Comments on Guard at Marengo.
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1. Composition of the Garde Consulaire a Pied at Marengo.
The Garde Consulaire was formed by decree of 3 janvier 1800 (13 nivôse an VIII). The Garde a pied was to be composed of some 1300 infantrymen, in 2 batallions of 6 compagnies each of grenadiers (under chefs des bataillons Soules and Tortel, respectively) and a company of chasseurs a pied.
The following were the sources for the gardes:
- The Garde du Corps législatif : nominally 1200 men in 12 companies, elected representatives of the Garde national sedentaire
- Garde du Directoire : 120 men in 2 companies, chosen from the army's veterans
- Guides : perhaps some 2 dozen or so guides a pied who had managed to return from Egypt
New selectees from the army : « La garde des consuls sera recrutée parmi des hommes qui se seront distingués sur le champ de bataille. » It is unknown how many such selectees were incorporated into the Garde before Marengo. Several officer biographies indicate such a selection in early 1800, but the number of selected gardes that could have made the Marengo campaign appears to be very limited (perhaps to less than 50 men).
The company of chasseurs a pied (nominally about 100 chasseurs) was formed somewhat later than the grenadiers and, if present at Marengo, seems to have been fielded without a seperate command. The biographical sketch of Soules taken from his Legion d'Honneur service record (Fastes de la Légion d'Honneur – T2. p 173.) says that he commanded 500 grenadiers or chasseurs at Marengo.
Tortel is noted in a revue of 3 mai 1800 at Dijon as marching with a total of 305 members of the Garde a pied, including 3 captains.
The total given by most sources, including Berthier's order of battle, is 800 for the Garde a pied at Marengo.
It is thus tempting to conclude that Soules commanded a batallion of 6 companies, likely the soldiers most fit for active service, and that Tortel led a reduced or half batallion of 3 companies. The remaining gardes would have stayed in Paris, where the commander of the Garde a pied, chef de brigade Frère, seems to have remained. Interestingly, a unit of veterans de la Garde was formed shortly after Marengo, as those unfit for active service were removed from the ranks of the Garde Consulaire.
Thus the composition of the gardes at Marengo would have been, in the majority and perhaps up to 3/4 of the total, former members of the Garde du Corps législatif – elected (!) representatives of territorial "home defense" units !
Assuming such an organization meshes nicely with several incidents and reports of the battle itsself. We can see Tortel's command in the gardes who passed out a re-supply of ammunition to Coignet's regiment if we wsh ot credit the old gronard's memory, while Soules' batallion is deployed on the far right of the French positions. Also, we might make the conjecture that the appointment of adjudant général (equivalent rank to a chef de brigade) Léopold Stabenrath to lead the Garde a pied in the evening counter-attack indicates that the forces of Soules (by then reduced in numbers) and Tortel had been united.
- The Garde a pied had a large musique – at least 55 members at the time of Marengo. How many, if any at all, of these made the campaign is unknown.
- The artillery of the Garde included 4 pieces that were attached to Soules command on the far right. These would be served by 40-odd gunners and perhaps another 40-odd members of the very newly created (militarized) train de artillery.
Together with some 15-20 officers of the batallion, and perhaps some additional officiers "a la suite" from among the the rather large general staff of the garde, it is easy to see how Soules' command might be reported a totalling some 600, as is seen in some accounts of the action on the French extreme right.
2.Time of Arrival.
A recent chronology of the battle of Marengo (D. Hollins, "The Battle of Marengo" , Osprey, p. 72) have Bonaparte and the Garde Consulaire arrving on the battle field at about 3pm. This "late arrival" scenario, based on the availbale time, tends to to limit the role of Garde a pied (and Bonaparte) to something less (and less "heroic") then many previous accounts of the battle.
However, an earlier chronology has strong primary source support. Among others, Coignet, Soult, Marmont, Berthier and Eugene all clearly indicate an arrival time at or before mid-day.
Eugene : around midday "beginning to take an active part"
Coignet : just before noon , handing out cartridges, their view inspiring him
Berthier's morning map : shown at Poggia
Soult : [morning positions] "Les deux divisions du général Victor avec la brigade de cavalerie du général Kellermann reslè rent ainsi en position à Pedra-Bona et à Marengo. Le général Lannes forma en seconde ligne, à six cents toises en arrière, ses deux divisions et la brigade de cavalerie commandée par le général Champeaux. La garde des consuls et une brigade d'infanterie, commandée par le général Carra Saint-Cyr, étaient en réserve à la troisième ligne, et le général de cavalerie Rivaud fut détaché à Sale."
