Lines.
"The French, particularly, have never been able
to march steadily in deployed lines."
- General Jomini

The line had been standard during the XVIII Century but lost popularity after the French triumphs with columns during the Revolutionary Wars. The difficulty with advancing lines was their sensitivity to terrain and order. The irregularities of the terrain caused the ranks to become ragged, the battalion bowed in the middle and sometimes broke completely in half. A line of two battalions on a battlefield would be halting to dress more frequently than one battalion. The long line made the troop more difficult to manoeuvre and to turn. For these reasons, commanders used lines only for short distances and over open terrain with no serious obstacles.

It was easier to attack with several battalion columns than with several battalion lines. General Antoine Henri Jomini wrote: "I have also seen attempts made to march deployed battalions in checkerwise order. They succeeded well; whilst marches of the same battalions in continous lines did not. The French, particularly, have never been able to march steadily in deployed lines... It maybe employed in the first stages of the movement forward, to make it more easy, and the rear battalions would then come into line with the leading ones before reaching the enemy ... for we must not forget that in the checkered order there are not two lines, but a single one, which is broken, to avoid the wavering and disorder observed in the marches of continous lines...
Suppose the attempt made to bring up 20 or 30 battalions in line, while firing either by file or by company, to the assault of a well defended position; it is not very probable they would ever reach the desired point, or if they did, it would be in about as good order as a flock of sheep."
Chlapowski writes: "He [General Dabrowski] took some battalions [of Polish infantry] out into the countryside and ordered them to perform certain manoeuvers. The movements in column went well, but battalions moving at the double in line with bayonets fixed were still very uneven and fell into bad disorder. The soldiers were not experienced enough yet to follow their marker with their eyes only, but instead turned their heads to the side as well. Once a few had turned their heads, their bodies could no longer walk in a straight line, steps became undeven and the whole line broke up as files either collided or diverged." (Chlapowski/Simmons - p 15)

Picture.

Fig. 1:
French infantry.
... bataillon de première ligne qui exécute le passage des lignes en retraite...

Fig. 2:
French infantry.
... bataillon qui, après avoir traversé la seconde ligne...

Fig. 3:
French infantry.
...bataillon de seconde ligne doublant les sections de pied ferme pour donner passage à la première ligne.

Picture.

Fig. 1
French infantry.
- Line forming column on the right flank.

Fig. 2
French infantry.
- Line forming column on the centre.

Fig. 3
French infantry.
- Line forming column on the left flank.

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Picture.

Fig. 19
Russian infantry
- Deployment of closed column into line.
(Source: Zhmodikov - "Tactics of the Russian Army in the Napoleonic Wars" Vol II)
To deploy a column of platoons in line, Khatov recommended forming a column of divisions first and only then deploying it into line. Rear divisions (a division consisted of 2 platoons) were to march by files to the right or left and then forward into alignment with the front division. He admonished readers against deploying under heavy enemy fire. Closed column of divisions formed on the right could be deployed into line either on the 2nd division, as shown in Fig. 19; either on the 3rd division; either to the left; either to the right.

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Depth of Line.
In most European armies when casualties were heavy
the men were drawn from the 3rd rank and placed
into the 1st and 2nd rank to maintain the proper
frontage of the company.

Long before Napoleonic wars the line of infantry was 4 and 5 ranks deep formation. Improving quality of firearms made possible to 'lighten' the line. In 1703 the British went from 4-rank deep lines to only 3-rank deep. The rest of Europe followed them. The Prussians were the next in 1740, the French in 1754 and the Austrians in 1757. By the end of XVIII century all armies formed their infantry on 3-ranks.

In most European armies of the Napoleonic Wars, when casualties were heavy the men were drawn from the 3rd rank and placed into the 1st and 2nd rank to maintain the proper frontage of the company. Sometimes the 3rd rank would disappear completely. According the French Regulations of 1791, Ecole de Peloton p. 101, once company was reduced below 12 files it was to be formed on 2 ranks.

The 2-rank system was first introduced by the Prussians during the Seven Years War. The intention was to bring more muskets to bear but soon was discovered that cavalry could easily rout such thin formation. Fortescue's summary of infantry tactics of the Seven Years War: "The number of ranks was left unfixed, being increased or reduced according to the frontage required, but probably seldom exceeded 3 and was occasionally reduced to two."

