"The enormous din and rattle of 500 muskets
is completely beyond imagination." - Colonel Elting
Concentrated firepower was essential
because of the poor accuracy of the
smoothbore muskets used during Napoleonic Wars.

Picture: Polish infantry in firefight. By Giseppe Rava, Italy. >

To modern man, long accustomed to repeating and automatic firearms, one, two, or even three rounds per minute is nothing to write home about. However, once one comes to grips with the idea of 600 men, packed into front of about 200 paces, able to fire anywhere from 1000 to 3000 rounds per minute, then the image alters drastically, even in the eyes of a modern soldier.
Von Angeli described the fight for Baumersdorf in 1809 between the Austrians and the French 57th Line Regiment: "One exchanged musketry at very close range. The enormous din, as wave upon wave of musketry constantly erupted ...is completely beyond the imagination. Evrything, even the thunder of the numerous cannon, seemed insignificant amid the raging storm of the so-called smallarms."

The intricacies of the tactics demanded a high level of skill on the part of the soldiers. Drill developed by Maurice [of Nassau] and further extended by Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden enabled maneuver and rate of fire unknown before. "This promise of tactical effectivenes lured French officers to the Netherlands and northern Germany, where they learned the great streess that the Dutch and Swedes placed on drill. ... Under the direction of Maurice of Nassau, Dutch infantry learned to maneuver precisely under fire. Although the square Spanish formations of 16th century could present a strong face to all four directions, they had done so at the cost of wasting manpower, for relatively few weapons could be brought to bear to the front.
Formations were thus solid but innefficient. Linear tactics, such as those employed by the Dutch, made the most of manpower by facing all weapons to the front in relatively thin formatios. ... Linear formations claimed greater efficiency, then, but were more vulnerable if taken off guard." (Lynn - "Giant of the Grand Siecle" pp 515-516)

Concentrated firepower was essential because of the poor accuracy of the smoothbore muskets used during Napoleonic Wars. During firing in three ranks, "elbow-to-elbow", the infantrymen were struggling for space to load, aim and fire their muskets.
Firing sometimes set tall dry grass or cornfield alight with burning paper from cartridges. In the flames many wounded perished.

Such firefight sucked in other battalions.
It all happened with or without the conset of their officers. For this reason it was important to have troops in reserve, far enough (but not too far) from the combat zone. The stress level during the firefight was incredibly high. (The stress during real combat is tremendous, for example during WW2 approx. 500.000 men were discharged from USA Army for psychiatric reasons. This is said that 101 psychiatric casualties per 1.000 men per year were recorded in the First Army (USA) in Europe. Source: Kellet - "Combat motivation" p 272)

1st, 2nd and 3rd Rank During the Firefight.
Most experts considered kneeling 1st rank good only
for the infantry formed in square against cavalry.

Napoleonic infantry was formed on 3 ranks. A 600-men strong battalion had 200 men in the first, 200 in second and 200 men in the third rank. The first two ranks loaded and fired, while - theoretically - the 3rd rank had to load their muskets and then give them to those in 2nd rank.

In reality it was very difficult to keep them doing this under fire. They would become excited once the battle commenced and would blaze away through the first two ranks. Passing the barrels of their muskets over the shoulders of 2nd rank, the muzzles were very near the ears and heads of the first rank. The loud discharge, heat and powder so close to ears, head and eyes were quite disturbing for the first rank. Sometimes fingers and elbows were shot away, and if the bursting percussion caps were too close to the ears of 2nd and 1st rankers their eardrums could be damaged.

Gouvion St. Cyr claimed that 1 in 4 casualties were inflicted by own 3rd rank. For these reasons they not suppose to fire.
The Russian recruits were trained to fire by two ranks. The first and second rank fired their first shots, file-by-file and then loaded and fired as quickly as possible. Each man in the 2nd rank, having fired his musket, passed it to the man in the 3rd rank standing behind it, took his musket, fired, loaded it, fired again and then returned it to the man in the 3rd rank and took his own musket from him, and so on. Men in the 3rd rank did not fire at all. They only loaded muskets and passed them on to the second rank. This method was borrowed from the French and often caused confusion.

