops had been rested and many re-equipped with new muskets, whereas Soult's infantry was handicapped by damaged ammunition and battered weapons. The Battle. The appearance of warships and transport fleet and the detonation of 4,000 barrels of gunpowder - convinced the Frenchman that the British's escape was imminent. Like those in Dunkirk in 1940, the British forces in Corunna were in dire peril, trapped with their backs to the sea. Marshal Soult began to collect his scattered troops for battle. However, the appearance of British warships and transport fleet and the detonation of 4,000 barrels of gunpowder - convinced the Frenchman that the British's escape was imminent. Realising that he could delay no longer, re resolved to attack immediately. Moore earmarked troops to cover the embarkation. Soult delayed by blown bridges, appeared at Corunna after the British. French and British Order of Battle. Cavalry was of very little use in the rugged terrain. "The nature of the ground also prevented any movement of artillery on either side." The strength of the French troops at Corunna vary from author to author. The most often given numbers are 15,000 men, 16,000 men, 20,000 men and even 24,000 men. According to Hibbert, Marshal Soult had 16,000 men in three infantry and three cavalry divisions. Since cavalry (3,600 men) was of very little use in the rugged terrain, Soult could use 12,000 infantrymen. The strength of Moore's army at Corunna is given at 15,000 men, 16,000 men and 20,000 men. "Since Sir John had lost some 5.000 men on the reatreat, and was in the process of shipping his cavalry and artillery - plus 3,000 sick and wounded - he would be left with approx. 15,000 foot soldiers with which to hold the ground." ... "Moore's decision to despatch the light brigades to the port of Vigo, south of Corunna, was a controversial one which has divided historians ever since… Oman - with the benefit of hindsight - states, '3.500 fine soldiers were wasted for all fighting purposes." (- Summerville) General Moore Marshal Soult 16,000 infantry 12,000 infantry According to Haythornthwaite the British troops had been rested and many re-equipped with new muskets, whereas Soult's infantry was handicapped by damaged ammunition and battered muskets. (Haythornthwaite - "Corunna 1809" p 91) One of Soult's divisional commanders was Henri-Francois Delaborde (1764-1833). Delaborde was son of a baker and was educated for the church. He was a leanly big man and spoke Latin language. According to Colonel Elting "he said little, but what he said was very definite." In the beginning of the French Revolution he joined the volunteers and passing rapidly through all the junior grades was made general of brigade after the battle of Rhein-Zabern (1793). He was present at the siege of Toulon and promoted general of division. In 1807 Delaborde was training new conscripts at his camp at Pontivy in France. Commander - Marshal Soult Infantry [French infantry was handicapped by damaged ammunition and battered muskets.] Cavalry Infantry Division - General Merle - - - - - - - 2nd Light Regiment (3 btns.) - - - - - - - 4th Light Regiment (4 btns.) - - - - - - - 15th Line Regiment (3 btns.) - - - - - - - 36th Line Regiment (3 btns.) Infantry Division - General Delaborde - - - - - - - 17th Light Regiment (3 btns.) - - - - - - - 76th Line Regiment (4 btns.) - - - - - - - 86th Line Regiment (3 btns.) - - - - - - - 4th Swiss Regiment (1 btn.) Infantry Division - General Merment - - - - - - - 31st Light Regiment (4 btns.) - - - - - - - 47th Line Regiment (4 btns.) - - - - - - - 122nd Line Regiment (4 btns.) - - - - - - - 2nd Swiss Regiment (2 btns.) - - - - - - - 3rd Swiss Regiment (1 btn.) Cavalry Division - GdD Franceschi - - - - - Light Cavalry Regiment - - - - - Light Cavalry Regiment - - - - - Light Cavalry Regiment - - - - - Dragoon Regiment Cavalry Division - GdD Lahoussaye - - - - - Dragoon Regiment - - - - - Dragoon Regiment - - - - - Dragoon Regiment - - - - - Dragoon Regiment Cavalry Division - GdD Lorge - - - - - Dragoon Regiment - - - - - Dragoon Regiment - - - - - Dragoon Regiment - - - - - Dragoon Regiment One of Moore's divisional commanders was Lord Paget (later Lord Uxbridge, and subsequently Marquis of Anglesey). Henry Paget was not only an excellent officer but also a womanizer. When he decided to elope with Wellington's sister-in-law (and got her pregnant, before returning her to a tearful husband only to elope for a second time, forcing a parliamentary divorce and then marrying the lady), the military establishment in London wrongly supposed that his talents were no longer required by Wellington because of the scandal. Lord Paget was a brave man, and well known general. Commander - General Moore Infantry [British infantry was had been rested and many re-equipped with new muskets.] Cavalry 1st Division - General Baird (5,000 men) - - - - - - - Warde - I, II/1st Foot Guards (2,000) - - - - - - - Manningham - III/1st, I/26th, II/81st Foot - - - - - - - Bentinck - I/42nd Highland, I/4th, I/50th Foot - - - - - - - artillery 2nd Division - General Hope (5,500 men) - - - - - - - Crawford - 71st Light, 92nd Highland, 36th Foot (2,000) - - - - - - - Leith - I/51st, II/59th, II/76th Foot - - - - - - - Hill - I/2nd, I/5th, II/14th, I/32nd Foot - - - - - - - Catlin - I/36th, I/71st, I/92nd Foot - - - - - - - artillery 3rd Division - General Fraser (?,??? men) - - - - - - - Beresford - I/6th, I/9th, II/23rd, II/43rd - - - - - - - Fane - I/38th, I/79th, I/82nd - - - - - - - artillery 4th (Reserve) Division - General Paget (?,??? men) - - - - - - - Anstruther - I/95th Rifles, I/52nd Light, I/20th Foot - - - - - - - Disney - I/28th, I/91st Foot - - - - - - - artillery Three of guns Moore gave to Paget; the remaining 6 he placed in pairs along the crest of Monte Mero. Cavalry and most artillery already on transports. Troops not participating in the battle: - Spanish garrison in Corunna under General Alcedo. - Spanish civilians armed with Spanish and British weapons. Map of battle of Corunna, 1809. Fraser's division was placed near Corunna. Lorge's dragoons were behind Delaborde's division. Franceschi's light cavalry was west of San Cristobal, facing Fraser. Considerable proportion of Soult’s army had never been engaged. The French infantry drove the British outpost from the Palavea and Penasquedo plateaus. Suddenly, from behind a curving, low stone wall beneath guns, a line of French infantry rose up and fired a volley of devastating effect. Colonel M’Kenzie and several of his men dropped dead. The rest turned and fled down the slope. When daylight came on January 15th the British guns had been waiting silently for 4 days. Moore had begun to doubt that the French would attack at all. But the French came. Soult sent captured Irish woman of 50th Foot that he should soon visit the British. "… some senior [British] officers thought the situation so perilous, so desperate, as to warrant peace talks with Soult." (Summerville - "March of Death" p 182) The last days were quiet but on 15th the whole scene changed. The Spanish people rushed up to roofs and balconies, and British sailors clambered up the ships’ rigging looking inland towards the hills. They had heard the sound of gun fire and were looking at each other with anxious enquiry. During the morning, when Delaborde’s infantry division had crossed the Mero River, the men of Mermet’s and Merle’s infantry divisions came up to the crest of the Penasquedo Heights. On their right Delaborde’s division climbed up the Heights of Palavea and dragged up 2 guns which before noon were firing across the valley at the forward regiments of Hope’s division. According to a soldier of the 42nd Highland "The French army did not advance very rapidly, on account of the badness of the ground." (Summerville "March of Death" p 186) Approx. 480 French tirailleurs spearheaded the attack. They were led by General Jardon, a tough, scarcely literate old soldier, hard-drinking and hard-swearing, who marched with his men, a musket in his hand and a dirty shirt on his back. The French infantry drove the British outpost from the Palavea and Penasquedo plateaus. Now walking, now running, they came on shouting, ‘En avant !’ Tuez ! Tuez ! En avant !’ pushing the English picquets before them, driving the light company of the 59th Regiment out of the village and then advancing up the slopes of Monte Mero. "When Laborde's division arrived ... the Duke of Dalmatia made no idle evolutions of display, for distributing his lighter guns along the front of his position, he opened a fire from the heavy battery on his left, and instantly descended the mountain with three columns, covered by clouds of skirmishers ... The nature of the ground also prevented any movement of artillery on either side, and the French columns in their attack were exposed to grape, which they could not return because of the distance of their batteries." (- Napier) Colonel M’Kenzie of the 5th Foot decided to take some companies of his regiment through the village of Piedralonga and make a charge on the guns, which, so far as he could see, were unsupported. He led his men through the village of Piedralonga and then opened them up in line for the charge up the slope beyond it. They ran few yards only. Suddenly, from behind a curving, low stone wall beneath guns, a line of French infantry rose up and fired a volley of devastating effect. Colonel M’Kenzie and several of his men dropped dead. The rest turned and