In 1794 Austrian General Mack's Instructionspunkte recommended that the 3rd rank be used to extend the infantry line and was dictated by circumstances and terrain.

During the Napoleonic Wars some German armies had their infantry formed on 2 ranks only. For example until 1809 the Wirtembergian light troops were formed on 2 ranks. In Prussia and Austria the 3rd rankers were extensivelly used as skirmishers and often were detached from their companies. Until 1807 in Russia all jager regiments were formed on 2 ranks.

The Thin Red Line.
"The [British] infantry, although on system formed 3 deep,
like the other nations of Europe,
is more frequently drawn up in 2 ranks"
- General Foy

Officially the British infantry was formed in 3 ranks. However during the Napoleonic Wars they had their infantry formed on 2 ranks only. (At Waterloo most of their battalions were formed on 4 ranks.)
French General Foy wrote: "The [British] infantry, although on system formed 3 deep, like the other nations of Europe, is more frequently drawn up in 2 ranks; but when making or receiving a charge, it is frequently formed four deep. Sometimes it has made offensive movements, and even charged columns, when in open order."

The British tactics was much influenced by the American experience. In that period there was a great deal of bickering about the makeup of the British infantry. "The basic tactical requirement in North America was for a looser, more flexible system, based on small bodies of men fighting in rough lines, often of one rank and never more than two; the 3rd rank had never been of great value as far as fire power was concerned, and in thick country it became a positive menace." (Warminster - "The British Infantry 1660-1945" publ. in 1983)
Already in 1759, Wolfe was issuing instructions in America on a single and 2-rank line formation for his infantry. General Abercromby used two ranks at Alexandria in 1801. General Moore at Corunna also used two lines.

The French and Two Ranks.
From 1791 on peace footing the French
would frequently drill in 2 ranks.

The French infantry was formed on 3 ranks. They however experimented with the 2-ranks in 1775-1776 and again in 1788. Already from 1791 on peace footing they would frequently drill in 2 ranks. During campaign, when casualties were heavy, the men were drawn from the 3rd rank and placed into the 1st and 2nd rank to maintain the proper frontage of the company. According the French Regulations of 1791, Ecole de Peloton p. 101, once company was reduced below 12 files it was to be formed on 2 ranks.

In October 1813, Napoleon wanted to increase the length of the battleline of his depleted infantry by 30 % and on October 13th 1813 was issued order: " ... Emperor orders the entire infantry of the army to form up in 2 ranks instead of 3, in that his Majesty regarded that the fire and the bayonet of the 3rd rank useless." Thus in the Battle of Leipzig the French infantry was formed on 2 ranks. But Ney's infantry was still formed on 3 ranks, he believed in deep formations. According to George Nafziger however this reoganization of infantry in the midst of a hard fought campaign "may or may not have occured." ( Nafziger - "Imperial Bayonets" p 60)

On secondary theaters of war, in Spain and Italy, the French kept their infantry formed on 3 ranks. Napoleon's orders needed time to arrive from Leipzig in Germany to the remote Spain and not every general was convinced to the new formation.

French Marshal Ney's "Military Studies - Instructions for the Troops composing the Left Corps" in the section "Observations upon different modes of firing" on pages 99-101: "The firing of 2 ranks, or file firing, is, with the exception of a very few movements, absolutely the only kind of firing which offers much greater advantages to infantry... Most infantry officers must have remarked the almost insurmountable difficulty they find in stopping file-firing during battle, after it has once begun, especially when the enemy is well within shot; and this firing, in spite of the command given by the field officers, resembles general discharges.
It would be better, therefore, after the two first ranks have fired, to charge boldly with the bayonet, and by an act of vigour force the enemy to retreat. The German soldier, formed by the severest discipline, is cooler than any other. Under such circumstances he would, in the end, obtain the advantage in this kind of firing, if it lasted long... These observatons are of a nature to urge colonels... to prepare and drill their men to attacks by main strength...a French commander ought never to hesitate in marching against the enemy with the bayonet, if the ground is at all adapted to a charge in line with one or more battalions at a time." (This is interesting that although Ney recommended two ranks, in 1813 at Leipzig he formed his own infantry on 3 ranks.)