Theoretically the men of 1st rank would be kneeling and firing - it gave more space for those standing in the 2nd rank. Some veterans (for example Tanski) declared that they never saw among the French troops kneeling and firing soldiers as was prescribed by instructions. If they were kneeling and firing it was difficult to get them stand up and advance. Kneeling soldier presented a much smaller target for the enemy and he wanted to keep this advantage as long as he could.
Kneeling by the 1st rank when firing was abolished in the Austrian infantry already before the 1809 campaign.
By this time kneeling in the Russian infantry as considered as idiocy.

Most experts considered kneeling 1st rank good only for the infantry formed in square against cavalry.

Gun Smoke.
The smoke was sometimes so dense that the infantrymen
could hardly distinguish friend from foe.
In such situation there was little chance of sensing
the other side casualties.

"Burning black powder gave off dense grey-white smoke with a distinct bad-egg stink, and on a damp or still day the smoke hung about ..." (- Professor Richard Holmes)
A high rate of fire produced massive clouds of smoke unless there was a strong breeze. The smoke was sometimes so dense that the infantrymen could hardly distinguish friend from foe. In such situation there was little chance of sensing the other side casualties.

The smoke obscured all vision and aiming, that is picking out an individual target was virtually impossible. Until wind cleared the battlefield the soldiers knew little about their position in line or the situation.
In 1805 at Austerlitz, two battalions of Austrian Grenzers opened fire on the French in Tellnitz: "Now a very murderous musketry fire began and the smoke was so close because of the fog that one could not see a single step. The battalions were completely wrapped in smoke, which made the operation more difficult." (Vanicek - "Specialgeschichte der Militargrenze ..." IV, p 112)

Length of Firefight.
The resolute Austrian Grenzers delivered a single volley
and immediately attacked with cold steel.

The length of the firefight varied, see examples below (from the shortest to the longest ones).

Bayonets.
"Lads ! Shoot and get at them !
Haven't you got bayonets ?
Go out and skewer the swine !"
- Prussian Duke of Bevern
to his infantry fighting
against the Austrians & Croats
in 1756

On picture: European infantry before the era of bayonet. The infantrymen were armed with long pikes and firearms. In the 1600s the Swedish infantry was considered as the best in the World. They were tall and strong men, disciplined, well-trained, and led by great generals. This picture comes from the movie "Potop" (The Deluge) 1974-5, directed by J. Hoffman. Time: 315 min. (short version 155 min.) This movie had an academy award nomination but didn't win.

A bayonet (from French "baïonnette") is a knife - or dagger- shaped weapon designed to fit on or over the muzzle of a rifle or similar weapon. It is a close combat weapon. It was introduced to the French army at the town of Bayonne in France in 1647.

The first bayonets were simple spear-like daggers with conical handles that were slipped directly into the musket barrel. An obvious disadvantage to these plug bayonets was that the musket could not be used as a firearm while the bayonet was in place. A solution was found with the development of the socket bayonet. This had a hollow socket that slipped over the outside of the musket barrel and had the blade off-set to the side. The weapon could now be loaded and fired with the bayonet attached.

The invention of a bayonet transformed the weapon into a pike without detriment to its use as a firearm. Thereupon the pikemen disappeared and the infantry became uniform in character, all armed with the flintlock and the bayonet. A trial with badly-fitting socket or zigzag bayonets was made after the battle of Fleurus, 1690, in the presence of King Louis XIV. Shortly after the peace of Ryswick (1697), the English and Germans abolished the pike and introduced these bayonets. Loading was made easier by the invention of an iron ramrod, which was first adopted by the Prussian army in 1719.
18th and 19th century military tactics included various massed bayonet charges and defences. Soldiers were instructed to direct the bayonet at the vulnerable points of the enemy's body: the throat, breast and abdoman. There were parries, thrusts, points and butt-strokes. In 1806 at Morungen the Russian Yekaterinoslav Grenadier Regiment used musket butts against French voltigeurs. The grenadiers said: "These shorties are not worthy of our bayonets" and drove them away just with musket butts, guffawing with laughter.

The bayonet has developed almost mystic prominence over the centuries. The charge of troops intent on carrying a defended post by bayonet was considered a heroic, undeniable act of courage which, once begun, must prevail.

With the increase of fire power however the use of bayonet dramatically decreased. For example during During General Grant's bloody campaign against Confederate General Lee in 1864, Union medical directors recorded only 37 bayonet wounds. Of the several hundred thousand wounded men treated in Union hospitals over the course of the war, surgeons noted only 922 bayonet wounds.

