1. What were the main differences between the Prussian army of 1813-14 (Katzbach, Leipzig) and that of 1815 (Waterloo)? Answer: First, the army of 1813-14 was drawn almost entirely from the core provinces of the Kingdom of Prussia - East and West Prussia, Brandenburg, Silesia, Pomerania - whereas the army of 1815, and by that I mean the Army of the Lower Rhine, consisted only in part of "old" Prussians. The Rhinelanders and to an extent the Westphalians were "new" Prussians of questionable loyalty. Secondly, in 1815 a number of foreign, i.e. non-Prussian, formations had been amalgamated into the line and were, on paper at least, now considered regular formations, although it was really only after the Waterloo Campaign that they could be considered as such in reality. In 1813-14, these formations were not part of the line. Finally, in 1815, the cavalry was undergoing a complete reorganisation, absorbing new and in part irregular formations and was in a state of chaos. In 1813-14, the cavalry consisted of high quality, hard core of regulars. 2. How would you compare the Prussian staff in 1812-1815 to the French staff (Berthier)? What were the differences ? The two staffs reflected the different nature of the Prussian army and state when compared to those of the French. Napoleon was both head of state and commander-in-chief of the army in the field. In Prussia, the king was the head of state, and he appointed the commander-in-chief, who was a different person and at times in a different location. Napoleon combined the positions of politician and soldier, while the commander of the Prussian field army was merely a soldier. Napoleon made all the decisions and his staff executed them without question. The commander of the Prussian army acted on instructions from his monarch and interpreted them according to advice given by his staff. The French staff was largely only an administrative organisation, the Prussian staff both an advisory and administrative organisation. 3. What were Blücher's strongest points as commander-in-chief and what were the weakest ? In the campaigns of 1813-15, Blücher held the post of commander-in-chief. However, he did so in name only and in reality it was his chief-of-staff, Scharnhorst and later Gneisenau, that were the de facto commanders. Blücher was not capable of holding supreme command in his own right from 1813 onwards, because he was suffering the ravages of age and had a history of mental illness brought on by stress. The most able commanders - the reformers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau - were unacceptable to the "old" Prussians as they were outsiders. An "old" Prussian commander, like Kleist or Bülow, was unacceptable to the nation because, rightly or wrongly, the officer corps was considered responsible for the catastrophe of 1806. The compromise was to appoint Blücher, who was highly popular in both the army and nation, as the figurehead nominally in command, but to provide him with an "assistant", who was actually in command. I think I have answered your question, albeit somewhat indirectly. Blücher was a popular man, but incapable of supreme command at this time. 4. What were the major reasons for such terrible defeats of the Prussian army at Jena and Auerstedt ? 1) Not joining Austria and Russia in 1805 in the Third Coalition. This combination would most likely have led to Napoleon's defeat. 2) Going to war against France in 1806 without the direct support of another great power. The Prussian army should have adopted a defensive strategy until the arrival of the Russians. 3) Dividing the army into three in the face of the enemy. Nobody was really in charge and King Frederick William III lacked the authority to impose his will. 5. Why did the Prussians skip the divisional level and instead form very strong brigades? What was the reasoning behind this ? In 1808, the Prussians had intended to form divisions based on the provinces remaining in the kingdom. However, the Convention of Paris restricted the size of the army to 42,000. The planned divisions instead became brigades. 6. Please comment on the Prussian lightning victories over the French marshals in 1813-1814 (Katzbach, Dennewitz and others). In the autumn of 1813, the Allies adopted a strategy of not letting any one of their three armies face Napoleon alone. Should the master place himself at the head of his troops, then the Allied army facing him was to withdraw, while the other advanced. While Napoleon was chasing air, the opportunity was taken to bring certain of his marshals to battle and defeat them individually. This strategy was finally rewarded with victory. 7. Who is your favorite Prussian general or officer and why, and who disappointed you the most and why ? Yorck has always been my favourite as I share a certain affinity with him. He was most able, forthright and outspoken. The dishonest and the incapable had a problem getting on with him. I cannot think of any generals or officers that disappoint me. 8. What is the biggest myth or false/wrong opinion about the Prussian army ? The alleged "inflexibility" of the army at a tactical level in 1806. Those espousing that view have not consulted any relevant primary source material and have failed to consider the analyses published by the French and German General Staffs. I refer particularly to the works written by Bressonnet and Lettow-Vorbeck. Furthermore, they have neglected to read about for instance the combat at Altenzaun. Thank You Peter