Examples of napoleonic infantry being formed on 2 ranks in combat:

Columns.
"Columns don't break through lines unless with superior artillery."
- Napoleon
"Not once did the Austrians withstand them [French]
but fell immediately into disorder,
despite the fact that they were in column,
and the French in line."- Chlapowski, 1809

There were several types of columns used by the infantry:

Ordre mixte
Napoleon advocated the use of both lines and columns
in the attack by acting in concert.

Frenchman Guibert developed the mixed order (ordre mixte). He advocated the use of both lines and columns in the attack by acting in concert. The lines suppose to give the necessary firepower and the columns brought their depth and strength. But it was Napoleon who introduced this system by employing it in 1796 at the Battle of Tagliamento and during the passage over the Isonzo River.

Most often the mixed order consisted of 1-2 battalions in line and 1-2 battalions in columns. Sometimes the formation was larger. Napoleon recommended to his generals that they have several battalions in lines and several in columns by division (frontage 2 companies) with half intervals. The half-intervals - in this case the length of platoon - enabled to quickly form squares against cavalry and to maneuver rapidly.

Picture: Suchet's infantry division at Jena 1806.

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Picture: Morand's infantry division at Borodino 1812. Morand's division was made of 13th Light, 17th and 30th Line Infantry Regiment.

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Picture: division of attack formation prescribed by Marshal Soult for General Vandamme's command at Austerlitz. In the first line was artillery, in the next were six battalions formed in lines (incl. 2 light battalions), and as reserve were four battalions formed in columns. (Source: Nosworthy - "With Musket, Cannon, and Sword.")

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"However, probably the most notable use of mixed order during this period occured during the critical point of the Batttle of Marengo, when General Desaix, attempting to thwart the advancing column of victorious Austrian infantry, deployed three French infantry demi-brigades in echelon refused towards the right.
As discussed, the 9th legere in the front most echelon had only its central battalion in line, the 30th de ligne slightly behind had its two battalions in line, while the 59th de ligne was deployed exactly like the 9th legere in front."
(Source: Nosworthy - "With Musket, Cannon, and Sword." pp 116-117. Published in 1996 by Sarpedon, New York.)

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In 1811 at Albuera, the French used the mixed order. They advanced with vigor with Girard's division (8 battalions) leading the attack. Despite all odds the Spanish thin line under José Pascual de Zayas held fast. They brought the leading French division to a halt and a tremendous firefight developed. The smoke and the anxiety resulted in a friendly fire; in the beginning some of the redcoats fired in the backs of the Spanish infantry before they realized their mistake. (By opening fire on the Polish uhlans they also shot many of Zayas' brave men in the back.)
Napier writes: "I supposed the mutual firing between a British and Spanish regiment happened when the Fusiliers were mounting the hill. I had understood Colonel Robert Arbuthnot so, and that he rode between both parties; the writer of the Strictures says he has Sir Robert's letter contradicting the fact. Nevertheless, that such an event did take place at one period of this battle, is proved by the contradictory evidence as to which party fired upon the other." (Napier - "History of the War in the Peninsula 1807-1814" Vol V, p 319)
"... the 29th Foot who, rather unwisely, began firing on the dispersed lancers: most of the shots passing the horsemen harmlessly by and striking the rear ranks of Zayas' formation instead. Nevertheless, the pertinacious Spaniards stood their ground and almost certainly saved Beresford from disaster." (Gates - "The Spanish Ulcer" p 259)

Squares against cavalry.
If infantry was formed on 2 lines of squares
and was supported by artillery "I cannot imagine
what cavalry would be able to accomplish against them"
- General Thiebault's manual, 1813

Whenever officers saw that enemy's cavalry was moving forward and making preparations for attack they started forming squares. Such movements of cavalry were already noticed at approx. 1-1.5 km. through field glasses.

According to French regulations of 1791 if the infantry was in line it sould be able to form square in 100 sec. If they were in attack column (colonne d'attaque) 30 sec. were enough.
At Leipzig the Austrian "5th Jager Battalion formed square at a run (!), delivered a volley, and waited its fate with bayonets at the ready." (Nafziger - "Napoleon at Leipzig" p 229)

Square could be also formed from column with full or half intervals. Actually to form a square was easier from a column with intervals than from line. It was expected that average trained battalion will form a hollow square in 2-3 min. In battle the infantry will need 4-6 min. To form a square from 2 battalions took approx. twice longer time. The better trained and accustomed to battle conditions infantry needed shorter time than raw troops.