fled down the slope. On the right, also, some lives were lost as a force of French cavalry edged forward and began a skirmish in the valley beneath the Heights of San Cristobal which continued intermittently all day. Bitter fighting for Elvina. The 50th Foot and 42nd Highland fired a volley and then rushed on with the bayonet. There was a brief and savage struggle, and then the French gave ground. They quickly recovered, however, and the Highlanders were held half-way down the slope. The French rallied and turned on the pursuers, the 50th, routing them and inflicting "grevious casualties." The redcoasts fled to their lines where Moore rallied them. It was 6 AM in the morning of 16th January. Moore mounted his … horse and rode off to his forward outposts along the ridge of Monte Mero. … He told Col. Anderson, who had been acting as Adjutant-General since Brigadier-General Clinton had gone to bed with diarrhea, that he hoped all the remaining baggage and horses would be aboard by 4 o’clock as he wanted the boats to be free by then for the embarkation of the reserve division…. At 12 o’clock the men of the reserve received orders to march for the harbour. At noon the French were in position and at 2 PM their principal battery opened fire on Elvina. Major Napier rode across his front to the ridge of his regiment. He noticed that each time a cannon shot whistled over their heads they all ducked. French General Mermet took light infantry and opened the ball. The French surged forward and fell on Bentinck's brigade. The British light infantry was quickly evicted from Elvina. The French 31st Light Regiment crashed straight into Elvina, drove out the British pickets, and continued up the slopes of Monte Mero. Eight French battalions advanced up the slopes beyond the village, while others wheeled to assail Bentinck's right. After passing Elvina, the French 31st Regiment had split into two. The right hand column, which had been marching up the slope against the 42nd Regiment, halted to deploy. The British 50th Foot and 42nd Highland fired a volley and then rushed on with the bayonet. There was a burst of ferocious shouting, a brief and savage struggle, and then the French gave ground. They quickly recovered, however, and the Highlanders were held half-way down the slope. The French rallied and turned on the pursuers, the 50th, routing them and inflicting "grevious casualties." The redcoasts fled to their lines where Moore rallied them. The 42nd was so hard pressed that Moore brought up 2 Guard battalions to support the Scots. After some bitter fighting the French finally fell back from the ridge to Elvina. "... the cavalry - had found it difficult to deploy." Four dragoon regiments under Lahoussaye trotted out from the cover of the hills behind them and edged northwards, as if to get round the right of the British frontline troops and cut them off from their line of retreat to Corunna. "The French offensive had been severely hampered by broken terrain, criss-crossed by walls and gulleys, and the troops - especially the cavalry - had found it difficult to deploy." (Summerville - "March of Death" p 199) To check the turning movements of the cavalry on his right Moore sent back orders to Fraser to move out of the Corunna suburbs on the heights of San Margarita, and orders to Paget to move towards San Cristobal. Paget had sent out the 95th Rifles in extended order as soon as he had received Moore's first order. A little later the 52nd Light, with the 28th Foot in support, had joined the 95th and, followed by the other 2 battalions of the division - the 20th and the 91st - moved along the right bank of the Menelos River. All 5 battalions moved quickly and had reached the edge of Monte Mero while the French dragoons were still stumbling through the maze of rough stone walls and rutted enclousers between Elvina and San Cristobal in the valley below. Unable to charge or even to change front on that broken ground, the French horsemen slowly gave way until Lahoussaye ordered them to dismount and fight as tirailleurs. The figthing deteriorated into petty fusiliade. The dragoons were in disadvantage as their dragoon-type muskets had shorter range than infantry muskets, and cavalryman will never match infantryman in markmanship. Diversions in Palavea and Piedralonga. "... neither side had gained any significant territorial advantage." - Summerville The French skirmishers also moved down into the valley near the sea to exchange shots with their British counterparts; and behind these skirmishers a column of French infantry was already pushing Hope’s outposts out of the village of Palavea. But the attack here was no more than a diversion and Moore concentrated on the danger to his right where Mermet’s