Now, in the nature of source criticism, these accounts can be dismissed as mistaken, or written later using published chronologies for guidance.
On the other hand, there is no – repeat no – primary source support for the later time of arrival of which I am aware. In fact, since according to Marmont for example, the sound of fighting was audible at the headquarters bivouac and at least two officers had reported the fighting from early in morning, it requires an assumption that Bonaparte sat unpresponsively through the morning to support the later chronology. This seems to me a counter-intuitive assumption, or one crafted to minimize the role of the First Consul.
The simpler assumtpion, that Bonaparte and/or the Garde moved to the battlefield by about mid-day, seems the simpler assumption and does not require that the several reports of his arrival at that time be dismissed.
3. Action before 3pm ?
If one allows the Garde a pied to have taken the field from mid-day, there then remains some 2-3 hours for them to act. Here is it easy to adduce numerous eye-witness acounts of their resisting Austrian cavalry – the number of charges variously given a 3 to 5. This "standard version" of Garde a pied at Marengo : the "block of granite". It appears in Victor, Berthier, Coignet, the contempory (and anti-Bonapartist) italian historian Botta, Soules service record, Soult, Eugene, Marmont, Petit and so on, ad infinitum.
In addition to the criticism that the were not yet on the battlefield, which was discussed above, there is a sceond critical point made : that there were no such Austrian cavalry available to (repeatedly) charge the Garde a pied. I have never seen exactly how this assertion is supported, if at all.
For example, there is … Brigade Johann Graf Nobili. 12 escadrons : 1873 hommes
…Dragoner-Regiment 3. Erzherzog Johann – 6 escadrons – Oberst Joseph Graf (de) Gavre (emigré, de Flandres) – rekrutierte aus Innerosterreich (Steiermark und Keurnten)
…Dragoner-Regiment 9. Fuerst Lichtenstein – 6 escadrons – Oberst Carl-Michael Marchese Belcredi (de Pavie) – ex-Stabs-Dragoner Regiment in Italien
These are said to have had trouble crossing the bridge to enter the battlefield proper …. which seems odd given that tehy had about 4-6 hours to make the crossing !
4. Sources for the "Destruction" of the Garde a pied.
The following have been variously claimed as "primary" or "based on primary" sources for the alleged destruction of the Garde a pied.
ITEM No. 1
Undated handwriiten notes which no longer exist but were reproduced in their regimental history (by which time they were named differently )
Pizzighelli, Cajetan. Geschichte des k.u.k. Husaren-Regimentes Wilhelm II. Koenig von Wurttemberg Nr.6.
1734-1896 / im Auftrage des Regimentscommandos zusammengestellt von Cajetan Pizzighelli. Rzeszow, Selbstverl. des Regimentes, 1897. viii, 853 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
Clearly, the notes, if they existed at all, could have been written at any time up to 1896 and by anyone and for any reason. This is NOT a primary source.
ITEM No. 2
The description written by Mras in 1822/23, working at the Austrian archives (1823 edition of Osterreichische Milierische Zeitschrift). This version in reprinted in de Cugnac. It is clearly not itself a primary source, and there is no reason to believe it is based on anything other than the manuscripts discussed below.
ITEM No. 3
Stutterheim A and B
Two manuscripts, printed finally in about 1900, said to be the work of Major Joseph Stutterheim. He was on Melas' staff and is said to have gone forward against Lannes with Schellenberg's column. As noted below, he claims to have himself seen the "destruction" of the Garde a pied, and this may be so.
His first manuscript is of 1811 deposited at the Austrian achives. The second, it appears, was a cleaned up version of the first of about 1823. Unfortunately, it appears that Stuuterheim was rather , er, ah … dead (!) at this point, so the second or B version has a bit of a cloud on its claim to be a primary source.