To form a square of equal faces took up to 2 times as long as forming an oblong.

In 1811 Marshal Davout instructed that the distances between squares should be 120 paces.
Usually 100-200 paces behind the squares stood own cavalry. These horsemen counterattacked when the situation required it. The most famous cavalry counterattacks were at Eylau, Borodino, and Waterloo.

Picture.

Fig. 20
French infantry
- battalion of 6 companies forming square from line.
Source: Nafziger - "Imperial Bayonets"
This particular manoeuvre was the longest way of converting from line to square.

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Picture.

Fig. 21
French infantry
- battalion of 6 companies forming square from column
Source: Nafziger - "Imperial Bayonets"
The square is formed from column on centre companies.

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Picture.

Fig. 24
Russian infantry
- square formed from attack column.
(Source: Zhmodikov - "Tactics of the Russian Army in the Napoleonic Wars" Vol II)
Two different types of battalion squares were prescribed in the Russian regulations: simple square and 'square against cavalry.' Simple square is shown in Fig. 20 (below).
The simple square could be formed from line on the center or on the 2nd division or 3rd division, from column of attack, or from column of divisions. The square against cavalry, was formed from line or from column of attack as shown in Fig. 24. The 'square against cavalry' could also be formed from a column of divisions: 1st and 2nd platoons formed the front part; the 3rd and 5th formed the right side; the 4th and 6th formed the left side; and the 7th and 8th platoons formed the rear part.

Generally square was a formation wherein the center was occupied only by few men (commander, color-bearer, wounded etc.) Ensign Gronow of British 1st Foot Guard writes: "Our squares presented a shocking sight. Inside we were nearly suffocated by the smoke and smell from burnt cartridges. It was impossible to move a yard without treading upon a wounded comrade, or upon the bodies of the dead; and the load groans of the wounded and dying was most appaling. At 4 o'clock our square was a perfect hospital, being full of dead, dying, and mutilated bodies." Wellington himself took refuge in this square. He appeared very "thoughtful and pale."

In square's corners would be posted marksmen and pick up cavalry officers and trumpeters. Sometimes individual cannon was posted in the front corner of the square. The roaring gun made proper impact not only on the charging cavalry but also on own infantry. However if the ammunition wagon was hit and exploded it created havoc. If the square decided to move (attack or withdrew) the guns and wagons hindered its movements and could cause disorder.

The presence of artillery greatly increased the chances of success against cavalry. There were however very few cases where the cavalry routed the artillery and broke the squares. In 1813 at Hanau, 8 French squares supported with 18 guns were routed by 20 squadrons of Bavarian cavalry. In 1813 at Dresden, the Saxon cuirassiers rode through the village of Alt-Franken and advanced against 2 battalions of Austrian infantry. Although the Austrians formed squares and were supported with 2 guns, the Saxons broke them and took prisoner all men and guns. (Due to rain the Austrian infantry were unable to fire many muskets.)

Solid squares.
Differing from the hollow square,
the solid square was a dense formation.

The development of the attack column during the Revolutionary Wars introduced a solid square (also called closed column). Differing from the hollow square, the solid square was a dense formation, formed by having the companies closing the intervals and having the men on the sides and the rear turn to face outwards.
The best thing about the solid square was that it was easier and faster to form than the hollow square. The square could move forward or retreat, but it was difficult to maneuver with it. The worst thing was its great vulnerability to artillery fire.
- The Prussians formed their battalions (4 companies each) rather in closed columns than hollow squares. Their regulations issued in 1812 (Exercir Reglement fur die Infanterie) eliminated the hollow square in favour of a dense column formed from the Angriffscolonne.
- The Austrians formed their battalions in so-called divisionsmasses. Two companies broke into 4 half-companies, aligned themselves behind the other, and closed their ranks up to about 3 feet between the half-companies. In 1809 the masses withstood all attacks of the French cavalry. Even the second rate Landwehr succeeded against chasseurs of Napoleon's Imperial Guard, Napoleon's personal escort. Klenau's infantrymen were slowly retiring and Massena sent Lasalle's light cavalry division in pursuit. Lasalle led from the front, saber in hand, against one of infantry squares. The square stood behind a moat and repulsed Lasalle's men with a musket volley. Lasalle was wounded in the chest and 2 hours later he was dead. Marulaz tried to avenge Lasalle and led a hussar regiment against the square. Colonel of the hussars was hit and Marulaz was wounded. The defiant square slowly retired.