infantrymen were moving behind Jardon’s tirailleurs. "The left of the British line had not been seriously assailed until around 4.30 PM, when Delaborde's troops advanced into Piedralonga, evicting the British pickets. Fierce fighting ensued, much of it hand-to-hand … but when the bloodshed ceased about 6 PM, neither side had gained any significant territorial advantage." (Summerville - "March of Death" p 199) The final French attack here came at 5:15 PM, against the Piedralonga sector, but Delaborde was soon repulsed and the fighting petered out in the gathering dusk of a cold winter's day. Moore supported the wavering Highlanders with the Guards. The Highlanders kept looking over their shoulders for signs of relief; and when they saw the Guards marching in their direction they decided to fall back. Picture: Highlanders in combat, by Dmitrii Zgonnik of Ukraine. The balls flying without warning over Napier's head so frightened him that for the first time that day he felt tempted to turn his back and run for his life. He was stopped by a weak but excited Irish voice. And then the man began to scream in pain and hysteria and terror, and Napier infected by the man's fear became frightened again too. Behind him the French were once more pouring down into Elvina and re-taking the village. Napier had driven the French out of Elvina, and, although his regiment was broken now and the 42nd Highland had also been badly mauled, the enemy having taken the village again were moving up from it for the second time. "The struggle for Elvina was long and bitter, and by 3:30 PM both the 42nd and the 50th were spent forces, and Napier wounded and a prisoner." (Chandler - "Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars" p 109) "The fighting in Elvina continued for some time,as dusk began to fall. Mermet fed in his reserves, and although the reinforced British pushed forward some way, part of the village appears to have remained in French hands until the fighting died down. (Haythornthwaite - "Corunna 1809" p 82) Moore decided to bring up the Guard Brigade for another frontal assault. As soon as the Guards arrived, Moore told his staff, he would send one battalion down to attack a large house and garden on the outskirts of Elvina from which a company of voltigeurs was maintaining a fierce fire on the 42nd Highland, who were unable to reply to it because their ammunition was almost finished. The Highlanders, indeed, kept looking over their shoulders for signs of relief; and when they saw the Guards marching in their direction they decided to fall back. Moore checked the movement himself. Immediately the Highlanders turned about again and went back to face the enemy. Moore and Baird were struck by French cannonballs. A round-shot had torn a hole so deep in his left shoulder that the lung was exposed. Hardinge galloped up to report the Guards' arrival. Moore looked in the direction in which Hardinge was pointing and was suddenly thrown from his saddle. He fell on his back at the feet of Colonel Graham's horse. A round-shot had torn a hole so deep in his left shoulder that the lung was exposed, the ribs over the heart and part of the collar-bone had been smashed, the muscles of the breast had been torn into strips and the arm was hanging only by the sleeve of his coat and a shred of flesh. Napier writes: "Sir John Moore, while earnestly watching the result of the fight about the village of Elvina, was struck on the left breast by a cannon shot; the shock threw him from his horse with violence, but he rose again in a sitting posture …" "No less a victim of this galling fire was Sir David Baird himslef, his left arm smashed by a roundshot… Lord Bentinck now came up on his quiet mule …" (Summerville - "March of Death" p 188) In the valley below the Mero ridge the fight still went on. As the remains of the 42nd Highland, turned about by Moore's stern words, approached Elvina for the second time that day, Mermet's infantrymen poured down into the village from the south and Reynaud's brigade from Merle's division approached it from the east. Brig-Gen. Manningham sent forward his two right-hand battalions, the III/1st and II/81st. The forces clashed on the gorse and rock covered ridges of the lower slopes and fought with bitter fury. The 81st lost 150 men, the 1st almost as many. When their ammunition was running low, Hope sent down the reserve regiment from Leith's brigade, the II/59th and as darkness fell the French finally retired. According to Haythorrntwaite as darkness fell the fighting ended, even skirmish-fire ceasing by 6 pm without much territorial advantage to either side. The French however had a foothold in Piedralonga. Considerable proportion of Soult’s army had never been engaged.