Stutterheim A
"… A few minutes before this deciding moment the Guard infantry came marching on the road from Sale to the center. With these chosen men Bonaparte hoped if not to restore the battle to stop us for a while and to protect his other troops that were already on the verge of flight. In column with opened divisions the Guard marched across open field and had individual skirmishers accompany her march at a distance of some 60 paces. There could not have been a more desirable sight for our cavalry. Ott whom the Guard passed ordered Lobkowitz DR10 to blow rapel and to attack as soon as all were assembled. Alone there were circumstances – above all Oberst Fürst Taxis could not be found – such that Ott ordered Oberst-Lieutenant Graf Harrach to lead the charge against the Guard; after time-consuming preparations DR10 set into step, then into trot, finally into the gallop. The Consular Guard infantry seemed to be close to disaster when at a few musket shots from its skirmishers the whole DR10 turned about and ran away. Some French cavalry that had been observing this from a position behind the Guard pursued our dragoons. The situation for Ott's infantry seemed desperate as in midst of the coverless plains she had been deserted by her only cavalry. Alone the same as the Consular Guard had pursued its march without being scared by the Austrian cavalry deployed in line Spleny IR51 advanced now in midst the plains headlong against the French cavalry which like ours some moments before turned about after a few shots and ran away.
The same battalion[s] Spleny IR51 supported by a battalion of Fröhlich IR28 then advanced against the Consular Guard. The Guard formed up by divisions into a line. Then under a continuous artillery and small arms fire and although many men fell on both sides these two lines marched against each other with so much order and vigour that it was difficult to say who would triumph. Then suddenly while behind the Guard the whole French army was on the retreat a swarm of Imperial cavalry came galloped from Marengo fell into its rear and let only a few escape. Also their 4 guns fell into our hands. Although the French hide this incident and try to highlight the prior deeds of the Guard, Major Stutterheim has seen this whole incident which by any means does not dishonour the Guard; and a short time after the battle he received from several Guard officers the confession that but 100 of them returned who were increased to 500 only by those returning from Austrian captivity."
Stutterheim B:
" … when one discovered in a depression the march of a small column with big red plumes, the characteristic of the guard, which moved through a field of high standing corn to prolong the line of General Lannes. When FML Ott discovered this he hurried to order Lobkowitz DR10 to mount an attack against this column. Alone the forming up of the DR10 was delayed and a volley from the guard threw disorder in its ranks. French cavalry from the center tried to take advantage of the withdrawal of DR10 when a battalion of Spleny IR51 left the deploying Austrian column stormed headlong against this French cavalry which surprised and dispersed by the musket fire also turned back and took to its heels.
After these cavalry combats had ended without any result General Gottesheim was charged to attack with the other battalions of Spleny IR51 and one of Fröhlich IR28 the Guard infantry that strove to cover the right flank of the French army. Attack and defense changed here in peleton fire and whole volleys like on parade ground. … […..description of the taking of Marengo farm …]
… Near Marengo the rolling musket fire had already decreased and drawn to the Austrian left wing where Gottesheim was still fighting the Guard and Vogelsang Carra Saint-Cyr when a few squadrons of Nauendorf HR8 [Note : more likely this was Dragoon Regiment No. 1] and Bussy Jager Regiment [emigre French] came on, gallopped from the main road and fell into the rear of the Guard. This attack decided and ended all fighting. Many of the Guard were sabered down, the bigger part, and the four guns surrendered. The French totally conceal this incident in their reports and hardly mention their guard that defended itself with so much glory in midst of the plains. The author witnessed this whole incident and summons all who have been present with the Consular Guard at Marengo if they could dispute this account."
For the French:
From Soules' Legion d'Honneur records :
" …. Passé comme chef de bataillon dans les grenadiers à pied de la garde consulaire le 13 nivose an VIII,
Soulès suivit le premier Consul en Italie. Lors de la bataille de Marengo, où il commandait 500 grenadiers ou chasseurs à pied de la garde, il reçut l'ordre de se porter sur la droite de l'armée. Il n'y lut pas plutôt arrivé, qu'il eut à soutenir suecessivement cinq charges de la cavalerie ennemie , mais il les repoussa vigoureusement et lui fit essuyer de grandes pertes. Pendant cinq heures consécutives, il se maintint, dans cette position, malgré les efforts réitérés d'une colonne de 8,000 Autrichiens qui cherchait l'en débusquer, et il ne se retira que sur l'ordre formel du général en chef qui l'envoya protéger le mouvement rétrograde de l'armée, avec environ 200 hommes qui lui restaient. A six heures du soir, il reçu l'ordre de reprendre l'offensive, ce qu'il exécuta en dirigeant son attaque sur un corps de 3,000 hommes qui cherchait à tourner notre droite, et dont il coupa la retraite par l'habileté et l'audace de ses manœuvres. A la suite de cette mémorable journée, le premier Consul lui décerna un sabre dèhonneur ; l'arrêté du 17 thermidor an IX qui le lui confère est conçu en ces termes : «Bonaparte, [etc.], d'après le compte qui lui a été rendu de la conduite du citoyen Soulès, chef de bataillon dans la garde des consuls, qui, dans toutes les campagnes de l'armée d'Italie, où il servait dans le même grade, a constamment donné des preuves du plus grand courage, ainsi qu'a la bataille de Marengo, ou il commiandait le détachement de la garde des consuls, lui décerne, à titre de récompense nationale, un sabre d'honneur.»
