It was too much for the British and when the Belgians refused to join the British in the Crimean War, Lord Liverpool gave his famous "cowardly Belgians" speech in 1851 in the Commons.

Netherlands Troops in 1815.
For a serious researcher any work on the Waterloo Campaign
which does not refer in detail to Dutch/Belgian, or German sources
is essentially one-sided and unreliable.

According to Erwin Muilwijk the Netherland troops in 1815 were "... typical new recruits with no campaign experience yet; just like every other army had large numbers of them in this period. Obviously Jager and Line battalions were professional soldiers, but even these had large numbers of new men. The militia was all sort of conscripted, but there was no specific difference I think. Not a bad army, not a distinguishable army perhaps at the start; but it prooved its task, to me. Perhaps a study on its own........"

The commander of Netherlands troops, Prince of Orange, has been much criticized by English historians for his actions at Quatre Bras and Waterloo. Siborne was the first, followed by many, incl. more recently the American historian Jac Weller, (ext.link) whose Wellington at Waterloo (1967) was marred by an over-reliance on English sources.
Prince of Orange was blamed for being too young, at 23, for his rank, Major General, and to hold a corps command. However, there was an ample precedent for this, as nearly 300 French generals, as indeed had the Duke of York in his day. Further, it was Wellington who appointed him to a corps command in 1815. Even it is assumed that the appointment was made solely to enable the British to have effective control of the 30,000 Dutch-Belgian troops, the Prince cannot be criticized for accepting it.
Rather might the government of Great Britain, the wealthiest nation in the World at the time, be blamed for sending its field marshal to war without providing him with an army.

General van Knoop replied to Siborne's characterization of the Dutch/Belgian troops by publishing "Beschouwingen over Siborne's geschiedenis van den oolog in 1815." It was also published in France, but not in Britain. Siborne however received support from Sir Charles Oman. Oman writes: "Out of the 1,080 sabres which it [Merlen's brigade] contained, only 22 had been killed and 146 wounded, but there was a dreadful deficit of 203 'missing' i.e. nearly a fifth of the men had abandoned to the rear."
Unfortunately Sir Oman did not bother to check non-British accounts of this charge. Having charged the French, Merlen's cavalrymen were riding back to their lines to regroup and were pursued by French. Both sides wore green uniforms. British infantrymen newly arrived on the battlefield, mistook the whole crowd for French and fired in their direction. Most casualties were among the horses. The dismounted Dutch/Belgians were unable to obtain remounts for few days and were counted as 'missing' in the sense that they were not available for active duty.

Left: General Baron D.H. Chasse, commander of 3rd Netherlands Infantry Diviosion. Lithograph by E. Spanier, after I.H. Hoffmeister. Musee Royal de l"Armee, Brussles.
Right: General Baron H.G. de Perponcher-Sedlnitzki, commander of 2nd Netherlands Infantry Division. Lithograph by E. Spanier, after I.H. Hoffmeister. Musee Royal de l"Armee, Brussles.

Chassé 3rd Division had two brigades (Detmers' and Aubreme's) and artillery. The division was ordered to deploy in close columns south of Braine-l'Alleud, a town with numerous brick buildings. It was to cover the right flank against a possible French flanking maneuvre, which didn't materialise. British authors stated that "Wellington had some misgivings as to the quality of Chasse's troops" and simply "they were not reliable." But leaving the town unoccupied would have given the enemy the chance to gain a position in Wellington's right flank.

Chasse's position at Braine-l'Alleud was not to be the final position before nightfall. Shortly afterwards Chasse moved his division behind that village and in the evening the final position was taken. Detmers' brigade (6 battalions) received order to defend the village "to the utmost" and was deployed as follow: 3 battalions were placed in front of Braine-l'Alleud (and they sent their skirmishers forward), 2 battalions were on marketplatz as a reserve, and 1 battalion was east of the village and served as a link between Chasse and the British army.