. In Britain politician after politician "demanded the publication of the official correspondence, pressed for the establishemnt of a parliamentary committee of enquiry ..." (- Esdaile). The French became the masters of the battlefield. The battle of Corunna was and still is a decent cloak to cover the shame of an embarkation. According to Sir John Hope the troops quitted their positions about ten at night. All night long the men of the rearguard had kept the fires burning on the hills to give the impression of activity. All night long the sailors had been rowing backwards and forwards between the ships and the harbour wall. By morning the wounded and more than half the rest of the army were safely aboard the fleet where "many fell asleep immediately and never awoke for 3 days and nights… On Leith's ship were the fragments of six different regiments; on another, men from fourteen units were crammed between the decks. In the gathering light of the early mornng the embarkation continued…. Moore's body, wrapped in blankets and a military cloak, was lowered into the grave by the red sashes of his staff. "The French … opened a cannonade upon the shipping in the harbour, which caused great confusion amongst the transports." - Captain Gordon Moore mortally wounded, died that night, while Hope pressed the embarkation. Benjamin Miller writes: "As we drifted down the harbour we saw hundreds of our soldiers, which had been doing duty in the garrison, sitting on the rocks by the water's side … waving their hats and calling for the boats to take them off …" The British had almost finished the embarkation by morning, when French artillery came into action from cliffs overlooking the bay. James Moore writes: "Towards 8 o'clock in the morning some firing was heard…" The firing heard by the mourners at Moore's graveside had been occasioned by a French advance. Beresford's brigade began to embark when suddenly from the heights above Fort San Diego there was 'a sudden terrific outburst of fire and it seemed to Commissary Schaumann as if the Day of Judgement had come. "Shot and shell whistled about our heads, and striking first the water, then the sloops, and anon the ships themselves, made hearing and seeing almost impossible. It was the French who at this very moment had opened fire from their batteries in order to shell and bombard the harbour and the fleet." The French became the masters of the battlefield and Soult had begun closing in on Corunna. The fire created confusion on the British side. Cpt. Gordon writes: "The French … opened a cannonade upon the shipping in the harbour, which caused great confusion amongst the transports. Many were obliged to cut their cables, some suffered damage by running foul of each other, and 5 or 6 were abandoned by their crews and drifted on shore." In fact, 4 transports ran aground, 3 of which had to be burned, their cargo of men ferried to other vessels in the harbour in a confused operation, during which some men were drowned. A young Spanish girl said to August Schaumann: "Oh how lucky you English are to have your ships and to be able to get away !" "Oh how lucky you English are to have your ships and to be able to get away !" "... at Coruna some Spanish gunners tried to snipe at [French] individuals with a 32 pounder gun." - Patrick Griffith In four or five days the fleet carried home about 26,000 men of Moore's army. Corunna's defences were left in the hands of its small Spanish garrison under the command of General Alcedo. Alcedo would fend off the French just long enough for the British to depart. Officer of the French Hussars writes: "The town of Corunna, surorunded by fortifications, was defended by its inhabitants and only capitulated on the 20th." (de Rocca, - p 66) Some angry Spanish gunners tried to snipe at [French] soldiers with a 32 pounder gun ! The expedition reached England between 21 and 23 June, having lost some 8,800 men. "The people of Portsmouth looked on in horror at the spectacle that was emerging from the harbour. The British expeditionary force had returned home, but there was no grand parade through the streets, no pomp or colour, no tale of victory. What appeared seemed rather to be the mere wreckage of an army." (Esdaile - "The Peninsular War" p 140) Harry Smith of the Rifles went into the George Inn where a colonel roared at his this white face, 'Who the devil's ghost are you ?" Some soldiers, ashamed of their appearance … were 'glad to escape observation and march quickly into barracks'…" It was all very well to talk about the courage and endurance of the troops but of what use were these virtues alone when pitted against Napoleon ? Despite his hero's death, Sir John Moore himself was widely blamed. While Soult gave orders for the erection of a monument in Corunna, the Government in London did little to defend his reputation against his critics… He had placed his army in an impossible situation and then, after days of uncertainty and vacillation, had been chased half way across Spain ignoring every position of strength at which he might have turned and fought back successfully. Destroying the army by his wild, precipitate retreat he had become obsessed by his overwhelming anxiety to reach the sea. One of his own young officers … afterwards wrote: "Sir John Moore proved lamentably deficient in those qualities of decision and firmness which he had so often displayed on former occasions, and which alone would have enabled him to extricate the army ... from the perilous situation in which it had been placed by his own ill-advised measures and the disasters of our Spanish allies. At this juncture, however, he appeared to labor under a depression of spirits so different from his usual serene and cheerful disposition as to give a mournful expression to his countenance, indicative of the greatest anxiety of mind." "...we have suffered a shameful disaster." - The Times, London The news of the horrifying return of the soldiers spread fast through an indignant country. 