During 20th century the German army developed more types of bayonet than all other armies combined. There was undeniably psychological value to the infantry in carrying a bayonet, even if in practice it was seldom used. Bayonets continued to be commonly issued in the Second World War.

Comparison of Wounds
Caused by Bayonets and Other Weapons.
The wounds from bayonets were most often inflicted
during pursuit or during attack on the flank of the enemy.

"As it turnes out, firearms and not bayonets caused the greatest amount of wounds on the battlefield. At Malplaquet, for example, the best evidence indicates that 2/3 of the wounds received by French troops came from the enemy's fusils, with only about 2 % were inflicted by bayonets. Of the men wounded by gunfire, 60 % had been struck in the left sde, the side facing the enemy as a soldier stood in line to fire himself.

Looking at a larger sample of veterans admitted to the Invalides in 1715, Corvisier arrived at the following breakdown of wounds:
- 71.4 % from firearms
- 15.8 % from swords
- 10.0 % from artillery
- 2.8 % from the bayonet
Perhaps the figures for bayonet wounds are so small because bayonets may either have killed more effectively, and thus allowed less soldiers to survive to be admitted, or produced wounds that were more survivable without permanent maiming. It is also possible that bayonet charges proved their worth by driving defenders from their positions before the troops actually colided." (Lynn - "Giant of the Grand Siecle" p 489)
According to another sample taken (in 1762) in Invalides;
- 69 % of the wounded were wounded by musket balls
- 14 % by sabers
- 13 % by artillery
- 2 % by bayonets

In 1807 during the war between France and Russia and Prussia, chirurg Dominique Jean Larrey studied wounded on one battlefield and found most were caused by artillery and muskets. Only 2 % of all wounds were caused by bayonets.

The damage inflicted during "bayonet assault" was most often executed by bullets. Larrey studied one particularly vicious close combat between the Russians and the French and found:
- 119 wounds from musketballs
- 5 wounds from bayonets

The wounds from bayonets were most often inflicted during pursuit or during attack on flank of enemy and not in frontal clash. Most men could more easily kill an enemy who was running away. Perhaps the sudden release of stress, when the enemy turned his back, so that he could be struck without risk, turned his emotion into elation and rage. But during pursuit the victorious troops became disorganized and vulnerable to counterattack.

Bayonet Attack.
The French regulations from 1805 stated that
bayonet attack is to be used against enemy
that is disorganized by fire,
physically and emotionally worn down.

"The earliest French bayonet attack occured no later than 1677 at the siege of Valenciennes, where, after an enemy cavalry charge 'the musketeers, having put their bayonets in their fusils, marched at them and with grenades and bayonets, chased them back in the town.' In another use of the plug bayonet, dragoons beat back enemy forces at a river near the same town in 1684. ...
As they have so often in their history, the French pictured themselves as particularly apt in the assault with cold steel. A belief in a special French talent in combat a l'arme blanche probably goes back as far as Merovingian times. The cult of the bayonet peaked late in the 18th century and again, with tragic consequences, just prior to World War I. Much of the language later assumed by advocates of the bayonet was already current in the 17th century. Writing in 1652, Laon expressed the belief that 'French infantry is more suited to the attack than to the defense.'
The French never seemed to tire of contrasting their own energy in the assault versus their enemies' stolid nature, particularly when Germans were involved. 'The [German] infantry is constant enough when syanding fast, but it is not lively in the attack and cannot carry off a coup de main. Chamlay agreed in the superiority of the French infantry on the offensive, starting in 1690 ... The same confidence typified opinion in the War of the Spanish Succession ... No less a figure than Marshal Villars praised 'the air of audacity so natural for the French infantry ... is to charge with the bayonet ..." (Lynn - "Giant of the Grand Siecle" pp 487-488)

Attack with cold steel was popular not only in France. In 1777 British General Burgoyne wrote: "The officers will take all proper opportunities to inculcate in the mens’ minds a reliance on the bayonet; men of their bodily strength and even a coward may be their match in firing. But the bayonet in the hands of the valiant is irresistible."