Aubreme's brigade stood behind Braine-l'Alleud where it was protected by a marshy ground covered with hedges and bushes. According to Erwin Muilwijk one battalion of this brigade (36th Jagers) "sent out its 2 flanker companies to both sides and covered all entries and bushes. This happened in full view of enemy patrols. Besides guarding the extreme right flank of Wellington's army, a small part of Chasse's division was also responsible for occupying the Hougoumont (from what time is not known). This is what sergeant Wiegmans says about it: 'The day before the fight I commanded the guard as sergeant, in the renowned farm Hougoumont, where the next day so many glorious deeds were done. Towards the evening of June 17 I was relieved ...' Wiegmans served in the 6th Company of the 6th Militia Battalion." (Erwin Muilwijk - "The 3rd Netherlands Division at the Battle of Waterloo" published in First Empire, UK 2005)

French cavalry patrols were sighted to Chasse's right flank and the general sent one battalion of Aubreme's brigade to occupy a nearby wood and watch the enemy. Chasse had no cavalry and he remained very vigilant for any French movement against his flank.

In the morning on June 18th the French patrols captured several chasseurs of the 36th Battalion but not much was going on. Lieutenant van Eysinga wrote: "I was busy with my NCOs to take care of the weapons ... my soldiers were cheerful and in a short time the muskets were in good order; many knapsacks were laden with superfluous goods, and I convinced my men that this could be very inconvenient..." Constant-Rebecque (chief-of-staff) arrived and inspected all troops of the 3rd Division. Detmers received orders from General Chasse to defend Braine-l'Alleud "to the last man." Detmers' men blocked all entrances with wagons, stones etc. In that time the French army was lining up at La Belle Alliance.

Detmer's brigade of 3rd Netherland Division.
"Forward Colonel Detmers and charge with the bayonet !"

Shortly before the battle Wellington realized that the French were deploying against his center and left wing, so he ordered Chasse's 3rd Division to move closer to the 2nd British Division.

Van Eysinga wrote: "We marched forward, the brave Ditmers at our head, who proved himself to be a man, whose undauntedness gave an example for us all ..." This movement was carried out while marching in squares. The troops deployed north of Hougoumont and in support of the large chateau. According to van Delen Ditmers' brigade was placed behind and along the road, while Aubreme's brigade was on their right "with two columns by sections."

The 3rd Division suffered first casualties from artillery fire, then formed squares and repulsed French cavalry. According to Erwin Muilwijk the Netherland troops also witnessed the defection of French cuirassier officer. Wiegmans wrote: "he reported himself to Ltn.-Col. van Thielen, requesting to be brought to the Duke of Wellington."

Before the attack of the French Middle Guard, Wellington called back the 3rd Division and deployed behind the Britsh Guard. When Halket's redcoats fell back in a frightful confussion, Chasse's infantry attacked the leading echelon of the Middle Guard. Major van Delen wrote: "During the interval an English ADC ... came to Colonel Detmers, and brought him the order to place himself in the first line with 3 battalions. Whereupon the said colonel advanced by sections in column with the 35th Jagers, the 2nd Line, and the 4th Militia. He marched by the side of the side of the heights occupied by the English army.
These battalions advanced in a manner to be more or less sheltered against the musketry fire, leaving the bayonets alone exposed." Chasse brought up three remaining battalions. Now Ditmers' brigade was formed in line, behind Allies infantry.

Chasse spoke to the soldiers: "... you will leave the second line and go over to the first, stay calm, trust in my leadership ... the battle is not decided, but how pleasing it will be to you to have cooperated in the decision." According to Wiegmans General Chasse formed Ditmers' brigade "in closed columns per 6 divisions (companies), and arrived with the sixth battalion ... Now he rode off to the left wing of Ditmers' brigade, but soon returned to our sixth battalion, and called forcefully: Storm pace ! ..."

With drawn sword "General Bayonet" marched forward into the gap, which appeared between the Brunswickers and the 5th British brigade. He called upon the Dutchmen: "Forward colonel Detmers and charge with the bayonet !"

Chasse wrote: "... there were no troops, not a single man of the allies between my division and the French Guard ..." Wildly enthusiastic, drumming and shouting, with their shakos on the top of their bayonets they dashed into the fray cheering 'Long live the House of Orange! Long live the king !' The Guard was shattered by the sight of fresh forces, broke and fell back down the slope. Their panic spread to d'Erlon's infantry.

Several British authors described this action with a portion of jealousy "the Dutch-Belgians were merely chasing an already defeated battalion" etc. while other authors didn't even mention it. This attitude however did change in recent years, see for example Mark Adkin's "Waterloo Companion." Adkin described the Dutch/Belgian contribution to the defeatd of Middle Guard and his maps are very helpful.