'The fact must not be disguised,' wrote a correspondent to The Times, expressing a general opinion, 'that we have suffered a shameful disaster." The campaign led to turmoil in England. Many politicians were alarmed at the manner in which the experiences of Moore's army had produced on the public opinion. Politician after politician "demanded the publication of the official correspondence, pressed for the establishemnt of a parliamentary committee of enquiry ..." (- Esdaile). After the victory at Corunna, Soult took the great naval base of El Ferrol. He captured 8 battle-ships, 3 frigates, several hundred prisoners and enormous equipment stockpiles, incl. 20,000 British muskets. According to Philip Haythornthwaite losses in the battle are difficult to assess. Napier writes: "The loss of the British was never oficially published, but was estimated at 800, and that of the French at 3,000. The latter is undoubtedly an exaggeration …" It would be interesting to know what the French have to say about their own and the Britsh casualties. It's very important to know both sides of the story, not just only the British view. In contrast to the media, politicians, and many military men in 1809, today some British historians consider Corunna as victory. They like to portray hard-fought retreats and withdrawals like Corunna or Dunkirk as triumphs. For example Summerville writes: "In short the British ... were not in a position to exploit their success with an offensive, the redcoats secured their embarkation, and thus claimed the Battle of Corunna as a victory." The truth is Moore choose to get out, and do it very very fast. This is not a victory in battle, they just succeeded in a hasty retreat. They ran away. When the dust settled, it was the French army that held the battlefield and Corunna itself, not the British. According to napoleon-series.org (2005) >> it was a French victory. In list of battles they write: "Here in this list France is mentioned as victor because it occupied the place at the end. In February 1998 there was quite a dispute in the discussion forum about who's victory this was (most voted for France). " For the French it was their victory. They sent the redcoats skulking off to the sea. For the Spaniards the battle of Elvina, as they called it, was also a French victory. The battle of Corunna was and still is a decent cloak to cover the shame of an embarkation. "Wars are not won by evacuations". - Winston Churchill A. Nuñez and G.A. Smith Map of Peninsular War PS. Napoleon left Spain for Paris, and then marched against Austria. He confronted his implacable continental foe, the Hapsburg Empire. During the Vienna campaign of that year, Napoleon suffered his first defeat since becoming Emperor (battle of Apsern-Essling), but rebounded to win Wagram, a battle of unprecedented lethality.

Sources and Links.
Recommended Reading.

Estudio Historico y Uniformología de la Guerra de la Independencia
GUERRA DE LA INDEPENDENCIA ESPAÑOLA 1808-1814
Chandler - "Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars" (1993)
Esdaile - "The Peninsular War" 2002
Gates - "The Spanish Ulcer"
Hibbert - "Corunna"
De Rocca - "In the Peninsula with a French hussar."
Napier - "History of the War in the Peninsula 1807-1814"
This is an interesting book, we love it ! Napier had been taken prisoner as he limped back through Elvina with 3 of his men from the 50th and an Irishman from the 42nd Highland. Other soldiers had clubbed him with their muskets. They would have killed him had not a French drummer intervened to save him.
Haythornthwaite - "Corunna 1809"
This is not a bad book, it's just so one sided. Here is part of review of this book from amaazon.com (2005): "However, readers should be aware of the author's pro-British bias in evaluating the results of the campaign." The author is extremely one-sided in the selection of sources. For example on p 94 Biographies and memoirs are listed very numerous British sources: Anon, Anglesey, Blakeney, Gonneville, Gordon, Green, Hall, Harris, Hayman, Porter, Moore, Morley, Napier, Neale, Oman, Parkinson, Robertson, Ross-Lewin, Schaumann, Smith, Steevens, Surtees, Tylden, and Verden. There are no Spanish sources and only a single French source, Lejeune. That being the case, the book should have been titled,"Corunna - The British Perspective."

Marshal Nicolas Jean de Dieu Soult
General Henri François Delaborde
Sir John Moore
Lord Paget
General Pedro Caro y Sureda, 3rd Marquis of la Romana
Corunna
Travel to Corunna
"War in Spain" - by Suchet
"How England Saved Europe"