During bayonet attack the troops advanced either in silence or with noise. The sense of hearing has one of the most disturbing effect on men of all senses. The noise made by the attackers would most often intimidate and confuse the enemy. (In the ancient times the troops beat on the drums all at once and the sound produced was most eerie and terrifying. Or they roared while holding their shields in front of their mouths so the sound is much louder.
Roman legionaries banged their swords on shields, or remained silent until the enemy came close and then raised an extremally loud battle-cry and threw their javelins at once.
In 20th Century the USA troops in Korea commented on how scary was the Chinese tactic of using drums and bugles at night attack. It is far easier to cope with stress when doing something (firing, shouting, fast riding etc.) than standing and watching the enemy advance and passively enduring it. For example at Boudicca, when the Roman legionares slowly advanced in silence the Britons made a noisy and fast advance. The silence of the Romans was so intimidating that the Britons' confidence collapsed and they fled before any serious contact was made. The Spartans also enjoyed a reputation for a slow and silent advance with cold steel.)

The French regulations from 1805 stated that bayonet attack is to be used "as a coup de grace against enemy that is disorganized by fire", physically and emotionally worn down. This was achieved by:
- artillery fire
- difficult terrain, obstacles
- surprise

There were some differences in regulations between the French, Prussian, British and Russians, but basically it was about weakening the enemy, physically and emotionally, before contact was made. For example the British in Peninsula were usually deployed on reverse slope, safe from artillery and musket fire, while the advancing French troops were exposed to the full effect of cannonade and were exhausted by marching uphill, through a broken terrain. The enemy was invisible. In such situation the French failed more often than not, so did the British in similar situations.
For example in 1812 at Salamanca, Pack's Brigade failed with the attack on the hill of Greater Arapile. "Pack's brigade had a significant ... numerical advantage (2.600 men compared to 1.800 infantry plus gunners). ... Climbing a steep slope slows the advance, depriving it of momentum and making the men breathless and disordered. ... Clearly the task was beyond Pack's brigade, and the decision to launch the attack, whether made by Wellington or by Pack, proved a mistake." According to Ltn. Ingilby of British Artillery ("Diary of Lt. Ingilby R.A. in the Peninsular War and Waterloo campaign") Wellington's infantry at Arapile "... advanced to within musket shot of the crest of the hill, but were suddenly driven back and overwhelmed by the fire of the French, who had screened their force on the slope of the opposite side of the hill."

Sometimes the French attack uphill, against all odds, was a success. Colonel Waller, (British 2nd Division) witnessed a French attack against Picton's "Fighting Division" in 1810 at Bussaco: "At this moment were seen the heads of the several columns, three I think, in number and deploying into line with the most beautiful precision, celerity and gallantry. As they formed on the plateau, they were cannonaded from our position and the regiment of Portuguese... threw in some volleys of musketry into the enemy's columns in a flank direction, but the (Portugese) regiment was quickly driven into the position ... the (French) columns advanced in despite of a tremendous fire of grape and musketry from our troops in position in the rocks, and overcoming all opposition although repeatedly charged by Lightburne's Brigade, or rather the whole of Picton's Division, they advanced and fairly drove the British right wing from the rocky part of this position.")
The British however broke many French attacks in the mountainous Spain and Portugal. Big role in success played their tactics. (ext.link)

During the Napoleonic Wars there were very many bayonet attacks.
It was especially effective against enemy being in the process of deploying. In 1815 in the Battle of Ligny, a battalion of Prussian infantry delivered a volley at French battalion. The French attempted to deploy and to return the fire. The Prussians fired another volley and attacked with bayonets throwing the French back.
Below are several examples of bayonet attacks:

Esprit de corps .
Panic gathered volume like a snowball.

Picture: Highlanders in combat, by Dmitrii Zgonnik of Ukraine.

Despite the intangible nature of morale, improvements in material factors (such as remuneration, food and shelter) can improve the morale. However, history is filled with stories of the self-will and determination of a poorly supplied army maintaining morale to the very end. Morale of troops can benefit from:
- Adequate quantity, and quality of food, and shelter
- The quality of military leadership and training
- Having a volunteer military, as opposed to a force made up of potentially less motivated conscripts
(source: wikipedia.org)

Not all men are equally brave, even within the same battalion there are the bravehearts, the cowards and those in between. Colonel of US Army S.L.A. Marshall showed how many soldiers, in the heat of combat, exhibit "posturing" which is identical to behavior exhibited throughout the animal world. The idea is to look and sound aggressive without actually attacking to kill. In combat this might mean shooting without aiming, wildly, over the enemy's heads, shouting, etc. To the casual eye (e.g. watching archival combat footage) this looks like true combat, but it's not. Marshall discovered this behavior through interviews with countless US soldiers who admitted (with much guilt) what they had done.
During the Napoleonic Wars the soldiers behaved no different. Some were eager to fight, some were not, and some just "followed the crowd."