Chasse's troops pursued the Middle Guard. Some of the fleeing guardsmen threw away knapsacks and bearskins and they took cover in the orchard by La Haye Sainte. Van Eysinga of 19th Militia Battalion wrote: "There they took a position and defended themselves in a way one could only expect of the noble French Guard; it grieved me to help destroy these brave troops ... At the mmoment we had cleared the orchard, French cuirassiers approached us in anger ..."

Detmers' brigade was among the first Wellington's troops who started the pursuit, "perhaps 10 to 15 minutes before the general advance was ordered by Wellington." (Source: "First Empire" # 86, publ. in UK in 2005)
Van Doren wrote: "The Guard, who could not resist this dogged attack, had to yield a second time for the bayonets of Chasse and give up the attack." Detmers' brigade continued pursuit, crossed the highway and French Grand Battery, where they didn't stop. They just went through the guns and ammunition wagons and followed the French.

Bijlandt's brigade of 2nd Netherland Division.
"At 12 o'clock ... Bijlandt's brigade ... moved farther back".
The position on forward slope was abandoned.

Perponcher's 2nd Division (incl. Bijlandt's brigade) was spread across Allies right wing. One of his units, the 27th Dutch Jagers, had been chosen to form the forward skirmishing line defending the entire left wing, from La Haye Sainte to Papelotte. (Barbero - "The Battle" p 127)

In the morning Bijlandt's brigade stood highly exposed, to 200 paces in advance of the British and German infantry. General Kempt write: "The first line was composed of Dutch and Belgian troops ... The second line was composed of the 8th and 9th Brigades under Major-General Pack and myself." General Perponcher was alarmed to find Bijlandt's brigade arrayed on the forward slope. Perponcher's chief-of-staff, Colonel van Zuylen van Nyeveldt reported: "At 12 o'clock the whole of the first brigade (Bijlandt's) and the artillery of the right wing moved farther back, in order no to hinder the evolutions of the English guns placed in their rear, and also to be less exposed to the fire of the enemy.
Crossing the sunken road, the brigade formed itself on the northern side of the road in the battle array as before, supported on its right and left by the English and Scottish troops, the guns in line with those of the English." Thus before the French heavy columns attacked the forward slope on Allies right wing was covered only by Dutch, Belgian, German and British skirmishers.

Sources disagree on what happened next with Bylandt's brigade:
during artillery cannonade

• British version: Bylandt's brigade was the only brigade in Wellington's army subjected to the full weight of artillery bombardement. In contrast the British brigades were deployed on reverse slope, at least 100 yards behind the crest, and invisible to the French gunners. David Chandler wrote: "... the unfortunate Dutch and Belgian troops of Bylandt ... suffered greviously from the fire of massed guns ... the exposed position of Bylandt must have been an oversight." (David Chandler - "Waterloo")
  According to Siborne, they showed "a considerable degree of unsteadiness."
  
• Netherland version: because Bylandt's brigade's flanks were not protected, Perponcher ordered on his own authority to move them back, behind the hedge line on the ridge. This movement was implemented around noon, approx. one hour before the French artillery opened fire. According to Lt. Scheltens and de Jongh (7th Line and 8th Militia), here they laid down in order to lessen the effects of the expected cannonade from the French Grand Battery. Col. van Zuylen van Nyevelt wrote: "At twelve o'clock the whole of the first brigade (Bijlandt) and the artillery of the right wing moved further back, in order not to hinder the evolutions of the English guns placed in their rear, and also to be less exposed to the [artillery] fire of the enemy. Crossing the sunken road, the brigade formed itself on the northern side of the road in battle array as before, supported on its right and left by the English and Scottish troops, the guns in line with those of the English."
  during the infantry fight
  
• British version: according to Siborne, they "fled in disarray at the first shots". The "Dutch-Belgians who either ran away before the enemy was within effective range, or were seized by panic without even seeing the French." (Jac Weller - "Wellington at Waterloo")
  