'Egyptian squares.'
It was a rectangle formation
with only 3-rank deep walls.

In Egypt, Napoleon's army faced the fierce but undisciplined Mamelukes. Although heavily outnumbered Napoleon realised that the only enemy's troops of any worth were their cavalry so he arranged his troops in large divisional squares with the front and rear made up of a demi-brigade each and the third demi-brigade of the division making up the two sides of the square. The squares had 3-rank deep walls. Cavalry and baggage hid within these squares. The large squares repelled the Mamelukes with artillery fire supporting.
Against the more disciplined and heavier European cavalry, squares with 4- and 6-ranks deep walls were more suitable.

Multi-battalion squares.
"It is agreed that the regimental square is the best for the defensive
and the battalion square [the smaller] for the offensive."

General Jomini: "It is agreed that the regimental square is the best for the defensive and the battalion square for the offensive." The larger the square the more firepower it had and the more diffcult to break it. But the large square required more time to form and moved slower. The large hollow squares (2-12 battalions in size) were used by the defending infantry.

The small, hollow or solid, squares (of battalion size) were used for the offensive. They were formed quicker and moved faster. The were only few cases when the large and slow squares were used offensively. It happened in 1790s in Egypt and in early 1813 in Germany. In both cases the French cavalry was much weaker in numbers and quality than enemy's horse.
In 1813 at Lutzen, French 20th Infantry Division under General Compans was formed in one huge square and advanced against enemy by Starsiedel. In the same battle, French six brigades were formed in 6 large squares and advanced against the enemy.
In 1813 at Smielkendorf, General Borstell organized the Prussian 5th Brigade into one square of 6 ranks with the cannons in the center. (Nafziger "Napoleon's Dresden Campaign" p 119)

Multi-battalionn squares were also formed when the battalions were very weak. In 1813 at Leipzig, battalions of Russian II Infantry Corps were only 100-200 men each. When they formed squares they were so small that there was no place for senior officers and for the wounded inside them.

One of the largest squares ever formed was at Krasne (Krasnoie, Krasnoye) in August 1812. Russian General Neverovski's force consisted of 10-16 infantry battalions, 4 squadrons of Harkov Dragoons, 3-4 Cossack regiments and 8-12 heavy guns. They were attacked by overwhelming numbers of French, Polish and German cavalry under Marshal Murat. Already in the beginning all dragoons and two Cossack regiments were routed by 9th (?) Polish Uhlans and fled. Seven guns were captured and five fled with the dragoons.
Neverovski formed his inexperienced infantry in one large square (other sources mention two squares) and slowly retreated along the highway. According to the Russians “40 attacks” of Murat’s cavalry were repulsed, while a Polish historian Marian Kukiel gives “30 charges” as being repulsed. The infantry square was able to reach the city of Smolensk where they “shot the gates behind.” De Segur wrote that Neverovski retreated “like a lion” and Murat made comment that he never saw such tough infantry before. Napoleon and Marshal Ney however criticized Murat for his tactics.

Squares in combat (part 1).
The cavalry-vs-square it was morale thing only.

When cavalry had chosen its objective and was ready to move, it set out at a walk, officers in front, their sabers unseathed. If, at this moment, the infantrymen in the square started to fidget a bit too much, the cavalry officers could risk acceleration the pace to a trot. Should the musket volley be fired badly - too soon or too high - the cavalry could pass to a gallop, and then the infantrymen, in all probability, would lose their nerve, break their ranks and flee. The result would be massacre.

For the squares, the first attacks were usually the ones that came closest to causing panic. "The first time a body of cuirassiers approached the square into which I had ridden, the men - all young soldiers - seemed to be very alarmed. They fired high and with little effect, and in one of the angles there was just as much hesitation as made me feel exceedingly uncomfortable" - wrote an officer of British Royal Engineers at Waterloo.