Surprise played an important role on the battlefield. Even the fine troops when surprised could be broken. In 1805 at Austerlitz, the French I/14th Line Regiment advanced to occupy Pratzen. As they neared the village, the "battalion was surprised by the sudden appearance" of Russian battalion (Novgorod Musketeers) "rising from the ravine ... and opening fire" on the French. "Taken completely off guard, the I/14th Line broke and fled in the direction of Puntowitz" with their colonel riding after them. (Goetz - "1805: Austerlitz" p 155)
Obviously not all troops panicked when surprised. Another example from Austerlitz. The fog was heavy and when French columns were sighted, the Russian infantry mistook them for their jagers or "other troops wanted to retire on them, and dared not to fire at all, but remained standing in best order ... Only when the enemy, formed in masses, approached to approx. 20 paces did they notice the fact that they were mistaken and threw themselves against them in a desperate manner and with exceptional bravery." (Mahler - "Tagebucher ans dem Jahre 1805" p 519)

Fighting enemy to the front and to the side could also break morale of the best troops. Flank attack holds special qualities and more often than not will break the enemy. In 1809 at Teugen, the French 57th Line Regiment (nicknamed 'The Terrible" for their bravery in combat) brushed enemy's first line away and descended into a hollow ground. They then climbed again and showed up in front of main line of Austrian infantry. It was still quite a great distance but the Austrians and French opened artillery and musket fire.
Several roundshots and canister hit the columns of 57th but didn't break their morale. The French deployed from columns into lines to respond with their own musketry. The French lines advanced, stopping to fire "every 25 paces." The musketry became very intense and the lines halted. Both sides were firing as fast as they could and the 3rd Line joined the fight. As it went on the French 10th Light appeared on Austrian flank. This surprise, and not the lenghty firefight broke the spirit of Austrians who hurriedly abandoned their positions.

Skulkers.
Taking the wounded to the rear
was a favorite skulker activity.

During lengthy musketry the infantry battalion would shrink toward its center and gaps appeared in the line. The gaps were caused by casualties and by cowards taking cover behind their braver comrades. Often the 3-rank deep line degenerated into a disordered "column".

The falling of the dead, and the moaning of the wounded caused a great deal of additional stress. A man who fell threw all his neighbors into great deal of confusion. Taking the wounded to the rear was a favorite skulker activity. Five wounded walked to the rear by 2-10 troopers weakened the line and its power fire. It must be a problem in every army, including Napoleon's famous Grande Armee. (Ancient Romans decimated their cowardly troops.)

In 1809 the Emperor issued orders prohibiting leaving the ranks under the excuse of carrying the wounded. The strict directive stated that no one could leave the ranks to succor the wounded.

- In 1814 at Berg-op-Zoom, the British 55th and 69th Regiment of Foot advanced in the dark then suddenly broke and fled in a wild panick.
According to Geeorge Nafziger "not a shot was fired at them, nor was a single Frenchman seen." (- "Imperial Bayonets" 1996 p 164)

- Chlapowski described panic among the French soldiers of Marshal Davout's superb corps during foraging.
Chlapowski writes: "At midnight we were woken by a great uproar from behind Marshal Davout's corps on the right. The Emperor and all his staff mounted up and he sent some of us off in the direction of the shouting. We came back over the next half to three quarters of an hour with reports that many of our soldiers were running about without their weapons, shouting that Archduke John was upon us. But the Emperor was not disturbed by these stories ... It turned out that this nonsense had been started by French soldiers foraging for food and hay in the night, who had run across some Bavarian soldiers doing the same thing, and on hearing them speaking German had fled in panic spreading the rumor which had eventually reached us." (Chlapowski - "Memoirs of a Polish Lancer" p 87, translated by Tim Simmons)