• Netherland version: according to witnesses and contemporary accounts (for example Ltn. Hope of 92nd Gordon Highlanders and Ltn. Henri Chrétien Scheltens of Dutch 7th Militia Btn.) Bylandt brigade engaged in close range volley fire with d'Erlons infantry at the hedgeline. According to these accounts the firefight was "protracted and effective" before the Dutch/Belgians fell back. "Having approach us to within 50 paces not a shot had been fired, but now the impatience of the soldiers could do no longer be restrained, and they greeted the enemy (French) with a double row." (Col. van Zuylen van Nyevelt, chief-of-staff of 2nd Division)
  Hope of 92nd Gordon Highlanders writes: "the Belgians ... returned the fire of the enemy for some time with great spirit," and they then "retired from the hedge". Scheltens of Bylandt's brigade and the author of "Souveniers d’un Grognard Belge" stated: "...our battalion opened fire as soon as our skirmishers had come in. The French column imprudently halted and began to deploy. We were at such close quarters ..." It was only after a series of firefights that Bylandt's forces eventually gave way and retreated through British line.

In Waterloo Ghigny's brigade was heavily engaged in the afternoon in numerous counter-attacks against cuirassiers. Despite losses suffered two days earlier at Quatre Bras, they performed far better than Wellington had perhaps anticipated.
"Ghigny's brigade did well in the early afternoon at Waterloo. Having moved forward from reserve near Mont St. Jean farm on his own initiative, Ghigny joined with Vandeleur's cavalry brigade to charge some of Jacquinot's lancers who had just badly mauled the British Union Brigade. Ghigny has described this action: 'We caused the whole of the cavalry which was in front of us, composed of lancers [Colonel's Bro's 4th Lancers], to retire until it reached the flank of a very numerous battalion formed in square. ... Ghigny then supported Vandeleur in covering the remains of the Union Brigade as it scrambled back to safety." (Adkin - "The Waterloo Companion" p 102)

After the British elite Household Brigade suffered heavy casualties in the hands of French cavalry, Tripp's brigade was the largest formation of heavy cavalry left. Tripp's heavies distinguished themselves against the French 7th and 12th Cuirassier Regiment. When the cuirassiers were ascending the slope in pursuit of the Household Brigade, Tripp's carabiniers charged. The two sides colided and the combat became general until the French withdrew down the slope. During battle the carabiniers counterattacked several times and had 2 out of its 3 regimental commanders hors de combat (!)

In contrast to Uxbridge's smearing the carabiniers, Wellington praised Tripp's brigade. Tripp's carabiniers also participated in the pursuit after battle, in contrast to majority of Uxbridge's brigades. According to two British officers, Seymour and Uxbridge, Tripp's Netherland cavalry brigade had no stomach to fight. That it refused to charge, and even had fled.
This is necessary to compare Uxbridge's statement with accounts from other nations. GM Jonkheer after action report: "After resting in this position, I noticed enemy's cuirassiers which were advancing to charge the English squares. I saw a perfect moment to charge the enemy and ordered the 1st Regiment of Carabiniers attack the enemy as they were disordered around the squares. After the charge there were numerous enemies dead and wounded left on the ground. At the moment when the 1st Regiment rallied, the enemy sent in a second charge, in this action there were more than one French cuirassier regiment. These were equally repulsed by the 2nd and 3rd Regiment, many cuirassiers were left in our hands."

There is much ridicule of the Netherland cavalry by British authors. If you believe them, the British cavalry - in contrast - was only too willing to charge. OK, but when at Waterloo officer Verners ordered the charge upon cuirassiers he soon discovered he was quite alone. The British hussars didn't follow him and he had to flee. There were more cases of cowardice.
(The 7th Hussar Regiment "Queen's Own" was the "embodiment of dash and panache". On June 17th at Genappe (in Belgium) Lord Uxbridge wanted to give them a "taste of glory" - the hussars charged but each charge "was not in the favor of the 7th Hussars. Finally the 7th Hussars refused to charge the French lancers." At Waterloo the hussars also didn't charge the lancers and also seem that they refused to charge into the flank of cuirassiers. At Genappe Uxbridge unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the British 11th Light Dragoon Regiment to charge in support of the 7th who were being driven back by French lancers. ("My address to these Light Dragoons not having been received with all the enthusiasm that I expected, I ordered them to clear the chausee and said, 'The Life Guard shall have this honour', and instantly sending for them." British authors don't dwell on these cases, instead their laser sharp focus is on the foreigners. In virtually every book about Waterloo are lengthy descriptions of how the Netherland cavalry refused to charge. They want you to believe that Allies army consisted of two extremely different types of soldiers, the Invincibles (the British) and the cowardly, unreliable Dutch and Belgians.)