If the square was broken very many infantrymen were killed and wounded, many lost fingers and hands as they sought to protect themselves from sabers by holding their muskets over their heads. Others threw themselves down. Horses were unwilling to step upon prone body. The excited cavalry usually passed over their heads, they quickly rose to their feet and either run to the rear or fired at attackers' backs. This is what the Russian infantry did at Eylau, the British at Waterloo, and the Prussians at Strigau. Kincaid writes: "[at Waterloo] hundreds of the [alles] infantry threw themselves down and pretended to be dead, while the cavalry galloped over them, and then got up and ran away... I never saw such a scene in all my life.".

However, the infantry square was THE best formation against cavalry. The square presented rows of bayonets ahead of them and no horseman armed with saber would have been able to strike at them without exposing himself and his horse to the sharp points of bayonets. Horses were unwilling to impale themselves on bayonets.
Prussian colonel Muffling mentions that in 1814 three newly raised Russian battalions were attacked by French cuirassiers. The Russians delivered volley at 60 paces killing not a single man or horse. The cuirassiers however turned back and retired !
A British officer writes: "[At Waterloo] No actual dash was made upon us [our square]. Now and then an individual more daring than the rest would ride up to the bayonets, wave his sword about and bully; but the mass held aloof, pulling up within 5 or 6 yards ..." (- Mark Adkin)

There were four popular methods of cavalry attacks on the square.
- the attacking cavalry is divided into two troops. The infantry emptied their muskets on the smaller troop, while the other troop charged before the infantry could reload.
- attack in echelons. The infantry emptied their muskets on the first echelon, while the second echelon was on them. In 1809 at Wagram Colbert's 'Infernal Brigade' (9th Hussars, 7th and 20th Chasseurs), rushed against Austrian infantry. The 7th Chasseurs was greeted with musket volley and fell back. Colbert was seriously wounded. The 20th Chasseurs moved against the square that had just repulsed the 7th. Despite having emptied their muskets the infantrymen were standing firm. The chasseurs however attacked and broke the square. Other square was broken by the 9th Hussars.
- part of cavalry dismounted (for better aiming) and approached the square in skirmish order. The main body waited for any sign of weakness of the square. Lewis described how the French cuirassiers at Waterloo fired at his square: "They fired on us with their carbines, then immediately do an about-turn while a comrade at my side collapses with a bullet full in the stomach and blood coming out of him as from a stuck pig."
- cavalry attacked combined with artillery

Squares in combat (part 2).
The cavalryman instinctively "ducked"
under fire becoming smaller target.

It was a horrifying thing for the infantry to see cavalry riding straight at them. Their eyes were popping out of their heads, jaws dropping, alarm bells ringing, hearts beating well out from their chests. In such moment the fire discipline and aiming were important.
According to G.Beskrovniy of Russia; "When cavalry is attacking the formed front, all officers must tell to their men they must not fire without the command, and when the command is given, every soldier must take aim without hurry and then shoot. The regiment's commander allows the cavalry to approach to 150 paces and gives a command to fire." (At Borodino many battalions fired at 50-60 paces.)

Usually there were more horses killed and wounded than riders. The cavalryman instinctively "ducked" under fire becoming smaller target. Horse is a bigger target than man anyway.

Few miles north of Leipzig, near Mockern, Prussian General von Yorck attacked with battalion of the elite Leib Regiment, 2 squadrons of Brandenburg Hussars and 1 sq. of horse volunteer-jagers who until now stood in a hollow ground and were unseen to the French. Behind them advanced Brandenburg Uhlans. Once they came closer to the French infantry the 308 Brandenburg Hussars "wheeled out" and charged. The French formed two squares and fired. The salvo made little impression on the hussars, they broke and pursued the infantry. The frightened infantry ran towards own artillery and thus masking their fire. In effect the entire battery was captured. Regiment of Wirtembergian cavalry struck the Prussians on the left flank but was immediately charged by 2 sq. of Prussian Uhlans (342 men). The Prussian uhlans and hussars broke two regiments of Wirtembergians and captured 9 guns. During pursuit they met battalion of 1st Marine Infantry Regiment and slashed it to pieces. The uhlans continued their brilliant charge and broke several other squares !
It was a disaster for Marmont's infantry.
Jurgass sent forward 1st West Prussia Dragoons, Lithuania Dragoons and several regiments of Landwehr cavalry. Total of 2.000-3.000 of cavalry flooded French positions. The dragoons attacked French cavalry, broke them and pursued towards Gohlis. They also captured 4 guns and took prisoners. Another group of cavalry, dragoons and Landwehr, attacked battalion deployed in line and broke it by attacking one flank. Battalions of 1st and 3rd Marine Infantry formed squares and attempted to halt the Prussians. But the Mecklenburg hussars took them from the rear while from the front attacked Prussian infantry. The marines broke in the instant, lost a flag and 700 prisoners. The 2nd Leib Hussar Regiment took 2 French flags and 2 guns, and the Landwehr and national cavalry captured several guns. The 7th and 8th Brigade continued their advance behind the victorious cavalry, but there was little or no resistance from Marmont's troops.