Chef de brigade dans les chasseurs à pied de la garde le 15 frimaire an x, …."
Grenadier Petit, grenadiers a cheval, standing to the right of the main road :
"… charged three times by the cavalry, fusilladed by the infantry, they surrounded their colors, and their wounded in a hollow square, exhausted all their cartridges and with slow and regular steps, fell back and joined our astonished ranks."
5. Casualty Reports.
> Murat's report a few days later : 121 wounded & killed — one would think perhaps this is meant as "severely wounded and not re-joined the ranks"
> Petit : 25 (unwounded ?) prisoners returned the day after the battle
> Brossier (captain, engineering staff): 260 total casualties
> Lauriston : about 1/3 casualties (thus, similar to Brossier)
6. My Opinion.
Here is speculation, analysis, summary — call it what you will.
The garde a pied arrived on the field about mid-day.
500-600 men under Soules took position on the extreme French right.
Here they successfully resisted repeated cavalry charges, over some hours, likely adopting square from time to time. To deny this flies in the face of some dozen-odd primary accounts. All of these cannot be lying, mistaken, copying, propoganda, etc.
Despite the well-deserved praise for this defense, it was no miracle – the ability of steady infantry to resisit unsupported and ill-co-ordinated cavalry assaults is well documented in the period (as are the deficiencies of Austrian cavalry doctrine).
In the later afternoon, they saw off a charge by Dr 10 in open column and then were finally caught, while in line in a firefight with 4 fresh enemy batallions supported by guns, and charged in the flanks and rear by 4 or more squadrons of light horse (DR 1 and Bussey Jagers) under Frimont.
Their defense, likely now very exposed as the remainder of the French had retreated, crumbled immediately or very quickly. Likely orders were sent about this time for them to retreat, but these were un-necessary / overtaken by events. Similarly, their likely quite depleted ammunition condition was neither a surpirse nor decisive. The key elements to the evetual success of the Austrians against the Garde was:
(i) more-or-less accidentally creating a viable combined arms attack
(ii) gross weight of numbers
(iii) the "morale fatique" of the defenders in an isolated position.
Of the 500-600 under Soules, some 200 retreated in something like good order, in something like hollow square around the colors, under Soules' direction. Another 100-odd likely just ran like stink !
There was no mass surrender, and few unwounded prisoners were taken.
Four attached guns were lost.
No colors were lost.
Stutterheim A is too "excited" on this topic – the tone of which is much reduced in Stutterheim B. Stutterheim A is the only source produced which could possibly be read as to imply a substantial surrender, and such is not explicitly stated even there.
Some 250-odd gardes were killed or wounded up to and including this "destruction" (a few additional casualties would have to be added for the evening counter-attack). Of these, about half were seriously wounded or killed.
The rallied members of Soules' command and the command of Tortel (total perhaps 500 men) were united for the evening counter-attack, under Stabenrath.
The "heroic" reputation for the Garde a pied was completely earned and merited for their performance at Marengo, especially so considering the actual composition of their ranks at the time (largely elected representatives from home defense national guard units). The lavish level of awards of armes de honneur to them was in to no way other than fully appropriate.
The inaction of the grenadiers a cheval is noteworthy.
Bessieres is reported by Eugene as halting a charge by the chasseurs a cheval that had been requested/ordered by Lannes. One wonders if he was being similarly "careful" in his use of the grenadiers a cheval at the time of Frimont's charge.
The use of the word "destroyed" is at least problematic in this context. Clearly large losses were incurred by Soules' command while on the extreme right of the French disposition (upwards of 50%). But equally, they stayed in the battle to participate in the evening counterattack. Perhaps the motto of the Lauzun hussards applies : "Perit sed in armis".
The recent work of Mr. Hollins, while valuable in bringing the topic to discussion and in adducing the various "Austrian" sources for use by modern readers, to too livid and sensationalized, and in places over-values the quality of some sources while dismissing out-of-hand many contrary ones of equal or better value. One would look forward to a larger work by Mr. Hollins, as some of the weaknesses of his published work to date may have been forced upon him by the requirements of selling "booklets" to a wide audience. "
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