Group of cavalrymen break into the square.
"Although several [French] cavalrymen
managed to break into the square,
they were all bayoneted."
- Regimental history of Prussian 28th Regiment

If musket fire made no impression on the charging cavalry, some squares would 'waver'. The men became anxious and some frightened souls abandoned their front rank and moved behind their comrades in second and third rank. It created small gaps in wall of the square.

If the cavalrymen were determined enough they would move into such gap and break into center of the square. Only equally determined infantry might still be able to close the gap and bayonet the bravados. It took place in 1812 at Krasne, and in 1815 at Quatre Bras. More examples below:

- in 1815 at Fleurus. A single square of Prussian fusiliers threw back 3 cavalry charges. Several cavalrymen however managed to break into the center of the square but were bayoneted. The regimental history of the 28th Infantry (a former Berg regiment) described what happened: "Although several cavalrymen managed to break into the square, they were all bayoneted. Even after such a show of resistance, the enemy tried to persuade the troops to change sides.
General Letort, commander of the French Guard Dragoons, recognised the Fusiliers by their Berg uniform. He thought that, since the hopelessness of their position would be obvious to them, their loyalty might waver. He rode up and demanded they desert the Prussian army. A shot rang out and Letort fell dead from his saddle. Fusilier Kaufmann of the 12th Company had leapt out of the square and given the enemy general his answer, in powder and lead. The battalion continued to withdraw but just before it reached the wood, the enemy cavalry approached again. The 10th Company faced front while the others continued their movement. At this critical moment, the full force of the enemy cavalry charge it home."

Artillery vs Square.
The Russians fired canister, throwing the French square into disorder.
Two squadrons of Lifeguard Horse Regiment then charged
and broke the square. (- Battle of Austerlitz, 1805)

The easiest way to break the square was to bring horse artillery and blast the infantry away. In 1813 at Dennewitz, two Prussian batteries coordinated their action with III/4th Reserve Infantry "completely deployed as skirmishers" (- G. Nafziger "Napoleon's Dresden Campaign" p 266) Two Wirtembergian battalions formed in squares were broken by canister fire and suffered horrible casualties. (One square lost 531, only 70 escaped !)

To bring the guns close to the square however was not as easy as it seems. Often the cavalry made continuous charges and counter-charges against the enemy's horsemen, any batteries would have been overrun as each wave of horsemen was forced, or merely retired, to reform in the rear. With no close friendly infantry to seek cover with the gunners would have been slaughtered or have to mount up and abandon their pieces in the heart of the enemy position. The only other alternative, that of continually limbering and moving downslope, then returning and unlimbering again would hardly be practical.

Furthermore, coordination between artillery and cavalry was a more difficult matter and it was not frequently done. The guns needed time to arrive, unlimber, load and open fire. The situation on battlefield however changed quickly and before the guns were ready, enemy's cavalry counter-attacked. The cannons were lost and the gunners were either scattered or cut down.

Below are examples of successful coordination between cavalry and horse artillery in breaking the square.

- In 1807 near Eylau, French 46th Line marched in snow while being fired upon by the Russian artillery and skirmishers. It didn’t stop them from crossing their bayonets with the Russian infantry and the famous 18th Line (nicknamed "The Brave") hurried to support their comrades. Meanwhile the S.Petersburg Dragoons moved around own infantry and began deploying into charge. The 18th Line suddenly saw a dark mass of cavalry coming at them and leaving no time for forming the square. The French infantry wavered and fired. The dragoons attacked from the front and from the rear and the infantry lost any order. A desperate struggle was around the French standard. Trooper Podvorotny drove the French standard-bearer to the ground and seized the Eagle. Trooper Deriagin and others cut down the escort of the standard, Adjutant Fomine, dragoon Erofeiev and trumpeter Logvinov were also involved in this bloody struggle.
Marshal Soult’s Journal of the IV Corps: “The 18th Regiment was near to arriving at the summit, when a large body of enemy cavalry surrounded it, charged it, repulsed it.” Colonel Langlois wrote that General Lavasseur, all the senior officers, as well as large number of officers and soldiers of this regiment were seriously wounded and, the worst of all, the Eagle was lost. The damage was indeed enormous: 44 officers killed, wounded and captured as prisoners - including Lavasseur, Ravier and Pelleport. The 18th also lost more than 500 other ranks, including several hundred prisoners. The situation could develop into a slaughter if not the charge by the 13th Chasseurs who saved the 18e Ligne. This regiment was so shaken that it was kept in reserve when the Battle of Eylau was fought. The losses of the dragoons were only 20 men killed and 18 wounded. The French army Bulletin dated 9 Feb. 1807 tried to downplay the loss of the regiment’s Eagle and the Emperor ordered that the 18th Line be given replacement eagle.

Receiving the attacking cavalry while formed in column was also not the best solution.

Skirmishing.
The American riflemen were armed with rifles, war axes
and Indian scalping knives. They had the air of men
to whom cleanliness was a virtue unknown. It "gave them
an air of wilderness and savageness which in Italy would
cause them to pass for the brigands of the Appenines."
- John Richardson

"Skirmishers are infantry who are stationed ahead or to the sides of a larger body of friendly troops. They are usually placed in a skirmish line to either harass enemy troops or to protect their own troops from similar attacks by the enemy. Skirmishers are generally lightly armed and lightly armored in order to move quickly across the battlefield. In ancient and medieval warfare, skirmishers typically carried bows, jawelins, and sometimes carried light shields. Acting as light infantry with their light arms and minimal armor, they could run ahead of the main battle line, fire a volley of arrows, slingshots or javelins, and retreat behind their main battle line before the clash of the opposing main forces. The aims of skirmishing were to disrupt enemy formations by causing casualties before the main battle, and to tempt the opposing infantry into attacking prematurely, throwing their organization into disarray." (- wikipedia.org)

Skirmishing was not new in Europe, During the Napoleonic Wars the opposing armies would march their infantry in column formations and deploy them in a line, shoulder to shoulder in three ranks. In front of these columns and lines moved skirmishers. All infantrymen were trained in skirmishing.

The skirmishers acted in 2s. The intervals between pairs were: in the French army 15 paces, in Austrian 6 paces, in Russian 5 paces. The intervals could change depending on tactical situation and available space. In 1815 at Quatre Bras the Duke of Brunswick deployed his Jager Battalion in a ditch near Gemioncourt. The jagers were in groups of 4 at intervals of six paces. They had put their large hats on the bushes in front of them. It attracted a lot of musket fire from French voltigeurs. :-)

As the battle continued the lines and columns fed the skirmish lines or broke down into skirmish lines themselves. The skirmishers used terrain, trees and buildings as a cover. Their primary target were enemy's officers, trumpeters, drummers, gunners, and skirmishers. The skirmishers also annoyed the flanks of the enemy and created terror when succeeded on appearing at the rear.

The skirmishers used a lot of ammunition. Once the cartrdige box was empty the skirmisher went to the ammunition wagon. It would in many cases mean being withdrawn from the front line. Also the musket didn't allow for continuous firing for many hours. Russian officer Davidov noted in 1808 that many skirmishers used to spend their ammunition very quickly or throw it out in order to leave the firing line. One general said that a number of soldiers is lost to "temporary desertion" while skirmishing. But officer F.N. Glinka wrote that in 1813 after Bautzen: "...Colonel Kern wanted to relieve a chain of skirmishers, who fought for several hours. They responded: don't relieve us ! We can fight till the evening; just give us cartridges !"

The greatest danger to skirmishers came from the cavalry. Beskrovnyi writes; "[when cavalry attack the skirmishers] The officer ... collects his men into groups of about 10 men. They stand back to back and continue firing and thrust their bayonets into the enemy cavalrymen, and everyone should be confident that the battalion or the regiment will come to their aid in a short time."